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This thesis explores whether a specific group of large EU law firms exhibited multiple 
common behaviours regarding their EU geographies between 1998 and 2009. These 
potentially common behaviours included their preferences for trading in certain EU 
locations, their usage of law firm alliances, and the specific reasons why they 
opened or closed EU branch offices. If my hypothesis is confirmed, this may indicate 
that certain aspects of large law firm geography are predictable – a finding potentially 
of interest to various stakeholders globally, including legal regulators, academics and 
law firms. 
 
In testing my hypothesis, I have drawn on research conducted by the Globalization 
and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network to assist me. Between 1999 and 2010, 
the GaWC published seven research papers exploring the geographies of large US 
and UK law firms. Several of the GaWC’s observations arising from these studies 
were evidence-based; others were speculative – including a novel approach for 
explaining legal practice branch office change, not adopted in research conducted 
previously or subsequently. By distilling the GaWC’s key observations these papers 
into a series of “sub-hypotheses”, I been able to test whether the geographical 
behaviours of my novel cohort of large EU law firms reflect those suggested by the 
GaWC. The more the GaWC’s suggested behaviours are observed among my 
cohort, the more my hypothesis will be supported. In conducting this exercise, I will 
additionally evaluate the extent to which the GaWC’s research has aided our 
understanding of large EU law firm geography.  
 
Ultimately, my findings broadly support most of the GaWC’s observations, 
notwithstanding our cohort differences and the speculative nature of several of the 
GaWC’s propositions. My investigation has also allowed me to refine several of the 
GaWC’s observations regarding commonly-observable large law firm geographical 
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1.1 - Introduction 
In recent decades, large law firms around the world have undergone a profound 
transformation. In numerous countries, the nation’s largest legal practices have 
increased their lawyer headcounts (Daniels, 1993, p147; Galanter and Palay, 1993, 
p146 - 155; Schack, 1993, p198 - 199; Abel, 1993 - 1995, p826 - 836; Gromek-Broc, 
2002, p125; Bruinsma, 2005, p85; Galanter and Roberts, 2008, p148) – sometimes 
(Nelson, 1988, p44 - 47) by more than 1,000 per cent. These developments have 
given rise to terms such as “megalawyering” (Galanter, 1983; Flood, 1996) and “big 
law” (Ribstein, 2010).  
 
In terms of large law firm geography – the focus of this thesis – market dynamism is 
also evident. In the past few decades, large law firms in various countries have 
grown their domestic branch office networks (Lynch and Meyer, 1992, p57 - 64; 
Daniels, 1993, p147 - 206; Abel, 1993 – 1995, p801 – 805; Baker and Parkin, 2005 - 
2006, p1650). Some, but not all (Sassen, 1991, p62), have also expanded 
internationally. Research suggests Europe is a favoured international expansion 
destination, notably among large US (Chapman and Tauber, 1994 - 1995, p944 - 
945; Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p103; Silver, 2000, p1109 – 1114; Thomas, 
Schwab et al., 2001 - 2002, p147) and UK legal practices (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
1999, p1869). Indeed, specific EU legal markets – notably Germany – have rapidly 
evolved from being largely ignored by such firms (Goebel, 1988 - 1989, p468 - 469) 
to becoming inward investment hot spots (Aronson, 2007, p800) – thereby impacting 
on the employment of thousands of lawyers. In light of this market dynamism, and for 
the additional reasons I shall set out on p88-92, this thesis will explore the evolving 
EU geographies of large EU law firms. 
 
In light of the significant geographical changes outlined above, one might assume 
that a substantial body of research now exists, explaining the transformation of the 
EU legal market – especially given that many geographical developments involving 
large EU law firm are reported in the legal trade press. However, as my literature 
review in chapter two will elaborate, such research has not materialised to any 
significant extent. We therefore currently have a rich source of “news” regarding EU 
legal practice geography, but also a limited, and partial, pool of academic analysis of 
the same issue. My investigation aims to mitigate against this knowledge dichotomy. 
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1.2. Aims and objectives 
Legal practice geography is a broad topic. However, the focus of this thesis is 
narrow. The objective of my research is to test my overarching hypothesis, which 
specifically relates to large EU law firm geography. My overarching hypothesis 
recognises the heterogeneous natures of individual EU legal markets, and the often 
heterogeneous geographies of large law firms operating within them (Pinnington and 
Gray, 2007, p158 - 164). Nevertheless, it also proposes that large EU law firms, 
operating in various different EU states, collectively appear to adhere to a limited 
number of identifiable patterns of geographical behaviours. Patterns of geographical 
behaviours may, for example, be observable in relation to the locations where large 
EU law firms do, or do not, operate branch offices at certain times. And, on a related 
point, patterns of behaviour may also exist in relation to these firms’ usage of 
alliances with other EU legal practices, which often supplement firms’ own EU 
branch office networks. It may also be possible to identify patterns of behaviour 
regarding the processes by which large EU law firms decide to undergo geographical 
change. Firstly, it may be possible to identify key common elements which, 
collectively, form the essence of such firms’ overarching geographical strategies. 
Secondly, and at a more granular level, it may also be possible to identify which 
specific factors repeatedly prompt large EU law firms to alter their branch office 
coverage in various EU locations. 
 
The notion that large law firms may collectively exhibit patterns of geographical 
behaviour is not pure speculation on my part. Rather, my overarching hypothesis 
appears to be supported by research undertaken by the Globalization and World 
Cities Research Network (GaWC) between 1999 and 2010. During this time, various 
GaWC authors published seven research papers exploring law firm geography, on 
either a legal sector-specific basis (Beaverstock, Smith et al, 1999, p1869 – 1873; 
Beaverstock, Smith et al, 2000, 95 – 120), or in comparison with other “advanced 
producer services” (APS) sectors (Beaverstock, Taylor et al, 1999, p450). Crucially, 
as I shall explain in my literature review, in these papers, the GaWC authors 
repeatedly suggested that certain patterns of large law firm geographical behaviour 
might exist. Helpfully, the patterns of behaviour identified by the GaWC closely relate 
to my own research interests: large law firms’ branch office locations, the nature of 
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large law firms’ inter-practice alliances, and the reasons why large law firms change 
their branch office geographies. 
 
In light of the GaWC’s research, one might wonder why my study is necessary. 
However, I suggest my investigation would aid our understanding of large EU law 
firm geography for several reasons. 
 
Firstly, the GaWC’s findings, indicating patterns of large law firm branch office / 
alliance behaviours have not – to date – been tested for replicability by reference to 
a novel, but equivalent, cohort of large legal practices. Indeed, several law firm 
geography-related papers (Aronson, 2007; Pinnington and Gray, 2007; Luschin, 
2010) published after the GaWC’s earlier works do not cite the group’s research, still 
less evaluate its findings. My study will, by contrast, undertake such an evaluation. 
Further, existing research indicates that law firms operating in various countries have 
been geographically active and / or expansive (Abel, 1993 – 1995; Daniels, 1993, 
p157 – 160; Morgan and Quack, 2005, p1772 – 1780; Aronson, 2007, p798 – 822; 
Pinnington and Gray, p158 – 162; Luschin, 2010, p66 – 82) for many years. 
However, in common with various earlier studies (Crabb, 1983, p1767; Warf and 
Wije, 1991; Lynch and Meyer, 1992; Flood, 1996, p187 - 200), the GaWC explored 
law firm geography only through the prism of large US and UK law firms (from now 
on, I shall collectively refer to such practices as “AS” – i.e. Anglo Saxon – firms). The 
GaWC’s rationale in focusing on such practices is understandable – they comprised 
a substantial percentage of the world’s “top” law firms (Beaverstock, Taylor et al, 
1999, p453 – 454). However, because no attempt has since been made to test the 
replicability of GaWC’s findings, it is currently unclear whether these findings are 
also applicable to other cohorts of large, geographically active, legal practices. My 
results, revealed from p128 onwards, will address this uncertainly – at least in 
relation to large EU law firms.  
 
I shall explain my cohort sampling in my methods chapter, from p87 onwards. Briefly, 
however, my sample group will not only include large AS firms, but also large firms 
“indigenous” to the various EU states I will evaluate, together with large 
“multidisciplinary (MDP) / conglomerate” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, 
p466) legal practices – a type of firm the GaWC erroneously (Martin, 2007, p187 – 
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188; Luschin, 2010, p66 – 82, p82 – 87) stated had “effectively died out with the 
Enron scandal” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p466).  
 
If my findings suggest the GaWC’s discoveries are replicable within my cohort, this 
would indicate the possibility that collective law firm geographical behaviours may –
to a limited extent – be predictable. If supported, such a finding could prompt future 
researchers to try to predict how the collective geographies of large law firms might 
evolve if, for example, a legal market undergoes law firm branch office liberalisation. 
To explain: historically (Schack, 1993, p195 – 196; Rogowski, 1995, p123 – 124; 
Schultz, 2005, p106), but also more recently in certain jurisdictions (Matsutani, 
2012), law firms have been subject to regulatory limitations regarding the locations in 
which they can trade. Where liberalisation has occurred, research indicates that 
large law firm geography can be transformed, sometimes within a short time period 
(Abel, 1993 – 1995, p801 – 802). Helpfully, as my literature review will elaborate, my 
study explores the evolving geographies of large EU law firms at a time when the EU 
liberalised rules governing foreign law firm branch office establishment. And, while 
the dynamics between this particular liberalisation and my cohort firms’ branch office 
changes are not central to this thesis, I will briefly explore some of the effects of this 
changing regulatory environment in my literature review and results. The ability to 
predict how large law firms may collectively alter their branch office networks in a 
given location, based on past liberalisation experience, would – potentially – be 
useful to numerous stakeholders, including legal regulators, law firms and 
academics. Indeed, a small number of scholars have briefly debated whether 
parallels should be drawn, and lessons learned, from past experiences when 
considering the likely impact of future liberalisations in legal markets such as 
Shanghai (Luschin, 2010, p29) or South Korea (John, 2012, p237 – 282).  
 
Further, and regardless of whether patterns of legal practice geographical behaviour 
are ultimately identified within my cohort, my findings will add to the existing body of 
economic geography research. In recent years, various studies have mapped, and 
often compared, the geographies of large entities across a wide range of sectors, 
including global media (Krätke, and Taylor, 2004, p459 – 477) and energy 
companies (Toly, Bouteliger et al, 2012, p289 – 306), and both intergovernmental 
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(Knox, 1995, p237 – 239) and non-governmental (Taylor, 2004, p95 – 100) 
organisations. Because my research use a different cohort of large law firms to the 
GaWC, and then compares my findings with theirs, it is hoped that my findings will 
encourage future researchers to investigate intra-sector, as well as inter-sector, 
geographical similarities and differences.  
 
In relation to the GaWC’s explanations regarding the reasons why large law firms 
change their branch office geographies, it should be appreciated that the reasons the 
GaWC identified were accompanied by little (Beaverstock, Smith et al, 1999, p1859 
– 1862) or no (Beaverstock, 2004, p165; Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, 
p464 – 465) supporting evidence or analysis. Often, the reasons offered were 
throwaway comments, which were not then discussed further. Unfortunately, I am 
not aware of any follow-up academic studies, which has tested each of the individual 
reasons for legal practice geographical change suggested by the GaWC. The lack of 
follow-up research regarding the GaWC’s explanations is perplexing, given that the 
majority of the GaWC explanations are, themselves, derived from a model produced 
by Dunning (1989, p30) in the late 1980s. I therefore suggest it is high time the 
GaWC / Dunning model was subject to systematic academic scrutiny. My research 
will undertake this exercise. 
 
My second reason for wanting to evaluate the GaWC / Dunning explanation for legal 
practice geographical change is that, conceptually, it has a novelty within legal sector 
research. Crucially, the GaWC / Dunning explanatory model assumes that law firms 
change their branch office geographies for a variety of reasons, which can 
nevertheless be defined and categorised. Superficially, such a proposition appears 
unremarkable. However, to date, various studies which have explored the drivers of 
large law firm geographical change – discussed in my literature review – have 
typically viewed the issue through the prism of a single causal explanation, such as 
client demand (Cullen-Mandikos and MacPherson, 2002, p491 – 499), regulatory 
liberalisation (Struble, 2011, p111 - 132) or law firm profitability (Sherer, 2007, p162 
– 185). If I can demonstrate that the GaWC’s proposition regarding a multiplicity of 
identifiable geographical change drivers is plausible, this alternative approach may 
help explain why some of the “single explanation”-focused studies have yielded 
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ambiguous results which even the studies’ authors have struggled to explain (Brock, 
Yaffe et al, 2006, p169). Furthermore, if my findings support the GaWC’s various 
granular explanations for legal practice geographical change, this opens up the 
prospect that future researchers may be able to identify hierarchies of importance 
regarding those granular explanations. Indeed, this line of enquiry has already been 
pursued in other business sectors (O’Farrell, Wood et al., 1996, p112; Roberts, 
1998, p195). Undertaking a preliminary “proof of concept” evaluation in a legal 
sector-specific setting would therefore appear to be a worthwhile exercise.  
 
The final reasons why I believe it is important to re-evaluate the GaWC’s research is 
that, in doing so, I will be able to identify significant omissions from the GaWC’s 
findings, which might be relevant to my overarching hypothesis – that limited 
patterns of large legal practice geographical behaviour might be observable between 
law firms and legal markets. Having signposted throughout my study that the 
GaWC’s research is a potentially important source of understanding of large EU law 
firm geography, I suggest my evaluation should also identify, and describe, what 
appear to be the most significant patterns of law firm geographical behaviour which 
the GaWC’s research appears to have missed. Indeed, from the outset of my 
investigation, my previous experience as a journalist on The European Lawyer has 
led me to believe that an important commonality of behaviours appears to be missing 
from the GaWC’s research: the existence of law firm geographical strategy as a 
driver of branch office change in its own right, separate from – but related to – the 
reasons why law firms change their branch office geographies in specific locations. 
Anecdotally, my previous journalistic writings suggests that large EU law firms do 
have overarching geographical strategies (Parnham, 2002, p14; Parnham, 2003b, 
p16 – 29; Parnham, 2005a, p52;). Furthermore, as I will explain in more detail on 
p51 onwards, the limited pool of services / professional services globalisation 
literature indicates it may be possible to identify common components that, 
collectively, form the essence of such strategies. However, because I am not aware 
of any research – GaWC or otherwise – which had sought to test this idea in a law 
firm-specific setting, I believed it would be useful for me to explore this issue. 
 
An incidental outcome of my research is that it should be possible to distinguish 
between large EU law firm geographical behaviours which are broadly replicable 
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across a diverse cohort of large legal practices, and those which are cohort – or 
even firm – specific. I suggest both research outcomes would be useful for any future 
researchers seeking to explore my findings further. Where my findings differ from 
those of the GaWC, this will indicate where firms’ collective – or individual – 
geographical behaviours appear idiosyncratic. My research will therefore aim to 
identify the nature of such idiosyncratic behaviours. Future researchers may wish to 
explore such behaviours more deeply, simply because they appear individualistic. By 
contrast, where different cohorts of law firms can repeatedly be observed exhibiting 
behaviours indicated by the GaWC and others, this would suggest a degree of 
predictability regarding these practices’ geographies – at least in relation to large UK, 
US and EU law firms. This finding would, in turn, pave the way for future researchers 
to further test the replicability of these findings in other legal markets. 
 
Given that my overarching hypothesis proposes that limited patterns of geographical 
behaviour might be observable between large EU law firms, how does my PhD title 
relate to this hypothesis? My thesis title, by way of reminder, is: To what extent has 
research conducted by the GaWC Research Network aided our understanding of 
large EU law firm geography. In fact, there is a clear link between my hypothesis and 
my research question. For the majority of my investigation, I shall evaluate the 
GaWC’s research in the following way: in my literature review, I shall first synthesise 
the GaWC’s more significant, and empirically-based, suggested patterns of 
geographical behaviour into nine “sub”-hypotheses. I will then subject these sub-
hypotheses to a preliminary evaluation, assisted by non-GaWC academic studies 
which have explored similar issues. In my results, I will then further test each 
individual sub- hypothesis by reference to observed behaviours of a novel cohort of 
large EU law firms of my own design. I shall also undertake a similar exercise in 
relation to the GaWC’s multi-faceted explanation of why large law firms undergo 
geographical change, which was offered on a more speculative basis. In my 
literature review regarding sub-hypothesis 11, I will assess every component of the 
GaWC’s multifaceted explanation by reference to non-GaWC academic studies 
which have explored similar issues. In my results, I shall then further evaluate these 
individual GaWC explanations by reference to the explanations offered by my novel 
cohort of large EU law firms when discussing their own geographical change events. 
Finally, where my own prior knowledge, together with my wider reading of the 
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existing services / professional services literature, suggests the GaWC’s research 
contains a notable omission regarding possible patterns of law firm geographical 
behaviour, an additional sub- hypotheses (hypothesis 10) will be formulated, derived 
from this wider reading. Testing whether my novel cohort of large EU law firms tend 
to behave in a manner consistent with the behaviours indicated in this wider pool of 
research will allow me to evaluate this hypothesis in its own right. In doing so, I will 
also be able to assess whether the GaWC’s research does contain a notable 
omission regarding possible patterns of legal practice geographical behaviour. 
Ultimately, by testing the replicability of each of the key geographical behaviours 
suggested by the GaWC, I will be able to evaluate the extent to which the GaWC’s 
research has aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography. Nevertheless, 
it should be appreciated that I am using the GaWC’s research as a vehicle for testing 
my overarching hypothesis, rather than as an end in itself.  
 
1.3. Conclusions 
This short introduction has illustrated the need for my study. Firstly, the limited pool 
of existing academic research suggests that large law firms in various jurisdictions 
have altered their geography dramatically in recent years – thus impacting on 
various legal markets, and on the careers of thousands of lawyers. But, despite this 
market dynamism, only a small number of academic studies have explored this issue 
specifically – particularly in relation to the EU legal market. Further, even where 
research has been undertaken, which suggests patterns of geographical behaviour 
might be observable among large law firms, it is currently unclear whether those 
patterns of behaviour are also applicable to large law firms that are not regarded as 
being of US or UK heritage, such as EU law firms. Thus, our understanding of this 
issue is currently partial. In addition, it is currently unclear within existing research 
whether law firms of any description alter their branch office geographies for singular 
or multiple reasons – and, indeed, if law firms even have overarching geographical 
strategies. For the reasons I will elaborate in my literature review in the following 
chapter, the GaWC’s research appears to serve as a useful conceptual framework 
for my investigation. However, in light of the ongoing uncertainty regarding so many 
aspects of large law firm geography – including the GaWC’s own findings and 
suggestions – I suggest further academic research into this issue is warranted. 
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2.1. Introduction 
The substantive part of this literature review contains five sections. The first briefly 
compares the scale of the GaWC’s research output with that of the wider body of 
(non socio-legal research) which explores services / professional services 
geography. This, in turn, is followed by a short discussion of two alternative 
theoretical frameworks I considered to guide my investigation, together with my 
reasons for ultimately rejecting them. The purpose of this section is to explain my 
preference for using the GaWC’s research as my theoretical framework, as I sought 
to test my previously-discussed overarching hypothesis. This chapter’s second 
substantive section discusses which elements of the GaWC’s research is central to 
my literature review, and why. The third section briefly discussed how I will use a 
wider pool of professional services sector-focused globalisation research, which 
collectively indicates that patterns of geographical behaviours may exist within my 
cohort – notwithstanding that the research does not discuss law firm geography. This 
literature is particularly useful to my evaluation of whether the GaWC’s research 
contains a potentially significant omission regarding possible patterns of large EU 
geographical behaviour. The forth – and much longer – section of my literature 
review focuses on my formulation of 11 sub-hypotheses regarding patterns of 
geographical behaviours I expect my cohort large EU law firms to exhibit, in light of 
the findings of the GaWC and others. (Effectively, each of my sub-hypotheses 
facilitates the testing of my overarching hypothesis, but at a more granular level). 
Fifthly, section 2.5.1.,offers an overview of law firm geographical research conducted 
by the GaWC and others which does not ultimately result in hypotheses formation. 
While this research is helpful in framing our expectations regarding my cohort firms’ 
likely EU branch office geographies, this research also indicates that some elements 
of law firm geography may be cohort-specific. As a result, commonalities of 
behaviours between my various samples are not expected. This evidence is not 
problematic for my overarching hypothesis, which does not assume that all large law 
firm geographical behaviours are common between practices and markets. 
 
2.2.1. The GaWC’s analysis – one of the most substantive bodies of work in a 
lightly-studied area of research 
Previously, I commented that my literature gathering had only uncovered a small 
body of socio-legal research which had explored large law firm geography. The 
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insubstantial and fragmented nature of this research led me to select the GaWC’s 
research as my theoretical framework. Objectively, the seven GaWC papers I will 
evaluate in this literature review do not sound like a substantial body of research. 
However, multiple analyses of the research output of leading business research 
journals suggest it may be. Illustrating this point, Netland and Alfnes’ (2007) analysis 
of the research output of seven research journals between 1999 and 2005 (p6) 
identified just 31 papers which explored the internationalisation of service firms – and 
a mere nine which related to professional services specifically (p12 - 13). (Indeed, 
this literature review will evaluate several papers identified by Netland and Alfnes 
which I regarded as useful to my investigation). Broadly similar findings were 
uncovered in Merchant and Gaur’s (2008) investigation, which explored the output of 
four research journals between 2003 and 2007 (p381). This study found that, of the 
654 papers published in their cohort journals, just 44 focused on the non-
manufacturing sector alone (p383). And, of those with an overtly legal focus, the only 
issue explored was Islamic finance (p389) – a subject irrelevant to my study. Of 
course, both Netland and Alfnes’ and Merchant and Gaur’s analyses were small-
scale, involved a limited number of publications, and explored short time periods. 
Therefore, we cannot objectively conclude that no research has been undertaken 
regarding professional services globalisation in recent years. However, these 
authors’ findings closely reflect my own research journey, when I struggled to identify 
a body of research comparable to the GaWC’s output.   
 
Within the wider body of globalisation research, it has been claimed that Dunning’s 
(1988) eclectic paradigm has, for more than two decades, become the dominant 
analytical framework for testing the causes of foreign direct investment and foreign 
activities of multinational enterprises (Dunning, 2000, p163). Essentially, this theory 
suggests organisations will become transnational if they can obtain “ownership”, 
“locational” and “internationalisation” (OLI) advantages from doing so. And, as I 
briefly mentioned in my introduction, in 1989, Dunning sought to extend the scope of 
his theory beyond its manufacturing origins to encompass the services sector. In 
doing so, he suggested a range of OLI advantages across 21 service sectors – 
including law (Dunning, 1989, p30). Yet, while the GaWC has since endorsed 
(Beaverstock, 2004, p164 - 166; Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p464 - 
465) Dunning’s law-specific OLI explanations for geographical change, this concept 
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has not been used to any significant extent by scholars who have examined law firm 
geography in the quarter of a century since it was published. Indeed, I am aware of 
just two pieces of research which have since – even vaguely – drawn on Dunning’s 
ideas. The first study involved 43 Taiwanese law firms, several of which were very 
small (22 firms employed less than three lawyers) (Chang, Chuang et al., 1998). This 
raises questions about whether any lessons can be learned from this study, given 
that many western law firms are far larger. More importantly, because none of the 
Taiwanese firms surveyed operated any foreign offices, the study instead examined 
their cohort practices’ motivations for collaborating with foreign law firms – a strategy 
which is arguably the antithesis of Dunning’s “ownership” advantage. The second 
law-related study was conducted by Nachum (1999), who explored whether certain 
countries were endowed with a competitive advantage in relation to their 
professional services sectors, based on their supply of qualified employees. 
However, because this short paper explored five different professional services, its 
legal sector analysis was brief.  
 
As a possible theoretical framework for studying law firm geography, Dunning’s 
eclectic paradigm has potential. It does, after all, propose a defined set of legal-
sector specific drivers of geographical change, which my cohort of large EU law firms 
may commonly cite when explaining their own geographical change decisions. 
However, because almost no substantive, law-specific, research appears to have 
used it, it is therefore a less attractive proposition to guide my research than the 
GaWC’s more extensive research output. Moreover, and unlike the GaWC’s 
research, Dunning’s writings offer no guidance regarding what patterns of branch 
office behaviours I might expect to observe within my sample group – one of my 
main areas of interest. Further, and as will become clear during my literature review, 
some of the law-specific explanations for geographical change suggested by 
Dunning (1989, p30) are often ambiguous, sometimes at variance with those offered 
by scholars who have explored the issue more deeply in a legal sector-specific 
context, or only offer a superficial explanation of a possible factor which legal sector-
specific research suggests that, in reality, is more nuanced. However, in light of the 
GaWC’s endorsement of Dunning (Beaverstock, 2004, p164 - 166; Faulconbridge, 
Beaverstock et al., 2008, p464 - 465), I have decided to explore the factors which 
Dunning identifies as possible drivers of legal practice geographical change as part 
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of my analysis of whether the GaWC’s explanations are replicated by my large EU 
law firm cohort. However, my literature review will not include an evaluation of the 
eclectic paradigm concept in its own right. 
 
According to Netland and Alfnes’ (2007) analysis of the four research journals they 
evaluated, the most popular geography-related research theme within the services 
sector literature between 1999 and 2005 was market entry strategy. However, this 
subject was explored in a mere nine of the 31 research papers they identified which 
explored any facet of services sector internationalisation (p14). And, in terms of 
professional services research specifically, Rosenbaum and Madsen’s (2012) review 
of existing literature regarding such firms’ modes of entry over the past 20 years 
(conducted on a keyword rather than a publication basis) yielded just 14 empirical 
articles which explored this subject, of which several did so only marginally. Further, 
just three of those studies involved law firms (p1656 - 1659) – two of which will be 
discussed in this thesis in any event. 
 
Like Netland and Alfnes’ (2007, p17) findings, my own research journey indicated 
that one of the most popular theoretical frameworks for exploring market entry 
across the services sector as a whole was the classic form of the “Uppsala model” – 
or “stage theory” – developed by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) in the mid-
1970s. Briefly, in the classic version of this theory, firms internationalise via four 
different stages: no regular export activities; export via an agent; sales subsidiaries; 
local production / manufacturing (p307). This theoretical framework has since been 
used to explore the internationalisation of both specific service sectors (Bell, 1995; 
Coviello and Munro, 1997; Boojihawon, 2007; Cheung and Leung, 2007; McQuillan, 
Mangematin et al., 2013) and also service sectors in comparison with each other 
(Erramilli, 1991; Roberts, 1999). Within English language academic research it has 
even been used – just twice, so far as I can establish – to assess the 
internationalisation strategies of law firms (Freeman, Cray et al., 2007; Bocconcelli 
and Pagano, 2013). Oddly – given that local “production” is the ultimate end point of 
stage theory – both of these studies involved elements where law firms were seeking 
to extend their reach into countries where foreign law firms were effectively banned 
from operating. As such, these locations were unhelpful focal points of investigation. 
Thus, these studies have limited value to my investigation.  
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More importantly, one of stage theory’s key components does not appear relevant in 
the legal sector. To explain: the second key element of Johanson and Wiedersheim-
Paul’s (1975) classic version of stage theory assumes firms will typically expand – at 
least initially – into locations which are not psychically distant from their own (p307 – 
308). Factors the authors claim might determine psychic distance include 
geographical distance, differences in language, culture, political systems, levels of 
education, or level of industrial development. The authors suggest psychic distance 
is correlated with geographical distance, but “exceptions are easy to find”. For 
example, “some countries in the British Commonwealth are far apart geographically, 
e.g. England and Australia, but for different reasons they are near to each other in 
terms of psychic distance.” The authors then offer the example of the US, which is 
psychically close to Cuba but also politically distant (p308). However, research 
conducted by both GaWC and socio-legal scholars suggests AS law firms pay scant 
regard to psychic distance in relation to the international locations in which they 
operate. Certainly, the UK – a rich, English-speaking, common law jurisdiction is a 
popular expansion destination for US law firms – but so are various geographically 
distant and linguistically different world regions, including mainland Europe, the 
Middle East and the Pacific Rim (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1873; Warf, 
2001, p403 - 404; Thomas, Schwab et al., 2001 - 2002, p147; Silver, Phelan et al., 
2009, p1446 - 1448). Further, US firms’ preference for these locations stands in 
contrast with their historically lesser (or non-existent) collective presences in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, for example. Past research into the geographies of 
UK law firms indicates a similar disregard for psychic distance in relation to the initial 
preferences for their international offices. This research shows London law firms 
clearly favouring Mainland Europe, the Middle East and Pacific Rim countries as 
expansion destinations (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1869; Pinnington and 
Gray, 2007, p162). Further, this research also shows that, during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, such firms also all-but ignored Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
Ireland – an English speaking, prosperous common law jurisdiction physically 
attached to the UK. Finally, further research suggests cross-border Australian law 
firms have historically traded in foreign locations that might be regarded as 
psychically distant (Freeman and Sandwell, 2008, p204 - 205) from their own legal 
cultures – typically preferring to open offices in the Asian Pacific region (Pinnington 
and Gray, 2007, p162) rather than the US, Canada, the UK, Africa or New Zealand. 
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Given these geographical behaviours among AS (and Australian) law firms, one has 
to ask: why explore possible patterns of law firm geographical behaviour among a 
new cohort of legal practices from the perspective of stage theory / Uppsala model, if 
you have significant doubts regarding the applicability of one of its core components 
– psychic distance – to the legal sector? 
 
2.2.2. Conclusions 
The eclectic paradigm and the Uppsala model / stage theory were just two 
conceptual frameworks I considered in relation to my study, before settling on the 
GaWC’s approach. None of the frameworks I reviewed – including the GaWC’s – 
were ideal. However, the GaWC’s research had the advantage of being a) closely 
related to my own area of interest – exploring possible patterns of law firm 
geographical behaviour; b) viable, within the scope of a thesis; c) contained 
elements that appeared plausible, in light of the limited legal sector-specific 
academic research previously undertaken. For these reasons, I decided to conduct 
my investigation of law firm geography using the GaWC’s research to guide me.  
 
2.3.1. The GaWC’s research which forms the basis of my hypothesis formation 
Earlier, I stated that the GaWC’s research included seven law-related research 
papers between 1999 and 2010. In fact, the GaWC produced several additional 
papers during this time, partly derived from their legal sector research. However, 
these additional studies are not included in my hypotheses formation because their 
findings focused on the aggregated activities of multiple advanced producer service 
(APS) sectors, and therefore did not yield legal-sector specific insights (Taylor and 
Hoyler, 2000; Derudder, Taylor et al., 2010). I have also not drawn on GaWC studies 
where APS geography is used to explore issues unrelated to my thesis, such as the 
“power” of cities (Taylor, Walker et al.). However, it is noteworthy that, even within 
the seven-strong pool of GaWC papers which explore law firm geography explicitly, 
the authors pursue two research agendas, only one of which is directly relevant to 
my investigation. In one pool of GaWC research, the authors treat the geographies 
of AS law firms as central to their investigation. In these papers, various 
observations regarding apparent commonalities of law firm geographical behaviours 
are made, in light of novel AS law firm branch office geographical data the group 
collected and analysed. My investigation will explore these GaWC findings and 
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related theories directly, and test whether they appear applicable to my own cohort 
of – less AS-focused – large EU law firms. By contrast, in another pool of GaWC 
research, the authors use the branch office geographies of law firms – and other 
APS sector practices – as a proxy tool (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p49 - 59) for 
exploring inter-city linkages: a concept described as the “world city networks” 
(Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p123-134; Taylor, Catalana et al., 2002). This 
research agenda has proved controversial, with some scholars questioning the 
assumptions that lie behind inter-city connectivities (Robinson, 2005) and also the 
methods for measuring them (Nordlund, 2004; Hennemann and Derudder, 2014; 
Neal, 2014; Parnreiter, 2014). Indeed, one of the original GaWC authors (Richard 
Smith) has recently stated there is no such thing as a world city network (Smith and 
Doel, 2011, p33). However, several of these GaWC studies indicate possible 
patterns of law firm geographical behaviour potentially relevant to my study, 
notwithstanding their contested assumptions and method. I have therefore drawn on 
the GaWC’s high level findings in these studies to help develop four of my 
hypotheses. However, I shall not use their research method. Where possible, I have 
also identified comparable research from the socio-legal field – often also involving 
AS legal practices – which indicates similar geographical behaviours among large 
law firms. This interdisciplinary cross-checking means I have some confidence that I 
should expect my own cohort to exhibit similar geographical behaviours to those 
suggested by the GaWC’s research. 
 
2.3.2. Conclusions 
The GaWC did not fully explore all of the issues I will discuss in this thesis – 
particularly relating to the reasons why large law firms change their geography over 
time – due to its varied research focus. Nevertheless, by adopting the socio-legal 
cross-checking approach discussed above, I aim to obtain the maximum value out of 
the GaWC’s research to assist me with the development of the majority of my sub-
hypotheses.  
 
2.4.1. Using (non-legal sector specific) services-related globalisation literature 
to assist with my evaluation of the GaWC’s research 
The majority of my hypotheses were formulated by reference to the GaWC’s 
research. These hypotheses were then subject to an initial evaluation by reference to 
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non-GaWC studies which explored similar issues. But what happens where I wish to 
test for a possible pattern of legal practice geographical activity, where no GaWC or 
other English-language research appears to exist, to assist with my hypothesis 
formation? In such situations, is it appropriate to draw on a wider pool of 
globalisation literature – particularly research involving other “professional services” 
(Nordenflycht, 2010, p156)? After much consideration, I have decided that I should, 
but only to a limited extent. This is because, as various scholars have observed, 
different professional services appear to have their own industry-specific 
geographical behaviours and drivers (Løwendahl, 2000, p151). Such a claim is 
plausible, in light of research which suggests that different APS sectors have sharply 
differing scales of branch office geographies (Novelle and Stanback, 1988; Malhotra 
and Morris, 2009, p898; Tether, Li et al., 2012, p986 - 989), can adopt differing 
organisation forms when globalising (Baden-Fuller, 1993, p102 - 103; Greenwood 
and Empson, 2003, p910 - 912), and have distinctive geographical preferences 
regarding where they trade (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p451 - 455; Taylor, 
Catalana et al., 2004; Hassens, Derudder et al., 2011). Indeed, even if one explores 
one factor which might be considered commonly relevant to all professional services 
– client demand – research suggests this factor may geographically manifest itself in 
sector-specific ways, due to differences in sectoral norms regarding client contact. 
For example, in some sectors – such as accounting / audit (Løwendahl, 2000, p158; 
Malhotra and Morris, 2009, p914) or advertising (Leslie, 1995, p404; Faulconbridge, 
Beaverstock et al., 2011, p6 - 7) – it may be sensible to operate a large number of 
branch offices, because regular client contact is required. However, in other 
professional service sectors – notably architecture – it may be possible to deliver a 
global service from one centralised location (Winch, Grèzes et al., 2002, p170 - 171; 
Faulconbridge, 2009, p2539 - 2541). Meanwhile, in the engineering sector, it has 
been suggested that firms often operate from their clients’ own premises (Pflanz, 
2013, p560) rather than opening branch offices. Further, where an office is required, 
it will be project-specific, and closed once the project is complete (Krull, Smith et al., 
2012, p1106 - 1107).  
 
2.4.2. Conclusions 
In light of the apparently sector-specific behaviours outlined above, I have concluded 
that it would be unwise to simply transpose geographical behavioural assumptions, 
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as discussed in one body of professional services globalisation literature, to my own 
law firm-centred, study. I have therefore only done where there is a lack of any legal-
sector specific research to guide my hypothesis development – as happened in 
relation to hypotheses 10, discussed from 51 onwards.   
 
2.5.1. Understanding the extent of cross-border large legal practice geography: 
insights offered by GaWC and other scholars 
In my introduction, I commented that the EU legal market was a significant centre of 
legal practice inward investment by AS law firms. However, this section of my 
literature review serves as a “reality check” regarding the extent to which large law 
firms generally appear to operate on a cross-border basis. The research findings 
discussed below are too diverse to allow me to formulate specific sub-hypotheses to 
test for possible commonalities of geographical behaviours within my cohort. 
Nevertheless, the varieties of behaviours this research uncovers are interesting, and 
will be tested for – to a limited degree – on p131 onwards. Moreover, these findings 
also help contextualise several of the sub-hypotheses which follow. 
 
Two GaWC papers, The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857 
- 1876) and the Geographies of Globalization: United States Law firms in world cities 
(Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p95 - 120) help set the scene regarding the scale of 
my cohort firms’ typical foreign branch office networks. In The long arm of the law, 
the GaWC researchers presented the total number of overseas offices operated by 
the top 30 London law firms, as set out in the 1996 – 1997 Chambers & Partners 
legal directory (p1863). Although the authors did not analyse these findings, they are 
instructive. The GaWC’s research reveals that, while one firm – Baker & McKenzie – 
traded in 54 overseas locations at that time, most other sample law firms operated a 
noticeably smaller international branch office network: the mean number of foreign 
offices across this cohort was 7.62, the median five and the mode just one. A broadly 
similar pattern of international branch office stratification was uncovered in 
Geographies of Globalization, a GaWC paper which explored the geographical 
activities of the 250 largest US law firms in 1997. Here, the GaWC authors noted that 
just 100 of the top 250 US law firms operated any international offices in 1997 (p96). 
Further, of those 100 firms which did trade internationally, one third operated just 
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one foreign office, while a further fifth traded in just two international locations. The 
GaWC authors therefore concluded that a majority of their cohort practices had: 
“merely an international foothold in the globalizing law business” (p106). Further, 
research conducted by several scholars, at various points in time, has also 
documented the modest international scale of many large legal practices. For 
example, in The global restructuring of legal service work? A study of the 
internationalisation of Australian law firms (Pinnington and Gray, 2007, p142 – 172), 
the authors evaluated the foreign branch office coverage of the top six Australian 
firms. Their finding showed one of their cohort firms operating no foreign offices, 
while even the most geographically expansive traded in just seven (p162). 
Geographically closer to my own world region of interest, in Large law firms in 
Germany (Luschin,2010, p26 – 94), the author noted that, of the 68 large legal 
practices evaluated (p40) in 2009 / 2010, 20 operated no foreign offices, while a 
further ten operated either one and two (p74). This evidence suggests a likelihood 
that several of my cohort practices will trade in few, if any, international locations, 
even though they are among the largest legal practices in their respective countries.  
 
By contrast, Institutional legacies and firm dynamics: the growth and 
internationalization of UK and German law firms (Morgan and Quack’s, 2005, p1765 
– 1785) paints a more complex picture of cross-border law firm norms among large 
law legal practices. This bi-jurisdictional comparative study is similar to The long arm 
of the law, because it explores the geographies of large UK law firms. It is also 
similar to Luschin’s above-mentioned study, because it explores the geographies of 
large German legal practices. However, the two key differences between Morgan 
and Quack’s study and those mentioned above is the time period evaluated (2003, 
later than The long arm of the law but earlier than Luschin’s study) and the sample 
size (just 15 large firms, a smaller cohort than both The long arm of the law and 
Luschin’s investigation). As I will now explain, these two cohort attributes may be 
relevant to my own cohort findings.  
 
My first observation is that the scale of large law firms’ international operations 
appears to be – at least in part – temporally-specific. As table one overleaf shows, 
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five out of the six UK law firms that Pinnington and Gray evaluated operated a larger 
international branch office presence in 2005 than they did in 1996 / 1997, when the 
GaWC undertook their The long arm of the law investigation. Linklaters, for example, 
increased its foreign office count from 10 to 30 during that period, while Freshfields’ 
foreign office total increased from 16 to 27. However, modest foreign branch office 
contractions were also evident among some firms, including Allen & Overy and 
Clifford Chance between 2003 and 2005, and Slaughter and May continually 
between 1996 / 1997 and 2005. Finally, the number of foreign offices operated by 
both Freshfields and Herbert Smith plateaued between 2003 and 2005. 
 
Table 1: the temporal specificity of large UK law firms’ foreign branch office 
networks 
 
UK law firm (2009 names used) Non-UK office totals 1996 / 1997 2003 2005 
Allen & Overy 18 26 24 
Clifford Chance 23 28 27 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 16 27 27 
Herbert Smith 5 9 9 
Linklaters 10 29 30 
Slaughter and May 5 4 3 
 
Adapted from: Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1863; Morgan and Quack, 
2005, p1776; Pinnington and Gray, 2007, p162 
 
In my results, I will not specifically compare the law firm-specific findings shown 
above with my own UK cohort’s foreign branch offices totals in 2009. However, I will 
explore whether the average number of foreign offices operated by my UK cohort are 
higher or lower than the GaWC’s earlier results, given that no clear longitudinal 
direction of travel is clear from the above findings. My results start on p132.  
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The second observation is that, by focusing on a narrower cohort of (nevertheless) 
large German firms than Luschin’s study, a notably more internationalist picture 
emerges within Morgan and Quack’s research. In contrast with Luschin’s findings, in 
Morgan and Quack’s study, every German cohort member had international offices 
in 2004. Indeed, the average foreign office network within Morgan and Quack’s 
cohort was 16.4 (p1776). Similarly, because Morgan and Quack’s study focused on 
a narrower group of large UK law firms than the GaWC in The long arm of the law, it 
is perhaps not surprising that these authors’ findings suggested that their UK cohort 
was more internationalist than the GaWC’s larger sample. Certainly, the mean 
number of international offices within Morgan and Quack’s 15-member UK cohort 
(p1776) is larger than the GaWC’s, which is 7.62 across 29 firms (data from one UK 
firm in the GaWC study was not available) (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1863). 
However, it is also arguable that – to a large extent – the more internationalist picture 
of UK law firms revealed in Morgan and Quack’s study is also due to temporal 
considerations, rather than cohort size. This is because, if one only evaluates the top 
15 law firms within the GaWC’s sample, the mean number of foreign offices remains 
considerably lower than Morgan and Quack’s 2004 findings – 9.58 in 1996 / 1997, 
compared with 17.13 in 2004.  
 
Because the GaWC studies discussed above did not compare two equally sized 
cohorts at a single point in time, it is impossible to determine whether the largest law 
firms in different countries are – contemporaneously – likely to exhibit differing, or 
broadly similar, geographical behaviours regarding the totality of their foreign branch 
office networks. However, because Pinnington and Gray and Morgan and Quack’s 
studies were undertaken on such a basis, useful insights can be gleaned from both – 
if only to establish that no cross-cohort pattern of international geographical 
behaviour appears obvious. On the one hand, Morgan and Quack’s comparative 
analysis of German and UK legal market in 2003 indicates some commonalities 
regarding international branch office norms: the average foreign branch office 
network among their German cohort was 16.4 offices, broadly comparable with the 
17.13 average among their UK cohort (p1776). Conversely, in Pinnington and Gray’s 
study, each cohort had a substantially different international branch office average: 
six among their Australian cohort, compared with 20 among their UK / European 
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equivalents (p162). In my study, it will be interesting to discover whether international 
branch office norms point, like Morgan and Quack’s study, to homogeneity between 
national cohorts or, like Pinnington and Gray’s investigation, to heterogeneity 
between such cohorts. My findings start on p131. 
 
The final point that should be made regarding to Pinnington and Gray’s study is that 
the authors indicate (p160 - 161) that the scale and collective locations of their 
Australian cohort firms’ international branch offices appear linked to law firm strategy 
in some way. I will explore the concept of legal practice geographical strategy in my 
hypothesis 10 discussion from p51 onwards, and also my results, starting on p176.  
 
2.5.2. Conclusions 
Taken together, the GaWC and socio-legal research indicates that, while the foreign 
branch office geographies of many large law firms are modest, others are not. To 
some extent, these differing levels of international expansiveness may be temporally 
specific. Additionally, there also appears to be heterogeneity between large law firms 
in different jurisdictions regarding the scale of a typical international branch office 
network. For this reason, I do not intend to produce a sub-hypothesis which seeks 
identify possible commonalities of behaviours between my each of my national 
sample groups regarding these specific issues. Nevertheless, on p132, I present my 
cohort findings, which highlights some of the more significant similarities and 
differences between my national samples regarding their 2009 foreign branch office 
norms. I suggest the similarities and differences I identify could be interrogated 
further in a future study.  
 
2.6.1. Hypotheses development 
The remainder of this literature review is devoted to my hypotheses development 
regarding law firm geography, which I will then test by reference to my novel cohort 
of large EU law firms in my results. To evaluate my overarching hypothesis – that 
large EU law firms, operating in various different EU states, collectively appear to 
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adhere to a limited number of identifiable patterns of behaviours – I have developed 
11 “sub-hypotheses”, which I will use to test for possible commonalities of behaviour. 
In essence, the more my sub-hypotheses are supported, the more my overarching 
hypotheses will also be supported – or vice versa (for convenience, I shall now refer 
to my sub-hypotheses as “hypotheses”, notwithstanding that it should be understood 
that their role is subservient to my overarching hypothesis). My results can be found 
in chapters four and five. Hypotheses one – nine have primarily been developed by 
reference to the GaWC’s research, although each have been cross-checked against 
additional academic studies where possible, with the aim of establishing the 
hypotheses’ likely robustness. For hypothesis 11, where GaWC’s explanations of the 
drivers of specific branch office geographical change are more speculative, the 
process is slightly different. In essence, I will utilise socio-legal research to refine the 
GaWC’s suggestions, before testing them in my results. Hypothesis 10 is the only 
hypothesis where neither the GaWC nor socio-legal research guided my hypothesis 
formation. In the absence of any legal-sector specific academic research, I have 
drawn on a wider pool of services globalisation literature to assist with this process.  
 
The order in which hypotheses appear is deliberate. Before we can usefully discuss 
the “whys” of large EU law firm geography, I suggest it is first helpful to understand 
“wheres” and “hows”. In my – lengthy – discussion of the “whys” of legal practice 
geographical change, I have drawn inspiration from several past studies (Roberts, 
1998, p103; Bell, McNaughton et al., 2003, p350; Boojihawon, 2007, p825), and 
structured my evaluation by reference to whether specific drivers might be regarded 
as being “external” or “internal” to the law firm. Consequently, explanations derived 
from Dunning’s (1989, p30) law-specific model will be evaluated on this basis, in 
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2.6.2.1. Hypothesis one: among the EU’s largest law firms, a small sub-set of 
those legal practices will operate a majority of that cohort’s total international 
branch office network  
My first hypothesis is that, among the EU’s largest law firms, a small sub-set of those 
practices will operate a majority of that cohort’s total international branch office 
network. This hypothesis is largely based on my reinterpretation of the data 
presented in the studies discussed below, rather than observations made by the 
reports’ authors. If supported, such a finding would suggest that globalisation 
tendencies are unevenly distributed among my cohort: a small number of firms in 
each of my national cohorts would be relatively geographically expansive, and a 
larger group less so.  
 
Turning now to the evidence supporting this hypothesis: by re-evaluating the GaWC 
data in The Long arm of the law, it is possible to determine that, in 1996 / 1997, just 
four firms in this 30-strong sample operated a majority of this cohort’s total 
international office network – running 111 out the 221 foreign locations (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 1999, p1863). Indeed, with 54 foreign offices, Baker & McKenzie single-
handedly accounted for almost a quarter of the cohort total. Similarly, by re-
examining the GaWC’s finding in Geographies of globalization, it is possible to 
determine that – across the entire 250-firm cohort – the majority of this group’s 276 
foreign offices were operated by just eight legal practices (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
2000, p107). Again, Baker & McKenzie’s extensive global presence is likely to 
account for a significant percentage of those (p108 - 111). In this paper, we are not 
told how many international offices this firm operated when the study was conducted. 
However, in light of the GaWC’s observations that it was world’s largest legal 
practice, and also the most globalised (p109), I have assumed Baker & McKenzie 
was the outlier in the GaWC’s analysis of the distribution of foreign offices between 
their sample firm members – trading in 47 foreign locations in 1997 (p107). 
Collectively, the GaWC’s findings suggest I might observe two notable behaviours 
among my cohort of large EU law firms, which relate to my above-mentioned 
hypothesis: firstly that my hypothesis itself is likely to be applicable to my sample 
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firms; and secondly that Baker & McKenzie’s presence in any of my evaluation 
cohorts may have some impact on my findings.  
 
Turning now to the findings presented in Morgan and Quack (2005, p1776) and 
Pinnington and Gray’s studies (2007, p162). Overleaf, in table 2, I have reinterpreted 
their findings, to discover how many of their sample firms would be required to 
constitute a majority of their cohort’s foreign branch offices. Both studies lend 
support to my hypothesis, because they suggest that between a quarter and a third 
of cohort firms were typically required to form a majority of each cohorts’ foreign 
branch offices. However, it is accepted that these authors’ findings are not quite as 
emphatic as the GaWC’s discoveries in Geographies of globalization, where just 
eight firms out of 250 constituted a majority of that sample group’s foreign office 
total. Moreover, it is accepted that Pinnington and Gray’s UK findings does not 
support my hypothesis, because these findings suggest that 50 per cent of UK 
cohort firms were required to form a majority of that sample’s foreign branch office 
network. However, I largely attribute this observation to the author’s small sample 
size – just six firms. By contrast, by reinterpreting Morgan and Quack’s study of the 
same jurisdiction, which comprised 15 firms, only a third of cohort firms were 
required to reach my hypothesis’ 50 per cent threshold. Reflecting my previous 
discussion on p22, this suggests the smaller the cohort of a country’s largest law 
firms evaluated, the more likely that those firms will operate foreign branch offices. 
However, because each of my national cohorts comprises 15 firms, in line with 
Morgan and Quack’s sample, I expect my own findings will broadly replicate theirs. 
 
One final observation can be made in light of my reanalysis of Morgan and Quack 
and Pinnington and Gray’s studies, which is also relevant to the GaWC’s findings: 
across the three jurisdictions evaluated in these two studies – the UK, Germany and 
Australia – Baker & McKenzie only featured in one national cohort, Morgan and 
Quack’s German sample (p1776). Certainly, with 57 foreign offices, this firm 
singlehandedly comprised almost a quarter of that cohort’s international offices. 
However, the firm’s absence from two other two sample groups suggests its local 
market impact might be inconsistent between countries: it may be present in many, 
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but not necessary a substantial employer of lawyers in all. I shall discuss this point 
further when I introduce my various national sample groups on p128. 
 
Table 2: how a small number of a country’s largest law firms can represent a 
majority of the sample’s foreign offices 
Study Country Cohort size 
Total no. of foreign offices representing a cohort majority 
Min. no. of firms required to represent a majority of sample practices’ foreign offices 
Minimum % of cohort firms required to represent a majority of sample practices’ foreign offices Morgan and 




ny 15 firms 124 4 26.67 
Pinning-ton 




ia 6 firms 12 2 33.33 
 




The GaWC’s research has moderated my expectations regarding the scale of the 
international branch offices I might expect to observe among my cohort practices. 
However, in light of Morgan and Quack’s Anglo-German analysis, I am reasonably 
confident my hypothesis will be supported in 2009, not only in these two EU states, 
but also in my seven other evaluation countries. Finally, the above-mentioned 
research has alerted me to the likely importance of Baker & McKenzie, and its 
potential to influence my country-specific findings. My findings start on p131.  
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2.6.3.1. Hypothesis two: large EU law firms which trade internationally tend to 
cluster their foreign branch offices into distinctive transnational patterns  
This hypothesis suggests that large EU law firms which trade internationally tend to 
cluster their foreign branch offices into distinctive transnational patterns. The 
GaWC’s findings in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857 
- 1876) has helped frame this hypothesis. In this paper, the GaWC looked beyond 
the specific foreign locations in which their cohort of large AS law firms traded, and 
explored these firms’ geographical behaviours through the prism of the “globalisation 
arena” (p1868) – in other words, on a supranational basis. Exploring law firm 
geography at this level of extraction, the GaWC researchers made several evidence-
based observations. Firstly, that their London cohort traded in four distinctive 
globalisation arenas in preference to others. In descending order of preference, 
these arenas were: Western Europe (77 offices / 20 cities), Pacific Asia (63 cohort 
offices in 11 cities), Eastern Europe (31 offices and 10 cities) and, finally, Northern 
America (23 offices / 11 cities) (p1870). Secondly, after comparing the geographies 
of their 30-strong London cohort with 30 large New York practices, the GaWC 
observed that these different cohorts behaved differently regarding their globalisation 
arena preferences. This led the GaWC authors to make five key observations: firstly, 
they noted that Western Europe was a “competitive globalisation arena”, because 
both groups of law firms were present in the region, albeit to greater (UK) or lesser 
(New York) extents; secondly, that the Northern American legal market was a “non-
competitive globalisation arena” because, while New York law firms were heavily 
present in this region, London law firms generally were not; thirdly, that both groups 
of firms were heavily present in the Asia Pacific (although London firms to a greater 
extent) – thus rendering the region a “principle open globalisation arena”; fourthly, 
that Eastern Europe might be regarded as a “secondary open global arena” – 
presumably because fewer firms of either nationality traded there, compared with 
other globalisation arenas; finally, the authors observed that “the rest of the world is 
relatively unimportant to global law firms” (p1874).  
 
Other scholars exploring law firm geography have not used the globalisation arena 
concept when conducting their research. Nevertheless, international clustering of 
foreign branch office behaviours have been observed in such studies. For example, 
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in Pinnington and Gray’s (2007) analysis of Australian law firm geography, the 
authors note their cohort firms’ tendencies to locate “almost exclusively” in the Asia 
Pacific region (p161). Similarly, in their analysis of the cross-border operations of 
their internationally-minded German cohort firms, Morgan and Quack (2005) note 
these practices almost invariably expanded into eastern Europe, with limited growth 
elsewhere (p1775). In light of these findings, I might therefore expect my various 
national cohorts to collectively exhibit distinctive behaviours regarding their 
international branch office trading locations. 
 
The complicating factor with my study is that I am solely interested in my cohort 
practices’ EU, not global, geographies. However, despite the narrow focus of my 
investigation, the GaWC’s research in Geographies of Globalization (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 2000, p95 - 120) offers useful guidance regarding what supranational 
EU behaviours I might expect my sample firms to exhibit. In this paper, which 
explored the international geographies of the top 250 US law firms in 1997 (p96), the 
authors found that, among the 100 large US firms which traded internationally, 
distinctive sub-global “schemes” of behaviour could be observed, and also 
quantified. Some of these schemes are not relevant to my EU-specific study, 
because they are “global”, “Asian” or “Eurasian”. However, among those EU-specific 
schemes, the GaWC authors noted that the most favoured scheme among their 
cohort involved trading in important Western Europe cities – a preference exhibited 
by 33 of the 100 legal practices evaluated. This Western European focus was 
noticeably more popular than either a pan-European scheme (East and West), 
favoured by seven sample firms, and also an Eastern European scheme, favoured 
by just one cohort member. The GaWC also noted that 15 of their cohort firms traded 
internationally via an “idiosyncratic scheme” – essentially, in unexpected locations of 
minor importance to the world economy (p107 – 108).  
 
Overall, the GaWC’s observation broadly reinforces Chapman and Tauber’s (1994 - 
1995) earlier discovery that, in 1994, the largest 700 US law firms had a far greater 
presence in the-then EU (which, at the time, essentially comprised Western 
European nations) than in Eastern Europe. According to Chapman and Tauber’s 
research, their cohort collectively operated 136 offices in the (then) EU, compared 
with just 58 in Eastern Europe (p945). Regarding my own sample group, I might 
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therefore expect my nine national cohorts to generally favour operating in the 
Western European globalisation arena, in preference to an Eastern Europe or a pan-
European focus. However, I might also expect some cohort firms to exhibit 
idiosyncratic foreign branch office behaviours. My findings start on p137. 
 
2.6.3.2. Conclusions 
The above-mentioned research suggests I might expect to observe two distinctive 
forms of cross-border clusters among my cohort firms. Firstly, in accordance with the 
GaWC’s research in Geographies of globalization, I might expect to observe 
distinctive transnational geographical clustering patterns within my various national 
cohorts. Secondly, in accordance with the group’s findings in The long arm of the 
law, I might expect my various national cohorts – collectively – to tend to favour 
certain EU-specific globalisation arenas at the expense of others, and compete in 
those arenas to greater or lesser degrees. But, overall, the focal point of my cohort 
firms’ international operations within the EU is likely to be Western Europe.  
 
2.6.4.1. Hypothesis three: within the EU, a country’s largest law firms will 
typically trade in a small number of domestic locations 
My third hypothesis is that, within the EU, a country’s largest law firms will typically 
trade in a small number of domestic locations. Besides exploring possible 
commonalities of behaviours within my cohort, and also the predictive power of the 
GaWC’s findings, a subsidiary aim of this hypothesis is to explore whether law firms’ 
frequently-modest international branch office totals are broadly replicated in relation 
to their domestic branch office networks.  
 
In the US, the concentration of both lawyers and large law firms into a limited 
number of domestic locations has been observed by Warf and Wije (1991, p161), 
Lynch and Meyer (1992, p45 - 48) and Baker and Parkin (2005 - 2006, p1649). And, 
in the EU legal markets, research conducted by the GaWC and others indicates 
similar patterns of domestic geographical concentrations. The first GaWC paper I 
shall discuss, Connecting Rhine-Main: The Production of Multi-Scalar 
Polycentricities through Knowledge-Intensive Business Services (Hoyler, Freytag et 
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al., 2008, p1095 - 1111), explores the geographies of certain legal practices in 
Germany in 2003, while the second, Balancing London? A Preliminary Investigation 
of the “Core Cities” and “Northern Way” Spatial Policy Initiatives Using Multi-City 
Corporate and Commercial Law Firms (Taylor, Hoyler et al., 2010, p1285 - 1299), 
explores the domestic geographies of UK-based law firms in 2007. A key focus of 
both of these papers was to explore connectivities between cities, using law firms as 
a vehicle for doing so. Moreover, Connecting Rhine-Main explored the city 
connectivities of eight separate APS sectors. Consequently, its analysis of the legal 
sector (p1106 – 1107) was brief. Meanwhile, an important component of Balancing 
London was to explore the impact of two initiatives designed to boost economic 
growth outside of London (p1288 - 1289) – a subject of no relevance my hypothesis 
testing. Nevertheless, because these GaWC studies represent two of the most 
substantive investigations of EU law firm domestic branch office geography, I regard 
both as having some value in assisting with my hypothesis development. 
 
Turning now to the hypothesis: both GaWC papers offer limited – often indirect –
evidence to suggest that, within the EU, a country’s largest law firms will typically 
trade in a small number of domestic locations. In Connecting Rhine-Main, the GaWC 
authors comment that their 28-strong cohort (p1100) of law firms were 
geographically concentrated within Germany, compared with other APS sectors 
evaluated (p1107). Indeed, their sample law firms (which were all AS practices 
(p1098)) were not present in more than half the German cities explored. This paper 
does not state just how few domestic offices these firms traded in. However, Morgan 
and Quack’s (2005) study offers guidance, albeit at a different point in time (2004) 
and using a different cohort of law firms. By re-interpreting Morgan and Quack’s 
analysis of the domestic branch office presences of their top 15 German law firms, it 
is possible to determine that the smallest domestic branch office network of their 
sample was just three offices, the highest 12, and the mean 5.93 (p1776). Balancing 
London does not offer a comparable analysis for the UK sector. Therefore, it is not 
possible to compare the GaWC’s findings with the German study discussed above. 
However, Balancing London notes that, of the 429 corporate and commercial firms 
the authors considered evaluating, 212 – almost half – were discounted because 
they only operated one domestic UK office (p1289 – 1290). That single-site offices 
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are highly prevalent across many UK commercial law firms offers further evidence to 
support of this element of my hypothesis. Additional clarity regarding the UK situation 
is offered by Morgan and Quack. Analysing the pair’s findings regarding the 
domestic branch offices geographies of the top 15 UK practices in 2003, it can be 
determined that eight of these firms traded in just one UK domestic location, while 
the most expansive firm traded in 10 (p1776). Further, the average number of 
domestic offices in their cohort was 2.46 – noticeably smaller than the German 
average of 5.93 discussed above. This suggests that what consists of a “small” 
domestic branch office network may be specific to individual countries, rather than 
commonly replicable between them. My findings start on p142. 
 
2.6.4.2. Conclusions 
In light of the research conducted by Warf (2001), Barker and Parkin (2005 – 2006), 
the GaWC and Morgan and Quack (2005) I should expect the domestic branch 
offices profiles of my cohort firms to be highly concentrated into what – in absolute 
terms – are a small number of locations. However, in light of Morgan and Quack’s 
findings, I should also expect that what constitutes a “small” domestic presence will 
be country-specific, and likely to vary between the EU states I evaluate. It will be 
interesting to discover whether my UK cohort sample of 2009 continues to trade in a 
very small number of domestic locations (averaging around 2.46), and also whether 
my German cohort firms traded in a slightly larger number of domestic locations 
(averaging around 5.93). At present, the domestic geographical behaviours of my 
cohort firms in my other evaluation jurisdictions is unknown, due to the paucity of 
English language research into these markets.  
 
2.6.5. Hypothesis four: when trading domestically, my cohort of large EU law 
firms tend to cluster their branch offices into a limited number of common 
locations 
My forth hypothesis is that, when trading domestically, my cohort firms tend to 
cluster their branch offices into a limited number of common locations. This 
hypothesis complements its predecessor: while the former explores potential 
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patterns of behaviour regarding the number of domestic offices where large law firms 
trade, this hypothesis explore possible patterns of behaviour regarding the actual 
domestic locations in which such firms trade. It assumes my cohort of large EU law 
firms are likely to cluster into certain domestic locations at the expense of others.  
 
Internationally, research conducted by Warf and Wije (1991, p161) Lynch (1992, p46 
- 47) and Baker and Parkin (2005 - 2006, p1649) indicates high levels of domestic 
agglomeration among large firms: in the US, New York clearly dominates, with 
Washington DC, Los Angeles and Chicago trailing far behind. And, within the EU, 
two GaWC research papers Balancing London (Taylor, Hoyler et al., 2010, p1285 - 
1299) and Connecting Rhine-Main (Hoyler, Freytag et al., 2008, p1095 - 1111) 
provide further evidence to suggest high levels of domestic legal sector 
agglomeration. In the UK, of those 135 multi-city corporate and commercial law firms 
(MCLF) which comprised their cohort (p1289), the GaWC research found those 
practices were heavily present in a small number of locations: London (73), 
Edinburgh (25), Manchester (23), Birmingham (21), Glasgow (19) and Leeds (11). 
Beyond that, less than a handful of firms were present in lower order cities such as 
Belfast, Guildford and Plymouth (Balancing London, p1298). I have previously 
discussed the GaWC research in Connecting Rhine-Main, where the authors noted 
that their cohort firms were concentrated in a small number of domestic locations 
(p1106 – 1107). And, in terms of those cities most highly connected to Frankfurt via 
their cohort law firms’ branch office networks, those locations were identified as 
including Cologne, Düsseldorf, Berlin, Hamburg and Munich. By contrast, the least 
connected cities included Chemnitz, Erfurt and Mannheim. In my study, due to 
sampling variances, I do not – necessarily – expect the same German and UK cities 
to be identified as playing host to either relatively many, or relatively few, multi-city 
cohort members. However, I expect that broadly similar patterns of domestic 
geographical consolidation and avoidance should be observable, not only in these 
EU states but also in the seven other EU state I evaluate. My findings start on p144.  
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2.6.6.1. Hypothesis five: despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in 
relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort will nevertheless tend to 
congregate into a small number of EU locations. These locations will have 
previously been identified by the GaWC as “global legal service centres”, 
“world cities” or locations deemed “over-provisioned by global law firms” 
My fifth hypothesis is that, despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in 
relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort will nevertheless tend to 
congregate into a small number of EU locations. These locations will have previously 
been identified by the GaWC as “global legal service centres”, “world cities” or 
locations deemed “over-provisioned by global law firms”. The first aim of this 
hypothesis is to establish whether, despite their geographical differences discussed 
previously, large law firms across the EU nevertheless cluster in a small number of 
common EU locations. The second aim of this hypothesis is to establish whether 
these possible points of EU locational commonality coincide with those identified by 
the GaWC. 
 
The starting point for the first element of my hypothesis is The long arm of the law. 
(Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857 - 1876). Besides discussing the globalisation 
arena concept, discussed above, this paper also ranks the specific international 
locations in which 30 large London law firms, (p1869), and 30 New York law firms 
(p1873) traded towards the end of the 1990s. Within the EU’s borders, this research 
identified 12 EU cities where either sample groups operated. Of these, five EU 
locations (Barcelona, Madrid, Milan, Piraeus, Rome) played host to London firms 
alone. However, the remaining seven locations were common to both New York and 
London firms (no EU locations were unique to New York firms). These points of 
commonality between the two samples were: London (30 City firms / 21 New York 
firms); Brussels (25 city firms, 7 New York firms); Paris (13 / 14); Warsaw (6 / 3); 
Frankfurt (5 / 6); Prague (5 / 4); and Budapest (4 / 5). Notably – with the exception of 
London – the level of geographical overlap between these two sample groups was 
modest and, in several cases, only involved a small percentage of each cohort. 
Nevertheless, as the authors noted, the similarities of their two cohort preferences 
should not be overlooked (p1873). This comparative research therefore offers limited 
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evidence to support the first element of my hypothesis in an EU-specific context, 
notwithstanding its AS law firm origins.  
 
More generally, there is a reasonable body of evidence within the wider pool of law 
firm geographical research to indicate that some of the above-mentioned locations 
are focal points of inward investment among law firms from countries other than the 
UK or USA. For example, the investment importance of Brussels, London and Paris 
were indicated in Daniels’ (1993, p159) study of Canadian law firms, and Pinnington 
and Gray’s study of Australian legal practices (2007, p162). In both these studies, 
the authors identified situations where a small number of their cohort firms either 
opened, or traded, in these EU cities. Finally, drawing on 2003 legal directory data, 
Van Criekingen, Decroly et al’s (2005, p173 – 187) study of international law firms in 
Brussels found 153 foreign-based legal practices operating in the city that year 
(p177).  
 
I shall now turn to the element of this hypothesis relating to global legal service 
centres or world cities. Here, some historical research context may be helpful, 
particularly in relation to world cities. From the 1980s onwards, various scholars, 
notably Friedmann, hypothesised that certain cities globally might be “used by global 
capital as ‘basing points’ in the spatial organization and articulation of production and 
markets” (Friedmann, 1986, p71). Friedmann describes such cities as “world cities”. 
Over several years, Friedmann repeatedly identified specific world cities (Friedmann 
and Wolf, 1982, p310; Friedmann, 1986, p72; Friedmann, 1995, p24). Further, 
several of the EU cities consistently identified by Friedman – notably Brussels, 
Frankfurt, London, and Paris – overlap with the potential points of large law firm EU 
commonality discussed above. Significantly for my study, Friedmann asserts: “the 
dynamism of the world city economy results chiefly from the growth of a primary 
cluster of high-level business services” (Friedmann and Wolf, 1982, p320). And: “the 
activities are those which are coming to define the chief economic functions of the 
world city: management, banking and finance, legal services (my emphasis), 
accounting, technical consulting, telecommunications and computing, international 
transportation, research, and higher education” (ibid). Friedmann’s writings therefore 
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suggest the agglomeration of law firms in certain locations is intrinsic to their world 
cities designation. Consequently, in my study, I believe it is reasonable to assume 
that my cross-border sample firms might collectively tend to congregate in world 
cities. 
 
Because Friedmann identified various EU locations as being world cities, one might 
consider it reasonable to use these locations to evaluate the collective focal points of 
my cohort firms’ cross-border investments. However, my hypothesis testing will only 
focus on the EU world cities identified by the GaWC in A roster of world cities 
(Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p445 - 458). This is because, in contrast with those 
cities identified by Friedmann – which were offered speculatively – the cities 
identified by the GaWC were generated by reference to the aggregate branch office 
locations of four APS sectors, including large law firms (p445). In doing so, the 
GaWC was attempting to overcome a long-standing “dirty little secret” (Short, Kim et 
al., 1996) of world cities research – what GaWC member Peter Taylor (1999, p1901) 
described as its “empirical deficiency”.  
 
In generating their rankings in A roster of world cities, the GaWC first produced 
sector-specific lists of “prime”, “major” and “minor” service centre cities, based on the 
aggregate number of offices within their designated APS sample cohorts. The 
designation of each location as being a prime, major or minor directly impacted on 
the location’s ultimate world city designation, because the classifications given to 
each city on a sector-by sector basis was aggregated to produce its overall world city 
ranking (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p451 - 455). Thus, a “prime” designation 
resulted in a score of “three” for each sector evaluated, whereas a minor location 
designation would only yield a score of “one”. Using the GaWC’s methodology, the 
most important “alpha” world cities” were given a score of 12 (three points, 
consistently awarded in relation to the four sectors evaluated). The least important 
cities are given a score of one, which indicates “minimal” evidence of world city 
formation. A score of four is the lowest possible world city ranking, yielding a location 
“gamma” world city designation. Below this, cities with a score of three are classified 
as exhibiting “relatively strong” evidence of world city formation, while cities with a 
score of two are said to exhibit “some evidence” of work city formation (p456).  
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Table 3, below, sets out EU locations designated by the GaWC as either important 
global legal service centres (GLSC) or either current or potential world cities. 
 
Table 3: GaWC EU locations designated as either important legal service 
centres or either current or potential world cities 
EU location Legal service centre designation 
World cities designation (12 = 
top score possible) 
Amsterdam Minor Gamma (6) 
Antwerp Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Arhus Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Athens Minor Relatively strong evidence (3) 
Barcelona Minor Gamma (4) 
Berlin Major Gamma (4) 
Birmingham Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
Bologna Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) Bratislava Minor Some evidence (2) Brussels Prime Beta (8) 
Bucharest Minor Some evidence (2) 
Budapest Major Gamma (4) 
Cologne Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
Copenhagen Not ranked Gamma (4) 
Dresden Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) Dublin Not ranked Relatively strong evidence (3) 
Dusseldorf Minor Gamma (6) 
Edinburgh Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) Frankfurt Major Alpha (10) 
Genoa Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Glasgow Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Gothenburg Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Hamburg Minor Gamma (4) 
Hague (The) Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
Helsinki Not ranked Relatively strong evidence (3) 
Leeds Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Lille Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Lisbon Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
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London Prime Alpha (12) 
Luxembourg Not ranked Relatively strong evidence (3) 
Lyon Not ranked Relatively strong evidence (3) 
Madrid Major and minor Beta (9) 
Manchester Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
Marseille Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Milan Major Alpha (10) 
Munich Minor Gamma (4) 
Paris Prime Alpha (12) 
Prague Major Gamma (6) 
Rome Major Gamma (5) 
Rotterdam Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
Stuttgart Not ranked Some evidence (2) 
Stockholm Minor Gamma (5) 
Turin Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Utrecht Not ranked Minimal evidence (1) 
Vienna Not ranked Relatively strong evidence (3) 
Warsaw Major Gamma (5) 
 
Adapted from: Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p455 - 456 
It is worth restating that the law firms used by the GaWC in A roster of world cities to 
generate the above rankings comprised solely of AS legal practices – a mixture of 
large, cross-border, US and UK law firms (p453 - 454). Thus, it will be interesting to 
discover whether my alternative cohort of large EU legal practices congregate in the 
same EU locations, notwithstanding that many of them are not AS practices. 
Addressing this issue directly, the GaWC acknowledged that, although different 
service sectors and different firms would undoubtedly have produced different 
results, they believed that “the evidence of gross similarities within and across 
service sectors does suggest that our inventory is reasonably robust: differences are 
likely to be minor and on the margins” (p451). Nevertheless, I have doubts regarding 
this assertion, not least because of the high prevalence of US and UK locations 
present in the 72-stong list: three of the 11 prime global legal service centres 
(GLSCs) are US cities (Chicago, Los Angeles and Washington); likewise, six out of 
the 27 listed major GLSC (Cleveland, Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, San Francisco, 
39 | P a g e   
Seattle) and six out of the 35 minor GLSC (Atlanta, Boston, Kansas City, 
Philadelphia, Richmond, Santiago). Similarly, London’s designation as a prime 
GLSC is unsurprising, given that 30 of the 130-strong cohort comprised London law 
firms. My doubts are further reinforced by the GaWC’s own findings, which reveal 
many differences between their cross-sectoral world city rankings and the legal 
sector-specific rankings generated by reference to AS law firms alone. For example, 
Brussels achieves the highest possible GLSC designation – prime – but is also 
ranked as a beta world city. Conversely, while Copenhagen is ranked as a gamma 
world city, it does not even qualify as a minor GLSC. Indeed, as later GaWC 
research acknowledges (Taylor, Catalana et al., 2004; Hassens, Derudder et al., 
2011), each APS sector they studied has its own (largely distinctive) patterns of 
branch office geographical behaviour. Thus, in my study, while I intend to explore the 
extent to which my EU law firms congregate in the GaWC’s EU-designated world 
cities, I will also pay close attention to those EU cities designated as prime, major 
and minor legal service centres. I suggest it is likely that my cohort firms may be 
more likely to congregate in those locations than the GaWC-designated world cities. 
 
Two final points should be made in relation to the rankings generated in A roster of 
world cities. I shall now discuss each in turn, because they are distinctive from each 
other.   
 
Firstly, they are moderately difficult to replicate, because of an omission in the 
GaWC method. One way of designating a prime GLSC is that seven or more cohort 
firms with foreign branch offices are present. Alternatively, a city can achieve a prime 
city designation if 26 or more firms with foreign branch offices are present in that 
location. Further, one way of designating a location as a major GLSC is that it is 
home to four or five cohort firms with international offices. Alternatively, a city can be 
designated as a major GLSC if five – 17 cohort firms with international offices are 
present in that location. However, we are not told what designation should be given a 
city hosting six cohort firms with international branch offices. Nor are we told what 
designation should be applied to a city hosting 18 – 25 cohort firms with foreign 
branch offices. Further, no explicit guidance is offered about how US and UK cohort 
firms should be treated if the same firm falls within both cohorts. For example, if a 
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firm is simultaneously a US and UK cohort member, and has offices in both London 
and New York, should its London office be regarded as a foreign office from a US 
perspective, and its New York office be regarded as a foreign office from a London 
perspective? I address both of these points on p108 of my methods section, when I 
explain how I shall attempt to apply the GaWC’s GLSC method to my cohort.  
 
Secondly, one of A roster of world cities’ authors – Peter Taylor – has since 
distanced himself from this paper. Recently, he stated that: “I admit my research 
odyssey got off to a bad start. A paper deriving from a study of London’s external 
relations described a roster of world cities – ordered alpha, beta, gamma – based 
upon the presences of some leading business service firms. This adopted a classic 
‘thing theory’ approach, assessing a city’s importance by its collection of firms rather 
than relationally through the connections of its firms.” Taylor continues: 
“Embarrassingly, despite its severe limitations, the ‘Thing Theory’ paper became 
very widely cited and continues to be so” (Taylor, 2014, p389). My investigation 
continues with what, for Taylor, may be the unwelcome process of reviewing his 
earlier findings.  
 
The final element of my hypothesis – the notion that certain cities are “over-
provisioned by global law firms”. This idea was raised in a more recent GaWC paper, 
Global Law Firms: Globalization and Organizational Spaces of Cross-border Legal 
Work (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p455 - 488). This paper includes two 
sets of findings relevant to my hypothesis. Firstly, it offered what it described as the 
top 20 global law centres (p460 - 461) – a ranking derived from the branch office 
locations of a 16 member-cohort of AS legal practices in the year 2000 (p462 - 464). 
It then further identified 10 cities as being “over provisioned by global law firms” (and 
also 20 locations deemed “under provisioned”, of which more shortly) during that 
same year. It is important to stress that this paper evaluated law firm geography 
using a different methodology to A roster of world cities. Here, the top 20 global law 
centres ranking hierarchies were generated by reference to assumed connectivities 
between cities, rather than law firm branch office locations alone. Further, the 
paper’s over (and under) provisioned rankings were generated by reference to the 
popularity of those locations among law firms, relative to other APS sectors. Yet, 
despite these methodological specificities, the findings revealed in Global law firms 
41 | P a g e   
are useful to my study because both indicate that certain EU locations may be 
particularly popular among large legal practices. Therefore, the global law centre / 
overprovisioned locations will be included in my own cohort evaluation, alongside the 
global EU legal service centres and world cities. Indeed, most EU locations identified 
in Global law firms were previously identified in A roster of world cities. But one city – 
Leipzig – was not. I shall therefore add Leipzig to the EU locations I might expect 
some of my cohort law firms to congregate during 2009. 
 
2.6.6.2. Conclusions 
Taken in the round, both the GaWC and non-GaWC research discussed above 
suggests a degree of common clustering may be evident in certain EU locations, 
involving an eclectic range of law firms. However, whether the specific locations 
identified by the GaWC are the focal point of legal practice inward investment among 
my sample firms in 2009 remains to be seen. My findings start on p148. 
 
2.6.7. Hypothesis six: despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in 
relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort of firms will 
nevertheless collectively ignore certain EU locations. In particular, they will 
commonly ignore EU locations identified by the GaWC as being “under 
provisioned” by global law firms 
My sixth hypothesis is: despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in relation 
to their EU branch office locations, my cohort of firms will nevertheless collectively 
ignore certain EU locations. In particular, they will commonly ignore EU locations 
identified by the GaWC as being “under provisioned” by global law firms. To an 
extent, the above-mentioned hypothesis represents a mirror image to the world cities 
proposition: just as certain locations around the world may become focal points for 
large law firm inward investment, so other locations may be collectively ignored by 
those same firms. Of course, it would be pointless to identify every foreign EU 
location in which my entire cohort law firms did not trade, which may comprise 
hundreds of EU cities. This is why the list of “under provisioned” locations offered by 
the GaWC in Global law firms (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p455 – 488) 
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provides a useful focus for my investigation. This study indicates that I might expect 
my cohort firms to be substantially absent from five EU cities: Athens, Copenhagen, 
Dublin, Lisbon and Madrid (p463). My findings start on p156. 
 
2.6.8. Hypothesis seven: despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in 
relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort of firms will treat certain 
EU locations as being focal points of modest legal practice investment or 
divestment over time. Some of these more commonplace investment and 
divestment locations will have previously been identified by either socio-legal 
or GaWC scholars 
My seventh hypothesis is: despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in 
relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort of firms will treat certain EU 
locations as being focal points of modest legal practice investment or divestment 
over time. Some of these more commonplace investment and divestment locations 
will have previously been identified by either socio-legal or GaWC scholars. This 
hypothesis assumes that large EU law firms tend to change their EU branch office 
geographies over time. It also assumes that such firms also potentially display 
common patterns behaviour regarding the locations in which they open or close 
offices. I have used both socio-legal and GaWC research as the evidential basis for 
this hypothesis. All of this research explores the geographies of AS law firms alone. 
 
Existing socio-legal research suggests that AS law firms often alter their branch 
office geographies over time. For example, Baker and Parkin’s (2005 - 2006) study 
of the evolution of US legal practices found that – between 1998 and 2004 (a period 
which overlaps with my own study) – the average number of offices operated by US 
multisite law firms increased from around 10.5 to closer to 13.5 (p1650). More 
relevantly to my investigation, Chapman and Tauber’s (1994 - 1995) study, which 
explored the geographical evolutions of the largest 700 US law firms up to 1994, 
discovered that the number of these firms operating in specific EU states grew 
substantially between 1960 and that year. Chapman and Tauber’s study found that 
the number of their cohort firms trading in France leapt from two in 1960 to 22 in 
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1994; from one to 60 in the UK; in Belgium from two to 34; and, across Eastern 
Europe collectively, from zero to 58 (p945).Given that Chapman and Tauber’s total 
cohort size was 700 US law firms, none of the above-mentioned EU locations 
represented countries or regions in which a majority of their sample firms had 
expanded into. Nevertheless, this research suggest that, in my own study, I might 
legitimately expect a small, but similarly observable, minority of my cohort practices 
to open new offices in these countries / regions during my evaluation time period. 
For reasons I shall explain on p92, the longitudinal element of my investigation 
explores my cohort firms’ changing EU geographies between 1998 and 2009. 
 
In terms of the specific focal points of legal practice inward investment I might expect 
to observe in relation to my sample firms, both the socio-legal literature and – to 
some extent – the GaWC, indicates several EU locations I should focus on. Galanter 
and Henderson’s (2007 - 2008) study, which briefly explores the changing 
geographies of the NLJ 250 US law firms between 1986 and 2006, suggests 
London, Brussels and Frankfurt might be favoured expansion locations. According to 
Galanter and Henderson’s research, their cohort firms increased their collective 
office numbers in London from 38 in 1986 to 74 in 2006; in Brussels from six to 35; 
and in Frankfurt from one to 24 (p1890). Meanwhile, Silver’s (2000) exploration of 
the changing geographies of large US law firms noted that 23 large US law firms 
arrived in London in the 1970s, 23 in the 1980s, and 23 during the 1990s up to 1998 
(p1112 - 1114) – indicating that this EU city has been a favoured expansion location 
for such firms over many years. Within the GaWC literature, The changing 
geography of globalized service provision, 2000–2008 (Hassens, Derudder et al., 
2011, p2293 - 2307) offers the most useful insights regarding which locations I might 
expect my cohort firms to expand into, notwithstanding its focus on inter-city 
connectivities. This study, which explores how connectivities between various cities 
evolved between 2000 and 2008, includes a list of specific EU cities (p2303) which 
the authors claim became either more or less connected within the legal sector 
between those years. Interestingly, most of the cities identified by the GaWC as 
becoming more connected are different to those suggested in above-mentioned 
studies. While the above studies indicate that London, Brussels and Frankfurt were 
focal points of EU branch office expansion, the GaWC suggested that, besides 
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London, Antwerp, Madrid, Milan, Paris and Vienna had become more connected 
between the two time points of their investigation. In my study, I shall evaluate each 
of the locations identified by both GaWC and non-GaWC scholars, in combination 
with each other. Did my cohort of large EU law firms expand into these specific 
locations between 1998 and 2009?  
 
In relation to legal practice branch office divestments, Silver’s above-mentioned 
research found that around 25 per cent of offices opened by US law firms in Western 
Europe during her evaluation time period subsequently closed – including those in 
Brussels, London and Paris (Silver, 2000, p1127 - 1128). The GaWC research, 
meanwhile, suggests Berlin suffered one of the most substantial connectivity falls 
between 2000 and 2008 within their legal sector cohort followed, to a lesser extent, 
by Rotterdam (Hassens, Derudder et al., 2011, p2303). Again, it should be stressed 
that the focal point of the GaWC research were connectivity trends between cities, 
using law firm branch offices as proxy indicators, rather than a straightforward 
evaluation of the changing branch office presences of a consistent cohort of large AS 
legal practices. My findings, which explores whether my cohort firms can be 
observed retreating from the above-mentioned locations between 1998 and 2009, 
start on p158. 
 
2.6.9.1. Hypothesis eight: my cohort of large EU law firms makes extensive use 
of “alliance capitalism” to extend their branch office geographical reach 
My eighth hypothesis is: my cohort of large EU law firms makes extensive use of 
“alliance capitalism” to extend their branch office geographical reach. This 
hypothesis assumes that, in common with many other industry sectors (Brown, 
Cooper et al., 1996; Hertz, 1996; Seristö, 2000; Boojihawon, 2007; Faulconbridge, 
Hall et al., 2008) my sample firms will work in partnership with other legal practices, 
in order to extend their geographical reach beyond that of their own branch offices. 
Cooperating with firms which one might, in some circumstances, be in competition 
with, is the essence of alliance capitalism (Dunning, 1995, p466). In the event that 
my hypothesis is supported, this would not only suggest that the use of alliance 
capitalism is commonplace amoung my cohort, it would further suggest that legal 
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practice geography cannot simply be understood through the prism of a firm’s branch 
offices alone.  
 
In terms of the overall prevalence of alliance capitalism I might expect to find among 
my cohort, the GaWC’s findings in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et 
al., 1999, p1857 - 1876) and Morgan and Quack’s (2005) research offer the most 
exhaustive accounts available – but only in relation to large UK and German law 
firms. In The long arm of the law, the GaWC evaluated whether the top 30 UK law 
firms in 1996 – 1997 traded “indirectly” internationally via relationships with other law 
firms. The research found that a small majority – 17 out of 30 – did so, compared 
with 12 that did not (data from one firm was not available) (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
1999, p1863). Morgan and Quack’s (2005, p1775 - 1777) more recent, and 
comparative, study of the cross-border behaviours of the top 15 UK and German law 
firms in 2004, also found extensive use of alliance capitalism among those legal 
practices evaluated, notwithstanding the different taxonomies used and sample sizes 
selected compared with the GaWC. Among the top 15 UK law firms evaluated, 
Morgan and Quack found that one third operated internationally – at least in part – 
via alliance capitalism. In total, three out of 15 firms operated via a “formal network”, 
while two operated via an “informal best friends network”. (One firm, Eversheds, 
traded by a mixture of organic growth and a formal network.) Broadly similar results 
were discovered among the authors’ cohort of 15 large German firms. Here, four 
firms traded – at least in part – via alliance capitalism: two made use of a formal 
network, while two belonged to an informal best friends network (p1776). The 
prevalence of large law firms’ usage of such relationships was not exactly the same 
between large UK and German firms. Nevertheless, Morgan and Quack suggest that 
both German and UK firms showed signs of commonalities in their 
internationalisation strategies (p1775 - 1777). Given these findings, one might expect 
my own cohort firms to exhibit broadly similar behaviours in 2009, not only in the UK 
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2.6.9.2. Understanding the distinction between law firm branch offices and 
alliance capitalism 
This section of my literature review represents a short diversion from my hypothesis 
formation regarding alliance capitalism. This is because there is a degree of 
conceptual confusion within existing research regarding how this concept should be 
applied in the real world. It is essential that I clarify my own preferred application of 
this concept now, because how inter-office relationships are defined will impact on 
my evaluation of the GaWC research. The first point of uncertainly is how I should 
distinguish between alliance capitalism relationships and my cohort firms’ branch 
offices. The second area of uncertainty is how I should treat what the GaWC 
describes as “conglomerate / MDP legal practices” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et 
al., 2008, p466). Both issues are distinctive, but also interlinked.  
 
Various authors, both within the socio-legal field and without, have suggested that 
the forms of alliance capitalism exist along a continuum of integration (Zander and 
Lerpold, 2003, p134). At one end of the continuum, argues Daniels (in a law-specific 
context): “there are relationships that approximate mergers, while at the other end 
there are relationships that merely entail a loose commitment to try to direct work to 
the other firm in situations where client demands cannot be effectively serviced 
within the referring firm. Between the poles of de facto mergers and loose referral 
arrangements are relationships involving more explicit and binding commitments to 
refer work of a particularized nature to firm affiliates” (Daniels, 1993, p180 - 181). 
Indeed, this presumption is reinforced by a diverse range of authors who have 
observed and classified law firm alliances, including legal practitioners (Calkoen, 
2001, p144), law firm alliance managers (McGarry, 2011, p8 - 10) and both socio-
legal (Sokol, 2007, p15 - 19) and GaWC scholars (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 
2008, p465 - 467). Generally, there is broad agreement among law-related 
researchers that a tightly integrated “formal network” or “alliance” model such as 
CMS or Lex Mundi might be distinguished from a less tightly integrated “best friends” 
approach (Calkoen, 2001, p144; Morgan and Quack, 2004, p19 - 20; Sokol, 2007, 
p15 - 16). However, the critical point of concern for my study is not these lesser 
levels of inter-firm co-operations: rather, it is the point at which an inter-office 
relationship ceases to be a form of alliance capitalism and starts to amount to a 
single firm. This distinction will influence the outcome of my empirical research. 
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Here, the GaWC’s position in relation to conglomerate law firms – and also that of 
socio-legal scholars – arguably adds to the conceptual confusion regarding the 
continuum between law firm alliance capitalism and branch offices. This is because, 
in their four “typologies of globalization”, set out in Global law firms, the GaWC states 
that MDP / conglomerate law firms are a distinctive category, separate from global 
law firms, CMS-style alliances, and also from membership of a “loose, ephemerally-
formed affiliation or network” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p465 - 467). 
The GaWC is not alone in this regard: Sokol (2007, p15 – 19) also believes MDP law 
firms are distinctive from alliance / best friends in his analysis of law firm expansion 
models. However, and by contrast, Morgan and Quack (2005, p1776) treat their 
German (MDP / conglomerate) cohort member, EY Law Luther Menold, as being 
part of a “formal network” – which is the same classification given to Hasche Sigle in 
relation to its CMS alliance. In others words, Morgan and Quack regard EY Law 
Luther Menold – an MDP / conglomerate law firm within the GaWC taxonomy – as 
operating within the previously-described continuum of law firm integration, rather 
than distinctive from it. Further confusion is added by McGarry (2011) in his e-book 
exploration of professional service networks. In this e-book, McGarry suggests there 
are four stages of professional service network development, one of which includes 
Ernst & Young, Baker & McKenzie and DLA Piper as “stage four” networks (p10) – 
effectively, the most highly developed form of network – on the basis that: “while they 
are technically and legally networks, their operation resembles that of any large 
corporation. They have a very significant external brand and are most often viewed 
as seamless corporations, which they are not” (p103 - 144). Therefore, depending on 
which of the three above-mentioned approaches I adopt in my study, I might regard 
Morgan and Quack’s German sample firm EY Law Luther Menold as belonging to a 
formal network (and thus in an alliance capitalism relationship with other EY Law 
members); using McGarry’s approach, I might regard the same firm as being an EY 
Law branch office; and, using the GaWC’s approach, I should regard EY Law Luther 
Menold as a distinctive form of trading operation, which is neither a conventional law 
firm alliance nor an EY Law branch office. Clearly, I must select one approach, and 
evaluate my cohort firms’ geographical behaviours accordingly. 
 
Ultimately, I have chosen to adopt McGarry’s approach, and treat conglomerate / 
MDP entities within my cohort as de facto law firms, for two reasons: firstly, in EU 
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states such as Germany, large law firm MDPs are a long-standing fact of life (Terry, 
2000), which occasionally employ hundreds of lawyers within a single practice. 
Indeed, Luschin’s (2010) study of large German legal practices, published 
subsequently to Global law firms, states that “of Germany’s (68) largest law firms, at 
least 29 have one more non-lawyer professional in the firm” (p82 - 87). I therefore do 
not believe we should regard such practices as requiring a standalone classification, 
at least within the EU. More importantly, while past research suggests that such 
conglomerate law practice often have complex ownership regimes (Henssler and 
Terry, 2001, p299 - 300; Thomas, Schwab et al., 2001 - 2002, p173 - 175; Daly, 
2002, p593 - 599; Webb, 2004, p86; Nnona, 2006, p857 - 859) – typically to comply 
with local MDP bar rules – other research has suggested that more conventional 
transnational legal practices often use similar arrangements (Drolshammer, 2001, 
p462 - 475). If it is acceptable to treat transnational legal practices such as Baker & 
McKenzie – a firm variously described as “Baker & McDonalds” (Flood, 1996, p195; 
Silver, 2000, p1146)", “McLaw” (Spar, 1997, p22 - 23), and “a franchise-like 
operation that lacked any genuine coherence beyond the worldwide mandates, 
policies and procedures” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p477) – as a 
single entity, then I suggest we should also treat MDP legal practices as single firms. 
In my evaluation of my national cohorts’ usage of branch offices / alliance capitalism, 
I shall therefore adopt this approach.  
 
My final comment regarding conglomerate / MDP law firms raises an important 
question regarding the GaWC’s observation in Global cities: that conglomerate law 
firms “effectively died out with the Enron scandal and the end of multidisciplinary 
partnerships” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p466). In light of the above 
discussion, this assertion is not supported by Luschin’s German legal market-based 
research. More generally, Martin (2007) – writing several years after Enron – noted 
that: “PricewaterhouseCooper's legal network Landwell still exists”, while “EY Law 
Europe group still has over 1,300 lawyers in over twenty countries” (p187 - 188). In 
light of Martin’s observation, I therefore expect to observe conglomerate law firms 
and, in particular, accountancy-linked law firms, within my cohort. Indeed, it will be 
interesting to discover their 2009 prevalence, several years after Enron.  
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2.6.10. Hypothesis nine: my cohort of large EU law firms use alliance 
capitalism to extend their geographical reach in distinctive ways, which are 
commonly replicated across multiple EU states 
My ninth hypothesis is: my cohort of large EU law firms’ make use of alliance 
capitalism to extend their geographical reach in distinctive ways, which are 
commonly replicated across multiple EU states. This hypothesis effectively builds on 
its predecessor. The previous hypothesis allows me to explore whether, collectively, 
my various national cohorts made widespread use of alliance capitalism. By contrast, 
this hypothesis explores whether the various distinctive ways in which my cohort 
firms make use of alliance capitalisms relationships is broadly replicated across each 
of my national evaluation cohorts. This hypothesis has been developed by reference 
to the GaWC study, The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857- 
1876), coupled with limited cross-border validation indicated by Institutional legacies 
and firm dynamics (Morgan and Quack, 2005, p1765 - 1785). However, my study will 
seek to further validate my hypothesis by reference to my wider cohort of large EU 
law firms, trading in a wider range of EU states, than either of these above-
mentioned studies.  
 
In The long arm of the law, the GaWC authors identified four distinctive (p1865 - 
1866) ways in which their 30-strong cohort extended their geographical reach using 
alliance capitalism: firstly, firms could operate a single foreign branch office, which 
was supplemented by a formal network (the example offered was Lawrence Graham 
and the Associated Business Lawyers of Europe alliance); secondly, firms could 
operate two or more foreign branch offices, further supplemented by an alliance 
(example offered: Taylor Joynson Garrett / Interlex); thirdly, they could operate an 
extensive network of branch international offices, supplemented by what might 
variously be known a “strategic affiliation” or “best friends” relationship (example 
offered: Allen & Overy’s relationship with Gide Loyrette Nouel in France and Loeff 
Claeys Verbeke in the Benelux countries); fourthly, firms could operate a 
considerable international branch office network, further supplemented by a formal 
network (Denton Hall, Denton International). Three additional geographical options 
were also suggested by the GaWC authors, although none might be regarded as 
them making use of alliance capitalism: firstly, they suggested that firms might 
exclusively trade in locations via a “direct” branch office presence (example: 
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Freshfields) – (p1862); secondly, firms could come to an agreement to work with a 
firm on an ad hoc basis (p1866); and thirdly – although this option was only included 
in the GaWC’s tabular data and not discussed directly – a firm could neither operate 
any foreign branch offices nor participate in any form of alliance capitalism 
relationships. Here, the example indicated was Travers Smith Braithwaite (p1863). 
Each individual approach appears reasonably distinctive from each other, and 
therefore suitable for hypothesis testing. 
 
Morgan and Quack’s (2005) study did not explore the relationship between law firms’ 
alliances and branch offices in the same manner as the GaWC. However, by 
reinterpreting the authors’ discussion (p1775 – 1777), it is possible to broadly verify 
several of the GaWC’s various geography-extending options, either in a different 
country (Germany) or at a different point in time (the UK). For example, the authors 
identify various firms trading internationally on either a “global” or “organic growth 
basis” – which suggests a “direct”, branch office-led, operation. Equally, the authors 
offer the example of Eversheds – operating three foreign branch offices – but also 
belonging to a formal network – which broadly matches the GaWC’s second 
approach. Finally, firms could combine a larger foreign branch office network which, 
in turn, is supplemented by an additional alliance relationship (example: CMS 
Hasche Sigle in Germany), which broadly matches the GaWC’s fourth option. It is 
not possible to identify equivalents to all of the GaWC alternative approaches in 
Morgan and Quack’s (2005) study – for example the “no direct foreign presence, and 
no indirect presence either”. Nevertheless, there appear to be several similarities 
between these two studies’ findings. In testing hypothesis nine, I shall combine the 
systematic approach to classifying alliance capitalism relationships adopted by the 
GaWC with the comparative approach taken by Morgan and Quack. The more 
national cohorts behave in a manner suggested by the GaWC, the stronger the 





51 | P a g e   
2.6.11.1. Hypothesis 10: large EU legal practices have overarching 
geographical strategies which are related to – but also distinctive from – the 
specific reason why they change their branch office geographies in specific 
EU locations. Further, in order to implement these overarching strategies 
requires a consensus to be reached between a firm’s leadership and its wider 
partnership 
My tenth hypothesis is: large EU legal practices have overarching geographical 
strategies which are related to – but also distinctive from – the specific reason which 
they change their branch office geographies in specific EU locations. Further, in 
order to implement these overarching strategies requires a consensus to be reached 
between a firm’s leadership and its wider partnership. This hypothesis will allow me 
to explore what I regard as a potentially important omission from the GaWC’s 
research – the role played by geographical strategy in determining the totality of the 
locations from which legal practices trade. As I will illustrate further in my hypothesis 
11 discussion below, the GaWC appears to assume that what we might describe as 
“second order” strategy considerations, such as regulation or client demand, might 
drive law firm geographical change, without considering whether “higher level” 
strategic considerations may also play a role in a firm’s total branch office 
geography. However, it would be unfair to single out the GaWC for failing to consider 
the existence of higher level legal practice geographical strategy: almost no 
substantive English language research appears to have been undertaken regarding 
this issue in its own right. In my study, I intend to address this possible lacuna in our 
knowledge – to the extent of exploring whether large EU law firms commonly appear 
to have overarching geographical strategies, and what key elements might 
commonly help generate such strategies. If supported, my findings will hopefully 
encourage further research into legal practice geographical strategy.  
 
It is not possible, within the confines of this thesis, to conduct an exhaustive literature 
review of geographical strategy research in general. However, research conducted 
across various service sectors suggests that one theme I should explore within the 
ambit of this hypothesis is whether my cohort firms tend to exhibit geographical 
“orientations” – essentially, a willingness to alter their geographical reach as a 
strategic consideration in its own right (Kreitl and Oberndorfer, 2004, p694 - 695; 
Ström and Mattsson, 2007, p253 - 254). Within the globalisation literature, some 
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firms’ orientations are manifested by their willingness to globalise within a very few 
years of establishment – they are “born global” (Rennie, 1993). And, within the legal 
space, Baker & McKenzie is perhaps the best known example of such a firm (Flood, 
2013, p21). However, research conducted by Bagchi-Sen and Kuechler (2000) 
suggests different firms within any given cohort are likely to exhibit heterogeneous 
orientations regarding their willingness to alter their international profile. Bagchi-Sen 
and Kuechler’s study, which focused on 195 SME accountancy practices in the 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls area of the US in 1998, discovered that respondent firms were 
split between those that were not interested in internationalising (24 firms), those that 
were interested but had not yet been successful (19 firms) and those that had 
already successfully internationalised (9 firms) (p131). Bagchi-Sen and Kuechler’s 
study did not explore whether these firms’ orientations might be replicated in relation 
to their domestic geographical preferences. However, in light of my discussion in 
relation to hypotheses three and four – which suggests that patterns of domestic 
geographical behaviour may be observable among large law firms – I believe this 
idea is worthy of investigation by reference to my cohort.  
 
Turning to the second aspect this hypothesis: research suggests my research should 
pay close attention to the geographical strategy pronouncements made by law firms’ 
senior managers. Past research conducted outside the legal market, but within the 
services sector as a whole, has repeatedly suggested that firms’ international 
orientation – and also their actual resulting internationalisation – are often heavily 
influenced by managers’ attitudes (Edvardsson, Edvinsson et al., 1993, p94; Javalgi, 
Griffith et al., 2003, p193 - 194; Deprey, Lloyd-Reason et al., 2012, p1616). For 
example, in the legal sphere, Sir Nigel Knowles of DLA Piper would be an example 
of someone who developed their firm’s international and domestic development 
strategy (Flood, 2013, p13 - 14) in a geographically expansive manner.  
 
In terms of the relationship between a firm’s leadership and its geographical 
orientation, research conducted by Bell (1995) into the internationalisation of small 
computer software firms suggest that many managing directors have a clear picture, 
from the outset, of which international markets they regard as having the best 
potential for their firm – irrespective of whether those markets were psychically or 
geographically distant (p66). The question of whether specific international 
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expansion locations might make clear economic sense to the firm is briefly discussed 
by both Krull, Smith et al (2012) and Løwendahl (2000, p142 - 162), neither of whom 
paint a flattering picture of managers’ decision-making processes. Løwendahl 
comments that, within the professional service sector, “the location of new local or 
regional offices is not always the result of rational analyses and strategic plans” 
(p156 - 157). Krull Smith et al (2012), who explored the internationalisation of 
engineering consultancies, suggests that those driving the early stage of their firms’ 
geographical expansion did not base their decisions on market research. Instead, 
decisions were based on their “entrepreneurial spirit” (p1112). Other researchers 
have reached similar conclusions. For example, O’Farrell, Wood et al’s (1996) 
analysis of the globalisation drivers of 90 South East England business service firms 
found: “unequivocally that there is little evidence that these firms use systematic 
methods to evaluate and choose between alternative foreign country markets” – a 
decision the authors partly attribute to the “bounded rationality of decision makers” 
(p111 – 112). It is beyond the scope of my investigation to explore the internal 
processes which resulted in my cohort firms making specific geographical decisions. 
However, as part of my analysis of the role played by law firm leaders in driving their 
practice’s geographical orientations, the above research suggests it is likely I will 
uncover examples of law firm leaders making “geographical vision”-based 
pronouncements regarding their firm’s proposed expansions into new markets (as 
per Bell) in a manner which, viewed from outside the firm, may not appear very 
sophisticated (as per Krull Smith et al, Løwendahl and O’Farrell, Wood et al). 
 
Assuming I can establish that my law firm cohort members have geographical 
orientations, research from outside the legal sector suggests that my sample firms’ 
orientations may also change. For example, the appointment of a new individual to a 
position of power may result in a firm changing its corporate strategy (Andersson, 
2000, p76 - 77). Indeed, in some situations, a “critical incident” or “episodes” (often 
involving a change of leadership) might result in what Bell describes as “born again 
global” firms – i.e. an established firm which suddenly and rapidly internationalises, 
having previously shown little or no enthusiasm for doing so (Bell, McNaughton et 
al., 2001, p179). Because my study involves a longitudinal component, it seems 
sensible to briefly explore this issue within the context of the above-mentioned 
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hypothesis. It is possible that I may uncover examples of changes to my cohort firms’ 
geographical strategies following changes to their leadership teams. 
 
Existing professional services research suggests that the role of senior managers in 
determining a firm’s strategy – while important – is not always the sole determining 
consideration, in terms of then implementing that strategy. Here, some explanatory 
context may be helpful. Within the legal profession, it is known that many large law 
firms continue to operate a partnership-led form of governance (Greenwood and 
Empson, 2003, p911; Hillman, 2003) rather than, as has been claimed, on a more 
corporate “managed professional business” basis (Cooper, Hinings et al., 1996). In 
the partnership model, ownership, management and operations of practices are 
fused (Greenwood, Hinings et al., 1990, p730), and even managing partners may 
only manage on a part-time basis (Samuelson, 1990, p652). There are many 
possible explanations for this situation, including regulatory restrictions on law firms’ 
right to incorporate (OECD, 2000, p50) or to permit non-lawyer ownership 
(Claessens, van Haeften et al., 2012, p205 - 206). Also relevant may be 
explanations tied to lawyers’ identity, which treasure their professional 
independence, discretion (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007, p266) and autonomy 
(Empson, 2013, p11 - 19). Whatever the reasons, it has been claimed that, within the 
legal sector, decision-making and strategy-formulation is often coordinated (but not 
managed) by an elected committee of partners, who in turn put forward proposals 
relating to the strategic direction of the firm or practice group (Faulconbridge and 
Muzio, 2008, p16). Consequently, law firm partners may typically be involved in 
important strategy decisions, including decisions relating to firm strategy and 
direction, mergers or new alliances (Pinnington and Morris, 2003, p90 - 92). 
Therefore, in my hypothesis evaluation, not only might I expect to observe 
geographical strategies being announced by senior law firm personnel, I might also 
expect to observe situations where proposed changes to my cohort firms’ 
geographies are contingent on partnership votes.  
 
2.6.11.2. Conclusions 
Collectively, the above-mentioned research suggests that – at any one point in time 
– law firms are not only likely to have geographical strategies, but also distinctive 
geographical orientations. Moreover, a firm’s overall orientation is likely to comprise 
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a combination of a firm’s leadership orientation, as endorsed by the practice’s wider 
partnership. Further, this process is likely to be dynamic: a change in firm leadership 
may result in a change in the firm’s geographical strategy. Equally, the views of a 
firm’s wider partnership may also influence the firm’s geographical behaviours. If the 
above hypothesis is supported by reference to my cohort of large EU law firms, this 
would suggest the GaWC’s legal sector research contains a potentially important 
omission, because it does not explore this possibility. My findings start on p176.  
 
2.6.12.1. Hypothesis 11: my cohort of large EU law firms changed their branch 
office geographies in specific EU locations for reasons suggested by the 
GaWC, or by scholars who have studies the legal profession 
My eleventh hypothesis is: my cohort of large EU law firms change their branch 
office geographies in specific EU locations for reasons suggested by the GaWC, or 
by scholars who have studies the legal profession. The first element of this 
hypothesis starts from the premise that there are multiple drivers of legal practice 
geographical change. That multiple factors might cause (non-legal) firms to change 
their geography has been noted in relation to various sectors (O'Farrell, Wood, et al., 
1996, p111 - 112; Roberts, 1998, p103 - 104; Fletcher, 2001, p25 - 49; Bell, 
McNaughton et al., 2003, p339 - 362; Laanti, McDougall et al., 2009, p136; Deprey, 
Lloyd-Reason et al., 2012; Krull, Smith et al., 2012) and, more speculatively, by 
Dunning (1989, p30). However, in light of Løwendahl’s (2000, p151) observations 
that the underlying reasons for globalisation in professional service firms is probably 
industry-specific, it is perhaps not surprising that the above-mentioned studies 
explore varied considerations, prompting them to reach a variety of disparate 
conclusions. This lack of cross-sectorial consensus regarding the likely drivers of 
geographical change has been compounded by the small body of legal sector-
specific research. In the legal sector, some of the explanations offered for 
geographical change (including several offered by the GaWC) are speculative, and 
not supported by specific examples of firms changing their behaviour for those 
reasons. Further, in a limited number of situations where more substantive, legal 
sector-specific, research has been undertaken, a single factor has typically been 
considered in isolation, such as client demand (Cullen-Mandikos and MacPherson, 
2002, p491 – 499), regulatory liberalisation (Struble, 2011, p111 - 132) or law firm 
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profitability (Sherer, 2007, p162 – 185). Perhaps not surprisingly, some research 
conducted using this singular focus has struggled to explain a clear link between its 
hypothesis and the behaviours exhibited by its cohort (Brock, Yaffe et al, 2006, 
p169). The only English-language legal sector study I am aware of which has 
explored whether multiple factors might drive law firm geographical change is a 
small-scale investigation conducted by Segal-Horn and Dean (2011). This study, 
discussed later in this literature review, focused only on the drivers of globalisation 
among a small group of “super elite” (effectively large English) law firms, and 
specifically states its findings are not intended to be statistically significant (p201).  
 
In light of the current, fragmentary understanding of the drivers of law firm 
geographical change, I shall therefore devote the remainder of this literature review 
to discussing what is currently known about some of the most potentially important 
drivers of law firm branch office change in specific locations. And, because the 
narrow aim of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which the GaWC’s research has 
aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography, this section of my literature 
review will examine the current evidential basis of the explanations offered by the 
GaWC, by reference to research conducted by other scholars. The GaWC’s 
observations are (briefly) discussed in three GaWC papers – the previously 
discussed The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857 - 1876), 
Global law firms: globalization and organization spaces of cross-border legal work 
(Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p455 - 488), together with a third paper 
‘Managing across borders’: knowledge management and ex patriation in professional 
service legal firms (Beaverstock, 2004, p157 - 179). These three papers offer 
various, but not consistent, reasons why law firms might change their branch office 
reach over time. Indeed, on at least two occasions, the GaWC simply signposts the 
reader (Beaverstock, 2004, p165; Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p464 - 
465) to Dunning’s (1989, p30) eclectic paradigm, which speculatively suggests 
multiple law-specific reasons for geographical change. However, because some of 
Dunning’s explanations appear to be too broad-brush, or at variance with the 
explanations offered by scholars who have explored individual issues more closely, I 
have not simply accepted the parameters of Dunning’s specific suggestions without 
further refinement. Additionally, and in common with other scholars exploring 
geographical change (Roberts, 1998, p103; Andersen, Ahmad et al., 2014, p68), I 
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will explore the suggested GaWC / Dunning explanations of geographical change by 
reference to those possible drivers that are (broadly) “external” to the firm, and then 
by reference to those that are (broadly) “internal” to it. This is different to Dunning’s 
approach, which groups his individual explanations thematically according to 
whether they might result in an “ownership”, “locational” and “internationalisation” 
advantage for embarking on geographical change.  
 
It should be appreciated that, simply by endorsing Dunning’s (1989, p30) 
explanations for geographical change, the GaWC effectively (Beaverstock, 2004, 
p165) suggested that 10 different divers of geographical change were possible. 
Indeed, because further explanations were also offered by the GaWC in The long 
arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1859 - 1862), the total number 
potential individual drivers I shall evaluate in this literature review is 13. In working 
through these 13 possible explanations, it is accepted that the analysis that follows 
will, potentially, be exhausting for the reader. However, in light of the GaWC’s 
previously-discussed novelty in suggesting that law firms may change their 
geographies for a multiplicity of different reason, I feel it is incumbent on me to 
evaluate such a proposition in detail. Moreover, in the event that I conclude that law 
firms do, indeed, alter their branch office geographies for a multiplicity of reasons, 
this suggests that future legal sector research might be conducted on such a basis. 
Additionally, my lengthy analysis might also reduce the likelihood that future 
researchers might fail to identify significant considerations driving geographical 
change when, for example, undertaking a survey-based research. This somewhat 
unfortunate outcome occurred in Roberts’ (1998) study, which examined the factors 
causing UK business service firms to open new overseas offices. Here, having 
presented survey participants with seven different options, which they were invited to 
rank on a Likert scale, 66.7 per cent said “other” considerations were “extremely 
important” – 23 per cent ahead of the next most “extremely important” option (p195). 
 
2.6.12.2.1. External factor one: regulation 
In Managing across borders, the GaWC’s restatement of Dunning’s law-specific 
eclectic paradigm (1989, p30), the GaWC authors offer few clues about the possible 
link between legal practice geography and regulation – merely suggesting that 
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transnational firms may gain an internationalisation advantage due to “restrictions on 
the use of foreign barristers in court” (Beaverstock, 2004, p165). However, various 
other scholars have also drawn a link between law firm geography and regulation. 
For example, Segal-Horn and Dean (2011) claimed regulation is: “the strongest 
barrier to the potential globalisation of the corporate legal sector” (p209). More 
recently, GaWC scholars in Global law firms have suggested this issue is a “definer 
of the geography of global law firms” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, 
p461). Indeed, when discussing their findings regarding “over” and “under” 
provisioned legal markets by global law firms in this paper, the GaWC authors 
suggested the locations of law firms is “actually an interaction between market 
demand and regulation” (p463 – 644). How this interaction between law firm 
geography and regulation takes place is not then explained. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that several locations identified by the GaWC scholars as being under-
provisioned by global law firms are those locations separately identified by socio-
legal scholars as being largely closed to foreign law firms due to regulatory 
restrictions. These closed countries / cities include Mumbai and New Delhi in India 
(Vena, 2011; Garg, 2011 - 2012), Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia (Terry, 2013, p489 - 
490) and Seoul in South Korea (John, 2012). However, as the GaWC authors notes 
in Global law firms, of the most under-provisioned locations they identified, two – 
Toronto and Montreal – are in Canada. This is surprising, the GaWC authors noted, 
considering that the US – Canada’s geographical neighbour – is regarded as the key 
centre in the development of global lawyering through New York, and that both the 
US and Canada are part of the North American Free Trade Association. The authors 
also – briefly – noted that several European capital cities are also under provisioned 
by global law firms (p463 – 464). Collectively, I believe these observations are 
instructive, in terms of understanding the relationship between law firm geography 
and regulation. Collectively, they suggest regulation can impact on law firm 
geography – notably by preventing law firms from trading in certain locations. 
However, in itself, regulation cannot always explain why some law firms do not 
operate in certain locations – as evidence by the Canadian anomaly. This is one 
reason, I suggest, why law firm geography should not be evaluated through the 
prism of a single causal explanation.  
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In terms of how regulation may affect my cohort firms’ branch office geographies, it 
should be recognised that my study straddles two different regulatory environments 
regarding the permissiveness of multi-site law firms within the EU. These time 
periods can be summarised as being: “before the implementation of the 1998 
Establishment Directive” (Directive 98/5/EC) and: “after the implementation of the 
1998 Establishment Directive”. Prior to the Establishment Directive’s enactment, EU 
firms’ right to trade in another EU state often required some form of market access 
liberalisation to have taken place, either as the result of domestic legislation (Young, 
1992, p40 - 42; Barsade, 1994, p315 - 316), voluntary agreement (Terry, 1997 - 
1998) or litigation (Kühn, 1989, p48 - 53; Schack, 1993, p195; Martin, 2007, p182 - 
183). In the absence of such reforms, research conducted in various world regions 
suggests law firm may alternately seek ad hoc permission from a local regulator to 
trade in a location (MacMullin, 1988 - 1989, p58 - 60; Liu, 2008, p778; Krishnam, 
2010, p65 - 67; Papa and Wilkins, 2011, p180 - 181). Additionally, firms may open in 
a location, despite the apparent unlawfulness of their behaviour, in the hope that any 
ensuing litigation will (retrospectively) legitimise their actions. This scenario occurred 
in Germany during the late 1980s, when German law firms successfully overturned 
what was, in effect, a ban on multi-office domestic practices (Abel, 1993 - 1995, 
p801 - 802; Schultz, 2005, p106). I shall discuss a possible third option open to firms 
shortly. My results, which explore whether my cohort firms entered new EU markets 
on the basis that they had obtained permission to do so, or because they presumed 
they had a right to do so, start on p188. 
 
In contrast with a state-centred approach to legal practice branch office regulation, 
which may be a feature of the earlier part of my study time-period, the regulatory 
environment which existed in 2009 – the end point of my study – was different. 
Briefly, the rights set out in Article 11 of the 1998 Establishment Directive are clear: 
law firms have a general right to establish branch offices in another EU state, and 
also to employ lawyers from multiple EU nations within the same firm. It has been 
claimed that the directive not only facilitated law firms’ ability to establish in other EU 
states, but also promoted an increase in the number of law firms operating offices 
abroad (Claessens, 2008, p132). Given that most EU member states implemented 
this directive by its March 2000 deadline (Hagan, 2003, p169; Claessens, 2008, 
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p148 - 234) – with the notable exception of Luxembourg (Hinds and Pech, 2007) – I 
might therefore expect to observe some of my cohort of law firms to explain their EU 
geographical expansion events by reference to the rights guaranteed by this 
directive. However, in light of my synthesis of past research into the scale of many 
large law firms’ cross-border operations, discussed previously on p19 onwards, it 
should also be appreciated that I do not anticipate that all of my cohort firms will 
have taken advantage of their cross-border branch office trading rights within the EU 
by the time of my 2009 evaluation: simply because they “can” does not necessarily 
mean they invariably “will” (or had, by that year). Nevertheless, my qualitative 
establishment directive related findings can be found on p188 onwards. 
 
Further, it should be appreciated that the Establishment Directive does not offer all 
types of legal practice the unfettered right to trade freely within the EU. During the 
directive’s lengthy gestation (Weil, 1991 - 1992; Siskind, 1992, p928 - 930), a 
decision was made to allow EU member states to constrain the rights of MDP law 
firms to practice in their jurisdiction (Claessens, 2008, p47 - 55), should they wish to 
do so. Member states’ right to limit MDPs has since been confirmed, during the time 
period of my study, in the multi-year battle over the rights of establishment between 
the Dutch Bar Association and (what was then) Arthur Andersen and Price 
Waterhouse Tax Consultants (Terry, 2001 - 2002). This battle, in which the 
accountancy practices established in the Netherlands and challenged the local 
regulator to stop them, culminated in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in 
Wouters (C-309/99, 2002) – which the Dutch Bar Association ultimately won (Daly, 
2002, p601 – 605). However, the Wouters’ judgment did not mandate EU states to 
ban MDPs, nor does it render it unlawful for EU states to permit them – it merely 
confirmed that the Dutch rules prohibiting MDPs were lawful (Forrester, 2004, p8). 
Consequently, comparative research has since indicated that MDPs remained 
permitted in various EU jurisdictions, including Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain – although sometimes only in relation to specific professions 
(Paterson, Fink et al., 2003, p49; Garoupa, 2004, p44; Claessens, van Haeften et al., 
2012, p205 - 206). As such, it is possible that I shall observe MDP law firms 
continuing to trade within my cohort in the years after the ECJ Wouters’ decision.  
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More generally, the Wouters outcome serves as a useful counterpoint to my earlier 
observations regarding the use of litigation in Germany to facilitate law firm 
geographical change. In Germany, the law firms won their branch office 
establishment battle – but in The Netherlands they did not. Within my cohort firms, I 
might therefore uncover incidences where my sample practices challenged local 
regulators to stop them from trading in a location, believing they have a right to do so 
– and also achieved contrasting outcomes regarding the success of this approach. 
My findings start on p189. 
 
The next possible relationship between law firm geography and regulation also 
relates to MDP law firms. However, some preliminary context setting would be 
helpful before I discuss this issue further. Across the EU, comparative research 
suggests that, in general, the regulation of lawyers is typically shared between bar 
associations and governments (Paterson, Fink et al., 2003, p45). However, 
comparative research also suggests that the level at which bar associations exercise 
regulatory power differs between EU states (European Commission for the Efficiency 
of Justice, 2006, p129 - 130; European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 
2014, p387). In some EU states, there are a mere handful of bar associations, 
whereas in others there are more than 100 (Gromek-Broc, 2002, p120; 
Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, AnwaltVerein et al., 2013, p11). This is relevant to my 
study is because, according to some legal scholars, MDP law firms have sometimes 
taken advantage of the fragmentary nature of legal practice regulation within a 
country, and located themselves within the jurisdiction of a sub-national bar 
association that is more sympathetic to their right to exist than others. For example, 
within France, it has been suggested that the MDP law firms associated with Ernst & 
Young and Deloitte traded with the jurisdiction of the western Paris bar of Nanterre in 
order to avoid being caught by rules introduced elsewhere in the country, which 
hindered such firms’ right to operate (Daly, 2002, p609; Boigeol and Williemez, 2005, 
p54). Research also hints that MDP law firms might also have behaved in a similar 
fashion in Belgium (Stevens, 2002, p106). In my study, it is possible that I might 
uncover examples where the geographies of my cohort law firms is determined, at 
least partially, by regulatory differences within a single country.  
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In his discussion of the branch office liberalisation process in Germany, Abel (1993 – 
1995) notes that, prior to the liberalisation occurring, some German legal practices 
set up independent “branches” in other cities, in order to circumvent the existing 
territorial limitations on their right to operate on a multi-site basis (p801 - 802). In my 
study, I am interested in exploring this issue further. In doing so, I have appropriated 
a term used by the GaWC in Global law firms: “regulatory entrepreneurship”. The 
GaWC definition of this term is that global law firms “have had to be active advocates 
of legislative change that favours their operation and work as servers of transnational 
corporations” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p474 - 476). My usage of the 
term is more derogatory: effectively, I define it as: “law firms seeking to circumvent 
restrictive establishment rules, and trading in locations they should not.” Earlier, on 
p48, I explained how some law firms, including those linked to large accountancy 
practices, have created complex webs of ownership structures, in order to overcome 
local rules hindering the trading rights of MDP legal practices. Here, a typical 
(historical) example were Arnheim & Co, an “independent” firm “sponsored” by the 
(then) accountancy giant, Price Waterhouse, or Tite & Lewis, (formerly) associated 
with the (then) Coopers & Lybrand (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1860 - 1861). 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that such deontological subterfuge was 
confined to accountancy-linked legal practices. For example, Abel describes how US 
firm Coudert Brothers shared an office in London with Beharrell Thompson, a firm of 
“ostensibly independent solicitors” (Abel, 1993 - 1995, p760). Elsewhere in the world, 
McDermott Will & Emery’s operations in Shanghai, operated via an independent 
Chinese law firm (Yuan Da Law Offices) might be considered another example of a 
law firm structuring itself in a manner which circumvented local restrictions on foreign 
law firms (Li and Liu, 2011 - 2012, p2854). In my investigation, I might uncover 
additional examples of law firms trading in locations which, on a straightforward 
understanding of their contemporaneous local regulatory environment, they should 
not. My findings start on p189. 
 
Of course, some law firms may find it acceptable to operate within the letter – if not 
the spirit – of regulations which inhibit their right to practice in a given location. And, 
for my penultimate explanation of how regulation may influence geography briefly, I 
shall discuss what might happen when liberalisation occurs. In Germany, Abel (1993 
– 1995) notes that many inter-city mergers occurred shortly after the German 
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Supreme Court’s ruling that multi-site offices were permitted (p801 - 802). In my 
study, I might therefore expect clusters of geographical change in the time period 
following any equivalent liberalisation process in other EU states. Moreover, 
research conducted outside the EU suggests that law firms may not simply expand 
into new locations following liberalisation – they may also alter their alliance 
capitalism relationships to take advantage of these new freedoms. To explain, using 
the Japanese legal market as an example. In 1955, foreign law firms were banned 
from opening offices in Japan – a regime that remained in place for the following 
three decades (Martin, 2007, p191). Initially, liberalisation took the form of permitting 
joint ventures. But, from April 1 2005, full integration between foreign and Japanese 
firms was permitted (Aronson, 2007, p820 - 821). Not only did some – but not all – 
foreign firms merge with local Japanese practices on the same day they were 
permitted to, some also “upgraded” their existing alliance relationships into full 
mergers (Struble, 2011, p123 - 127). Similarly, within the EU legal market, I might 
uncover examples of my own cohort firms also “upgrading” their existing alliance 
capitalism relationships into integrated branch offices, once liberalisation permitted 
them to do so.  
 
2.6.12.2.2. Conclusions 
Collectively, the research discussed above provides a strong indication that 
regulation is, as the GaWC suggests, a “definer of the geography of global law firms” 
(Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p461). However, this research also 
suggests the manner in which regulation may define law firm geography is 
multifaceted, and more complex than Dunning’s nine-word explanation regarding 
“restrictions on the use of foreign barristers in court” (1989, p30). As a broad 
observation, the socio-legal research I have discussed suggests that law firm 
geographical change may be contingent on three alternate regulation-related 
scenarios: specific permission to trade (typically pre liberalisation); a right to trade 
(typically post liberalisation or successful litigation); and finally whether it possible to 
trade in a location via regulatory entrepreneurship (a scenario in which the right to 
trade is not established, but restrictions can nevertheless be circumvented). 
Additionally, the above-mentioned research suggests that firms’ ability to establish in 
a location may be contingent on not only national but also sub-national rules. Finally, 
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this research suggests that firms which attempt to use regulatory entrepreneurship to 
establish in a location may – or may not – be allowed to remain in that location. My 
exploration of these issues in relation to my law firm cohort starts on p188.   
 
2.6.12.3.1. External factor two: client considerations 
The GaWC has repeatedly stated that law firms might change their geographical 
profile for client-led reasons (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1859 - 1860). And, 
drawing on Dunning’s legal sector-specific eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1989, p30), 
the GaWC authors have indicated that becoming transnational may offer law firms a 
competitive advantage over other types of practice regarding their ability to gain 
access to transnational clients (Beaverstock, 2004, p165; Faulconbridge, 
Beaverstock et al., 2008, p464 - 465). I am not aware of any legal sector research 
which has found that law firms do not believe that altering their branch office reach 
would give them a competitive advantage over their peers, in terms of their ability to 
work for international clients. However, I am aware of a reasonable body of research 
which suggests that maintaining a compact geographical profile does not – in itself – 
hinder a firm’s ability to act for such clients. For example, on a granular – firm-
specific – level, Slinn’s (1984) account of the early history of (what is now) AS law 
firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer notes that the firm acted for the Anglo-
Californian Bank, the National Bank of New Zealand and the Land Mortgage Bank of 
India as far back at the 1800s (p129), despite not opening its first overseas offices – 
in Paris – until 1973 (p172). More generally, some scholars doubt whether scale – in 
itself – offers an advantage to law firms. This is because, with the demise of 
relationship lawyering, corporate counsel are inclined to hire the best firm for a 
specific service – even if those firms might be regarded as “boutique” practices 
(Baker and Parkin, 2005 - 2006, p1657). Indeed, research exploring the buying 
preferences of in-house counsel at large EU companies, conducted by legal 
publishers, has consistently supported this argument. This research has observed 
some – but not all – in-house lawyers expressing scepticism over the attractiveness 
of a “one-stop” law firm solution, in terms of instructing legal practices on a pan-
European basis (LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, 2003, p44; LexisNexis Martindale-
Hubbell, 2005, p36 - 37). Moreover, this scepticism appears to manifest itself in 
general counsel at large European PLCs often instructing several, if not dozens, of 
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different firms (Martindale-Hubbell International, 2008, p12; LexisNexis Martindale-
Hubbell, 2012, p26) – often on a country-by-country, practice-area-by-practice area 
basis (Casley Gera and Gillam, 2009, p24 - 58). Indeed, the above-mentioned 
LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell studies – and also academic research conducted by 
Ellis and Watterson (2001, p109 - 112) – have repeatedly noted that commercial law 
firms are instructed (or recommended) largely on the basis of their expertise and 
ability to meet deadlines. This research has also consistently claimed that a firm’s 
geographical coverage is generally regarded as a minor consideration, in terms of 
gaining instructions or recommendations (Martindale-Hubbell International, 2008, 
p20; LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, 2012, p17). Therefore, in my investigation, I will 
not assume that any client-related explanations for geographical change, offered by 
my cohort firms, will invariably be accompanied by an claim that change was driven 
by the need to attract transnational clients.  
 
That said, because both socio-legal scholars (Abel, 1993 - 1995, p743; Silver, 2000, 
p1112; Warf, 2001, p399; Thomas, Schwab et al., 2001 - 2002, p142 - 144; Segal-
Horn and Dean, 2011, p204 - 207; Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013, p905) and also 
researchers from outside the legal sector (O'Farrell, Wood, et al., 1996, p111 - 112) 
have suggested that client demand and client access is a driver of geographical 
change, I believe it would be premature to dismiss this as an explanation of why law 
firms change their geography. Nevertheless, research conducted by both the GaWC 
and other scholars suggests the relationship between clients and law firm geography 
might be almost as multifaceted as the relationship between law firm geography and 
regulation. For example, in The long arm of the law, the GaWC offers Clifford 
Chance as an example of a firm using law firm geography strategically – using its 
geographical scale to target both global and regional multinationals (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 1999, p1859 - 1860). Spar (1997), meanwhile, suggests law firms may 
change their geography for two contrasting client-related reasons: firstly, they follow 
existing clients into new locations; and secondly they establish in a new location 
speculatively, presumably in the hope that new clients will follow (p13). Indeed, such 
client-seeking and client-following behaviour is largely confirmed by Roberts’ (1998) 
previously-discussed findings regarding factors driving a variety of (non-legal) 
service sector firms to establish an overseas presence. Asked to rank the 
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importance of various possible factors – including productivity costs and knowledge 
of the country – survey respondents consistently rated client-related factors far more 
highly than these other considerations. Client location, this survey found, was 
classed as extremely important by 43.7 per cent of respondents, and very important 
by a further 24.5 per cent. And, in terms of potential client demand, present market 
opportunities was regarded as extremely important by 43.2 per cent of respondents 
and very important by 35.1 per cent of respondents. Finally, potential market 
opportunities were ranked as extremely important by 41.6 per cent of respondents 
and as very important by 32.2 per cent of respondents (p195). Within the legal 
sector, the need to service existing clients in new locations has also been illustrated 
in one of the very few academic studies to explore the drivers of law firm 
geographical change. In Cullen-Mandikos and MacPherson’s (2002) analysis of the 
establishment drivers of US law firms in London, seven of the nine London local 
managing partners interviewed suggested their firms’ investment decisions had been 
driven by a desire to retain US clients now also operating in the UK. By contrast, just 
two managing partners expressed an interest in serving non US clients (p494). In my 
study, I might expect to observe my cohort firms – including non-AS practices – 
altering their geographical profiles both in response to current client demand, and 
also on a more speculative basis.  
 
It is worth noting that client demand might not only drive geographical expansion, but 
also contraction. Here, Slinn’s (1997) authorised history of the law firm previously 
known as Ashurst Morris Crisp offers an illustrative example. Slinn notes the firm 
opened a Paris office in the early 1970s, largely to act on behalf of IBM in its dispute 
with the European Commission. After the case was settled, Slinn observes that 
Ashursts then shut the office (p195). In my study, I might expect to observe firms 
closing EU offices where client demand discontinues. 
 
Of course, as discussed previously, many large law firms (even large US law firms) 
do not have substantial international presence. Here, Silver (2000) makes the – 
perhaps self-evident – comment: “not all clients need foreign or international legal 
services…A large and varied client basis is likely to yield only a small number of 
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clients with needs in a particular foreign location” (p1131). In other words, a firm may 
simply decide there is no compelling business case for it to trade internationally, 
given a lack of client demand to do so. In my study, I might expect that some of my 
cohort firms will justify their lack of geographical expansiveness on such a basis. 
 
Moreover, even where client demand for geographical change may exist, it is 
possible that a law firm may nevertheless decide against doing so for wider strategic 
reasons. For example, Pinnington and Gray’s (2007) study, which examined the 
globalisation of Australian law firms, found – at the time – a reluctance by these firms 
to follow their clients into Europe. To the extent that such firms were willing to follow 
their clients abroad, Pinnington and Gray suggest the Asian legal market was the 
limit of Australian firms’ territorial ambitions. Effectively, client matters beyond these 
firms’ self-imposed geographies boundaries were ceded to US and UK legal 
practices in an unspoken arrangement that was “neither an explicit not a contractual 
part of their formal ‘co-operation agreements’” (p158). This appears to be a 
legitimate concern, in light of research conducted by legal publishers LexisNexis. 
This research suggests that large law firms in many jurisdictions often receive a 
significant minority of their fee income via referrals from other legal practices 
(LexisNexis Martindal-Hubbell, 2010, p11 - 12) – in other words, geographical 
expansion may result in lost referral revenues. One might therefore expect some of 
my cohort firms to defy client demand for similarly strategic reasons.  
 
Finally on the issue of client demand – in its broadest sense – it is worth noting that 
individual offices of existing law firms have occasionally broken away from their 
parent operations, claiming that they were not receiving sufficient referral work to 
justify their office’s ongoing branch office status within the firm. Here, the best 
example offered by socio-legal scholars is the departure of Baker & McKenzie’s 
Zurich office, because more than half of its client base was local, and therefore not 
generated by the firm’s international partnership (Abel, 1993 - 1995, p746; Flood, 
1996, p206). Thus, in relation to my cohort, it is possible that I may uncover 
examples of firms shrinking their geographical coverage for client-related reasons – 
possibly even intra-office client-related reasons.  
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2.6.12.3.2. Conclusions 
As with regulatory considerations, the above research suggests client considerations 
should not be regarded as a singular factor driving law firm geographic change. 
Instead, client considerations should be regarded as an umbrella concept which may 
explain a diverse range of law firm geographical behaviours. In terms of driving 
actual geographical change, actual and anticipated client demand appear to be the 
two key considerations that are most relevant to my study. However, two additional 
considerations also appear relevant, in terms of firms actively deciding not to change 
their geography: either there is no demand from clients to do so or, alternatively, that 
client demand is disregarded in light of a firm’s higher level strategic considerations. 
My client consideration findings start on p191. 
 
2.6.12.4. External factor three: significant geopolitical events 
In The long arm of the law, the GaWC suggests “Europe and European Monetary 
Union” (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1861 - 1862) might be an important driver 
of UK and US law firm geographical change within the EU. While this explanation is 
clearly specific to this world region at a certain point in time, the essence of this 
concept – that a significant geopolitical event may have a transnational impact on 
law firm geography – arguably has parallels with other events in recent history. For 
example, within the EU, it is know that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
resulted in a rapid and substantial expansion into that world region by certain large 
US law firms (Chapman and Tauber, 1994 - 1995, p949). Therefore, as I analyse my 
cohort firms’ EU geographical evolutions, I shall seek to uncover examples of large-
scale geopolitical events which prompted my sample practices to alter their EU 
branch office coverage. My findings start on p195. 
 
2.6.12.5. External factor four: geographical diversification to reduce 
organisational risk  
In The long arm of the law, the GaWC suggested that law firms might expand their 
geographical reach to diversify their exposure to risk (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
1999, p1860). However, the illustrative examples offered appear to more closely 
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related to actual and potential client demand in specific locations, rather than risk 
spreading. For example, the authors suggested that several US firms opened in 
China to service an influx of investment banks. Equally, their comments that “the 
major financial crisis of 1997 – 98 in Pacific Asia will cause the market for some legal 
work to shrink” (p1860) hints that firms might close their branch offices in response 
to falling demand. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, risk reduction does not 
feature in socio-legal researchers’ explanations of law firm geographical change. As 
part of my assessment of the GaWC’s contribution to our understanding of this issue, 
I shall seek to uncover examples of my cohort firms altering their branch office 
geography on such a basis. My findings start on p198. 
 
2.6.12.6. External factor five: technological advances 
Another possible driver of branch office geographical change identified by the GaWC 
in The long arm of the law is “technological advances” – effectively the ability to 
operate a multisite operation via the use of technologies such as intranets and 
internal noticeboards (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1861). Other researchers 
have suggested that technology can aid the smooth functioning of a multi-site law 
firm, facilitating both inter-office practice groups (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 
2008, p481 - 482) and innovations such as worldwide client billing (Segal-Horn and 
Dean, 2009, p47). However, whether technological considerations are, by 
themselves, an enabler of legal practice geographical change, or mainly an 
implementation issue (Segal-Horn and Dean, 2007, p214 - 215) which must be 
addressed as part of an law firm expansion event is, at this stage, uncertain. Indeed, 
elsewhere in the professional services research literature, Deprey, Lloyd-Reason et 
al’s (2012) analysis of the internationalisation of SME management consultancies 
suggests the use of technology can supplant a firm’s need to establish branch 
offices, because technology allows them to access international markets “while 
allowing continuing location in the UK and regular travel abroad for face-to-face 
meetings with clients as necessary” (p1617). Within my law firm cohort, I shall seek 
to uncover examples of sample firms altering their geographical reach in light of 
technological developments. However, if I cannot do so, this may be because 
technology considerations might best be regarded as a post-expansion 
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“implementation matter” – or even an inhibiter of the need for branch office 
geographical change – rather than a facilitator of it. My findings start on p199. 
 
2.6.12.7. External factor six: the need to interact with other local services 
The need to interact with local services is the first of two “external” explanations for 
geographical change where the GaWC authors restate (Beaverstock, 2004, p165) 
Dunning’s (1989, p30) law-specific eclectic paradigm as possible internationalisation 
advantages for transnational law firms, but then offer no illustrative examples, or 
explain of how this advantage might manifest itself. My discussion of this possible 
factor, below, is therefore framed only by reference to research conducted by non-
GaWC scholars. 
 
Although research into this issue is limited, non-GaWC research suggests the need 
to interact with other local services may prompt law firms to change their branch 
office geography. For example, firms may wish to establish a “liaison” office, whose 
function is so limited that it does not even involve the firm offering international or 
home state law. Here, the purpose of such an office may simply be to allow firms to 
learn about the local business environment, collect information, represent 
themselves to government and business, and promote relationships (Krishnam, 
2010, p65 - 67). Perhaps not surprisingly, research has identified law firms operating 
liaison offices in locations where branch office establishment freedoms are curtailed 
– notably India (Papa and Wilkins, 2011, p180 - 181), where several foreign law 
firms opened liaison-only offices during the 1990s. In other situations, a liaison office 
may allow a law firm to interact with local legal practices without merging with them – 
as happened in China during the same time period (Li and Liu, 2011 - 2012, p2849 - 
2851). In my study, I might expect my law firm cohort to justify geographical changes 
on such a basis: that is, they might claim an office has been established simply to 
coordinate their activities with locally-based stakeholders, and for no other purpose. 
My findings start on p200. 
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2.6.12.8. External factor seven: extent of local infrastructure 
The final Dunning-inspired (1989, p30) explanation of legal practice geographical 
change offered by GaWC that might be considered external to a law firm is “extent of 
local infrastructure” (Beaverstock, 2004, p165). The GaWC offers no guidance about 
what that infrastructure might be, or how it might impact on law firm geography. 
Therefore, I have decided that a plausible focal point for my own study might be the 
supply of lawyers in a specific location – can firms physically recruit sufficiently 
qualified personnel to establish offices in locations they intend to trade? In my study, 
I shall therefore seek to uncover examples of my cohort firms explaining their 
decision to alter their geographical reach on the basis of the availability of local 
lawyers. However, in light of Roberts’ (1998) research regarding drivers of cross-
border geographical change among UK services firms, I do not expect this 
consideration to be frequently cited by my cohort practices. Roberts’ research found 
that, of the seven possible factors offered to survey participants, only a small 
minority said the availability of skilled labour had any importance to their decision to 
expand into an overseas location – and almost a fifth of survey respondents said this 
consideration has no relevance (p195). My findings start on p203. 
 
2.6.12.9.1. External factor eight: competitive forces – or herd behaviour 
In The long arm of the law, (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857 - 1876), the 
GaWC authors briefly suggested that London’s law firms had globalised in light of 
increased competition from three sources: US law firm, European law firms, and 
accountancy firms (p1860 – 1861). Geographical change in response to competitive 
pressures was also suggested by Novelle and Stanback (1988) when explaining the 
internationalisation behaviours of some French law firms in response to inward 
investment by US legal practices (p106 – 107). However, several socio-legal 
scholars have offered a less flattering explanation of what appears to be the same 
phenomena: herd behaviour. Essentially, “the more firms went abroad, the more 
others itched to follow” (Spar, 1997, p13), possibly because they felt an “adolescent 
angst that all your friends are at a party to which you haven’t been invited – it is 
unbearable not to be there, even if you know you would have a terrible time” (Abel, 
1993 - 1995, p741). Other scholars, such as Sokol (2007, p5 - 28), offer a kinder 
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explanation for such behaviour: that firms may follow the herd on the assumption 
that other practices must have better information about a certain foreign market – 
perhaps because there are increased opportunities in that market (p13 – 14). In light 
of these repeated assertions that herd behaviour can drive law firm branch office 
change, I intend to explore the issue further by reference to my cohort.  
 
In relation to the EU legal market, various scholars have identified possible focal 
points of herd behaviour. At a country specific level, it has been claimed that Spain 
went from having “no foreign law firms” to “nine, representing three countries” in just 
two years (Abel, 1993 - 1995, p739). More recently, Bruinsma (2003) notes that The 
Netherlands encountered an “invasion” of foreign – mainly English – law firms at the 
end of the 1990s (p22). Further, research suggests the German legal market, once 
noted for its national bar’s “vigorous” opposition to the establishment of foreign firms 
(Goebel, 1988 - 1989, p468 - 469), might be a fruitful candidate for a case study in 
relation to my cohort firms’ possible herding behaviours. Evidence indicating the 
usefulness of a German-focused case study is offered by Galanter and Henderson’s 
(2007 - 2008) findings in relation to the changing foreign branch office locations of 
the top 250 NLJ US-heritage law firms between 1996 and 2006. This study found 
that the number of these firms trading in Frankfurt increased dramatically during this 
time period, up from one to 24 (p1889). Perhaps not surprisingly, Aronson (2007, 
p763 - 831) expressed a degree of cynicism regarding law firms’ own explanations 
for rapid consolidation within Germany, asking whether client demand – a frequently 
stated reason for law firm merger activity – could explain why nine out of the top 10 
German practices entered into a merger or formal alliance in a single year (p823). 
This is a useful insightful in relation to my own study, because it suggests that herd 
behaviour might usefully be explored by reference to law firms’ collective deeds 
rather than their explanations offered.  
 
Herd behaviour is a plausible concept. Indeed, evidence already discussed, which 
illustrates groups of firms collectively “rushing” into certain locations, gives it 
credibility. However, a word of warning is offered by Silver (2000, p1108), who points 
out that “group movements” can be explained by the fact that “particular economic 
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conditions” are often common to “all large law firms, which invariably share similar 
kinds of clients and practices”. And, although Silver appears to believe that herd 
behaviour exists (p1103), her observation serves as a warning about the risks of 
viewing common factors which may affect any given group of firms through the prism 
of herd behaviour. Indeed, Chapman and Tauber’s (1994 – 1995), longitudinal 
analysis of the global office trading locations of 700 leading US law firms between 
1960 and 1994 illustrates this point. For example, the authors note the EC “1992” 
initiative, the relaxation of regulatory barriers in Japan, and the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe were each accompanied by a sharp rise in US law 
firm office numbers in these locations around the time each event took place (p945 – 
946). More recently, the GaWC authors link UK law firms’ expansion into the EU with 
the advent of European monetary union and the foundation of the European Central 
Bank in Frankfurt (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1861 - 1862).  
 
2.6.12.9.2. Conclusions 
In the light of various examples of law firms collectively “rushing” into certain 
locations at various points in time, it is plausible that competitive pressures / herd 
behaviour may influence law firm geography. However, the possibility that group 
movements may also be driven by common factors lends a complexity to this issue 
which existing research has arguably not resolved. In my study, I shall seek to 
identify specific incidences of “group movements” among my cohort firms, with 
Germany a clear candidate for a case history. My findings start on p204.  
 
2.6.12.10.1. Internal factor one: legal systems advised on 
Having evaluated eight possible drivers of geographical change which appear to be 
largely “external” to a law firm, I shall now consider five possible drivers which 
appear to be “internal” to it – starting with legal systems advised on. Here, in their 
restatement of Dunning’s (1989, p30) law-specific eclectic paradigm, the GaWC 
authors briefly mention the internationalisation advantages for transnational law firms 
of being able to understand “local customers and legal procedures” and (in relation 
to transnational clients) having “knowledge of their particular needs” (Beaverstock, 
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2004, p165). However, a more detailed evaluation of this issue can be found in 
another GaWC paper, the The long arm of the law. In this paper, the GaWC’s 
provide a useful case history of the legal qualifications of Freshfields’ lawyers in the 
firm’s various global offices. This research discovered that, in 1997, Freshfields had 
developed a diverse – and office-specific – series of behaviours regarding its 
lawyers’ qualifications. In locations such as Barcelona, Beijing and Tokyo, the firm’s 
offices operated on an entirely expatriate basis. By contrast, in other locations, such 
as Singapore, the firm’s offices were entirely staffed with locally qualified personnel. 
In numerous other locations, including Madrid, Moscow and Paris, offices were 
staffed using a mixture of ex pat and locally-qualified practitioners (p1862 – 1865). 
Such behaviours have also been observed – again in relation to AS practices – by 
Silver. In Regulatory mismatch in the international market for legal services, Silver 
(2003) contrasted the behaviour of Davis Polk & Wardwell (DPW), which historically 
offered US law advice in all of its international offices with that of McDermott Will & 
Emery (MWE), which offered foreign – i.e. local – law in its non-US offices (p498 – 
499). In my study, the research conducted by both Silver and the GaWC’s suggests 
that, while I might expect to observe my cohort firms framing their geographical 
change decisions by reference the firm’s legal system capabilities, I should not 
necessarily expect those explanations to be consistent within firms (as per 
Freshfields) or between firms (as per DPW versus MWE).  
 
As with the ongoing existence of MDP law firms (discussed previously on p48), 
Silver’s research is another example where there is a discrepancy between some of 
the GaWC’s observations and that of socio-legal scholars. To explain: in Managing 
across borders (Beaverstock, 2004, p166), and more extensively in Global law firms 
(Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008), the GaWC authors assert that “ex 
patriation [i.e. the deployment of lawyers qualified in one country to another] is, then, 
a crucial organizational strategy of the global legal firm” (p484), further suggesting 
that a majority of solicitors at the top 10 London law firms in 2003 / 2004 work on an 
ex patriate basis outside their home jurisdiction (p486). This observation is at 
variance with Silver’s findings regarding the qualification held by lawyers working for 
large US law firms in their international offices. Across two separate studies, Silver’s 
(2004 - 2005) research found that more than 75 per cent of the lawyers working in 
the foreign offices of US law firms were not US bar association-admitted (p926 - 
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927). Indeed, in some foreign cities, Silver’s research also suggested that lawyers 
with a US legal qualification often comprised a small minority of a US firms’ local 
workforce. Within the EU, these percentages ranged from 0 per cent in Düsseldorf to 
17 per cent in London (Silver, Phelan et al., 2009, p1450). Moreover, lawyers 
working for US firms in many foreign locations were also highly likely to be qualified 
to practice in the jurisdiction where they worked (p1453 - 1454). Such findings are 
broadly replicated by Morgan and Quack (2005) in Institutional legacies, which 
explored the professional qualifications of partners at the top 10 German firms in 
2005 (half of which were either UK-German or US legal practices). Morgan and 
Quack’s research found that just 24.3 per cent of partners evaluated held foreign law 
degrees – 12.7 per US degrees, and 6.5 per cent UK degrees (p1770). In my cohort 
evaluation, where such information is available, I shall therefore pay close attention 
to the qualifications of those lawyers involved in the establishment of my cohort 
firms’ foreign offices, noting whether they are locally qualified or ex pat. 
 
The final manner in which legal systems capabilities may influence a law firm’s 
geography is speculatively offered by both Daniels (1993) and Mayson (1997). 
Although neither scholar substantiates their suggestions with specific examples, both 
indicate that legal systems capabilities may be relevant to firms’ wider geographical 
strategies. However, both authors have a different focus regarding their assertions. 
Daniels’ model – see table 4 overleaf – draws a connection between a firm’s legal 
system capacity and its client base. By contrast, Mayson’s model – see p77 – links a 
firms’ legal system capacity to its usage – or not – of foreign branch offices or 
alliances. Thus, using Daniels’ model, we might observe firms offering a single 
“home law” capacity to either “home clients” domestically, or “foreign clients” – 
presumably assisting such foreign clients with their inbound investments into the law 
firm’s territory. Equally, a law firm might develop a multiple legal system capacity, 
thus enabling it to advise “home clients” on their “foreign law” requirements – 
presumably by reference to their outbound investments. Finally, a firm may develop 
a capacity to advise foreign clients on their foreign law needs: essentially, the firm 
offers a “home law” practice in every location in which it trades (p184). Such a 
scenario is – possibly – envisaged by the GaWC in their restatement (Beaverstock, 
2004, p165) of Dunning’s law-specific (1989, p30) eclectic paradigm, when the 
authors suggest that “foreign customers may purchases services in home country”. 
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However, it is accepted that this interpretation is a matter of supposition, because 
the GaWC offer no guidance about what this consideration might mean.  
 
Table 4: Daniels’ model of legal practice suggesting different combinations of 




Source: Daniels, 1993, p184. 
 
In contrast with Daniels’ approach, Mayson’s (1997) model – shown overleaf – 
suggests that law firms use their legal system capacity to signal whether or not they 
intend to compete or cooperate with other legal practices. Mayson’s approach 
suggests that firms which only practice internationally via networks or affiliations, are 
adopting a cooperation strategy. By contrast, international or multinational law firms, 
which operate their own foreign branch offices, and offer either home or local law, 
might be said to be operating a competitive, integrated strategy (p202). In terms of 
my own cohort evaluation, both Daniels’ and Mayson’s models indicate behaviours I 
might expect to observe among my sample practices. Following Daniel’s model, I 
might expect to observe some of my cohort firms to frame a branch office change 
event by reference to the type of law and clients the new office is intended to serve. 
Equally, following Mayson’s model, I might expect those of my sample law firms who 
expand internationally, and then offer the home laws of the countries in which they 
now operate, to cease cooperation with firms in those countries.  
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Table 5: Mayson’s model of legal practice suggesting an intersection between 
legal systems offered a firm’s wider geographical strategy 
 




from HOME OFFICE 
 
 
Home law only 
INTERNATIONAL practice from 
home office through a 
NETWORK or AFFILIATION 
 
Home law only; mutual referrals 
INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FIRM 




A: INTERNATIONAL practice 
Home law only 
ALLIANCE with joint venture 
FOREIGN OFFICE 
 
A: INTERNATIONAL practice 
Home laws of alliance firms 
only 
 
B: MULTINATIONAL practice 
Home law and local law 
 
B: MULTINATIONAL practice 







Home law = local law 
PARALLEL PARTNERSHIP 
 
Home laws of partners firms 
and local law 
 
Source: (Mayson, 1997, p202) 
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2.6.12.10.2. Conclusions 
Collectively, the research discussed above indicates that legal system 
considerations may drive law firm geographical change. Therefore, I shall evaluate 
whether this factor has affected the EU geographies my cohort law firms. However, I 
also suspect that, in the light of Daniels’ (1993) and Mayson’s (1997) suggestions, 
legal system considerations may closely interact with other considerations, both 
internal and external to the firm. Externally, does the firm wish to develop its 
capabilities to advise clients locally in a given market – typically on the basis of its 
local law capacity? Additionally, does the type of law firm offers affect its 
relationships with other firms in certain markets? My findings start on p208. 
 
2.6.12.11.1. Internal factor two: practice area / industry sector specialisms 
In their various papers, GaWC did not explore the idea that the practice areas or 
industry sector capabilities offered by law firms might play a role in their changing 
geographies. Moreover, this possible driver of geographical change is not suggested 
in Dunning’s law-specific eclectic paradigm – unless “need for understanding of local 
customers and legal procedures” (1989, p30) is interpreted widely.  
 
The GaWC’s lack of consideration that practice area / industry sector considerations 
might influence law firm geography is at variance with various socio-legal scholars 
who have repeatedly, if often obliquely, connected the issues. For example, Roorda 
(1993) suggests British and American law firms had active arbitration practices in 
Paris, as well as other cities in Europe and Asia (p149). Brussels, meanwhile, has 
long been recognised (Novelle and Stanback, 1988, p42) as a centre for firms who 
specialise in EU law, attracting law firms of many different nationalities (Goebel, 
1988 - 1989, p476 - 477). Indeed, research conducted by Van Criekingen, Decroly et 
al (2005) found that, in 2003, 197 international firms had offices in Brussels, of which 
153 were foreign-based (p177 -179). Elsewhere in the EU, Henssler and Terry 
(2001) suggest that individual cities within countries may attract firms for different 
practice area-related reasons. For example, within Germany, they suggest Frankfurt 
is known for its focus on international banking law, capital markets and M&A work, 
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whereas Düsseldorf is a focus point for intellectual property (p277). Also in Germany, 
Luschin (2010) describes the practice area-related focal points of various German 
cities slightly differently to the above-mentioned cities – suggesting Frankfurt is a 
centre of finance, Düsseldorf is a corporate centre and Munich an IP hub (p39). More 
generally, various scholars have suggested that corporate and capital markets work 
is inherently international (Spar, 1997, p16 - 17; Silver, 2000, p1099 - 1100; Flood, 
2001, p253 - 259). 
 
In terms of locations with a specific industry sector focus, Henssler and Terry (2001) 
suggest Düsseldorf is home to technology companies (p276 – 277). Elsewhere in the 
world, Silver suggests that Texan law firms tend to focus on energy matters, New 
York firms on finance, California firms on tech start-ups and Washington firms on 
political matters (Silver, 2007, p70 - 71). In truth, the precise labels attached to cities 
regarding their practice area / industry focuses are arguably not important to my 
evaluation. Rather, as a generic point, this research suggests my cohort of firms may 
justify some of their geographical change events by reference to the location’s 
practice area or industry sector-related possibilities.  
 
2.6.12.11.2. Conclusions 
In light of the above research, I suggest legal or industry considerations may prompt 
some of my cohort firms to change their EU branch office geographies. However, 
because a large number of industry sector / legal specialisms have previously been 
identified as possible drivers of geographical change, I shall not assume that any 
one specialism is uniquely likely to be responsible for my cohort firms’ geographical 
change events. My findings start on p213.  
 
2.6.12.12.1. Internal factor three: financial considerations 
That financial considerations may play a role in law firm geography represents 
another division between GaWC / Dunning, and researchers from outside this 
grouping. I am not aware of any substantive GaWC research which has explored the 
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relationship between law firm geography and financial considerations. By contrast, 
various scholars from outside the GaWC have investigated the links between the two 
phenomena. However, their findings have generally proved inconclusive.  
 
According to traditional economic theory, one might expect larger law firms to benefit 
from costs advantages over smaller firms, partly due to the greater economies of 
scale – for example, the ability to share fixed overheads between additional fee 
earners (Samuelson, 1990, p647 - 648; Samuelson and Fahey, 1990 - 1991, p443), 
thereby reducing the unit cost of that support per fee earner. However, some 
scholars have questioned whether such arguments explain why law firms have 
achieved their large scale, given that efficiencies can be generated within smaller 
firms (Gilson and Mnookin, 1984 - 1985, p316 - 318). And, in relation to the financial 
performance benefits of law firms operating a substantial cross-border presence, 
evidence from existing research is mixed. Research conducted by Spar (1997) 
suggests that large firms with a substantive international presence can be 
substantially more profitable (in this case 37 per cent more profitable) than other 
firms in the same cohort with a more domestic focus, when judged on a profits per 
partner (PPP) basis. However, Spar’s research also found that some – more 
geographically compact – US firms can also be highly profitable (p18). Moreover, 
others scholars have pointed out that some large law firms in specific markets – 
notably Slaughter and May in the UK (Aronson, 2007, p796 - 797; Faulconbridge and 
Muzio, 2009, p657 - 658) – have not adopted a strategy of large-scale geographical 
expansion, yet are some of the country’s most profitable practices. All of these 
observations have been replicated – on a larger scale, and again involving US law 
firms only – in Sherer’s (2007) research. Essentially, Sherer’s longitudinal cluster 
analysis of large US law firms between 1999 and 2003 found that a “circle of elite” 
firms – which all had a relatively low percentage of their lawyers working outside the 
country – nevertheless enjoyed a consistently higher profits per equity partner (PEP) 
than those firms with a larger percentage of their workforce working internationally. 
However, Sherer’s research also suggested that both the elite firms they evaluated, 
and also their more internationalised counterparts, were more profitable than their 
domestically focused peers (p170 – 178) – which largely replicates Spar’s 
observations. Ultimately, Sherer concludes that the high profitability demonstrated by 
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the circle of elite firms defies the notion that highly successful firms need to be 
international (p180 – 181). In light of this research, I have concluded that it would not 
be helpful to explore the relationship between my cohort firms’ international 
operations and their profitability in my study, partly because the link between these 
variables appears unclear. 
 
In my investigation, I also do not intend to undertake a detailed longitudinal 
investigation into the evolving profitability of my cohort, in light of their changing 
geographical reach – not least because financial data relating to my sample firms is 
only sporadically available. However, building on another aspect of Sherer’s (2007) 
research, it is noteworthy that there appears to be comparatively little evidence that 
law firms can achieve “first mover” financial advantage by undertaking 
internationalisation earlier than their peers – indeed there may even be a small 
financial penalty for doing so. In his evaluation of his cohort firms’ financial 
performance, Sherer discovered that “early internationalisers” had a slightly lower 
PPP in 2003 (US$ 1,022,500) than those who did so “later” (US$ 1,121,667) – 
(p173). These findings are also broadly replicated in Brock Yaffe et al’s (2006) study 
of the evolving financial performance of the world’s largest 100 law firms between 
2001 and 2003. In this study, the authors distinguished between three types of firms: 
prospectors (35 per cent lawyer growth in two years, offices in +10 countries), 
analysers (+25 per cent lawyer growth, offices in four or more countries, or 11 per 
cent lawyers abroad) and defenders (lowest rate of growth, offices in three or fewer 
countries). In terms of overall financial performance, the authors discovered that 
prospector firms grew their revenues at the highest rate of all sample firms (24.62 
per cent, compared to 16.77 per cent for analysers and 11.46 per cent for 
defenders). However, in terms of profits per equity partner growth, prospector firms 
performed poorly – yielding a mere 3.68 per cent increase, compared with a 15.98 
per cent increase for analysers and 7.15 per cent for defenders (p167). Analysing 
their findings, the authors suggested that analyser firms may have a balanced 
approach to diversification, in contrast with the riskier strategies of prospector firms 
(p169). However, the authors acknowledged that the reasons why analyser firms 
outperform defenders was unclear. My own study will not seek to answer this puzzle, 
because I am only concerned about whether financial considerations have any 
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bearing on law firm geography per se, rather than – as in this study – the cumulative 
financial impact on the scale of firms’ international operations. But it is an area ripe 
for future research.  
 
The above-mentioned research suggests it is difficult to establish a clear link 
between law firm geography and financial considerations at a macro scale. However, 
comments made by some scholars – typically in the most fleeting terms – suggest 
that financial considerations might impact on law firm geography on a more micro 
level. One might, for example, speculate whether the low profits per partner of 
German firm Oppenhoff compared with its merger partner Linklaters (Henssler and 
Terry, 2001, p287) might have been a “pull factor” for Oppenhoff to agree to its 
geography-extending combination. Equally, the need to improve financial 
performance among recently merged Anglo-German practices may have prompted 
several office closures in that country (Aronson, 2007, p802). 
 
2.6.12.12.2. Conclusions 
It is ironic that financial considerations, arguably one of the more heavily investigated 
aspects of law firm geography, have been unable to offer clear guidance on the 
relationship between these two variables. However, and despite the slim evidential 
basis for possible “pull” and “push” factors driving geographical change, I have 
concluded that financial consideration should not be discounted from my evaluation. 
In my study, I shall focus my exploration of whether financial considerations might 
prompt my cohort of firms to alter their geography at a firm-specific – possibly even 
office-specific – level of granularity. My findings start on p215. 
 
2.6.12.13. Internal factor four: quality control 
Quality control is another example where the GaWC (Beaverstock, 2004, p165) 
simply restates Dunning’s (1989, p30) law-specific driver of geographical change 
without further explanation. Nevertheless, research conducted by a small number of 
scholars suggests this consideration might prompt my cohort firms to change their 
branch office geography for this reason. For example, my sample practices may wish 
to work on a “one firm” basis, where best practices and standardised service delivery 
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methods can be deployed (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013, p900 - 901). 
Alternatively, firms may justify their geographical change events on the basis that 
clients will receive an “effortless experience” of “client facing consistency” (Segal-
Horn and Dean, 2009, p48 - 49). My findings start on p218. 
 
2.6.12.14. Internal factor five: personal partner preferences 
The final possible driver of legal practice geographical change within my cohort was 
briefly suggested by Løwendahl (2000) in the context of professional service 
geography generally, rather that law specifically. Essentially, Løwendahl suggested 
that an office may be established in a new location due to the personal preferences 
of a firm’s partners – for example, if a UK partner marries a Spanish citizen, and 
consequently wishes to open Madrid branch. Indeed, the firm may shut that office if 
the partner subsequently leaves the firm, and no one can be found to replace them 
(p156 - 157). This explanation has been tacitly endorsed by the GaWC in 
Geographies of globalization, when the authors indicated that “historical or personal 
links” may cause some firms to operate “idiosyncratic” schemes of branch office 
geographical behaviour (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p108). This is an intriguing 
proposition, which I will further explore on p219. 
 
2.6.12.15. Section conclusions 
My review of the fragmented body of existing research suggests that a variety of 
considerations are likely to drive law firm geographical change in specific 
circumstances – which supports the GaWC’s top-level proposition on this point. 
Moreover, in some situations, there appears to be broad agreement between 
scholars that certain drivers may prompt legal practice geographical change, even if 
different scholars discuss individual drivers at different levels of granularity. By 
contrast, in other situations, there appears to be no consensus – or indeed, 
supporting evidence – regarding the plausibility of various drivers suggested. In light 
of these numerous evidential uncertainties, I believe a systematic analysis of this 
issue by reference to my cohort is warranted. Do my sample law firms commonly 
explain their EU geographical change events by reference to reasons described by 
the GaWC or other scholars – and at the same level of granular detail? My findings 
start on p187.  
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2.7. Literature review conclusions 
I believe the research discussed above provides further justification for my decision 
to evaluate law firm geography through the prism of the GaWC’s law-related 
research. Collectively, the GaWC’s research has allowed me to produce a series of 
testable hypotheses regarding possible patterns of geographical branch office 
behaviours I expect my cohort of large EU law firms to exhibit. The GaWC’s research 
has also indicated possible patterns of behaviour regarding alliance capitalism, both 
in terms of large EU law firms’ collective use of it, and also the manner in which such 
firms use it in conjunction with their EU branch offices. Finally, the GaWC research 
has not only suggested that law firms might change their geographies by reference 
to a multiplicity of different reasons, it has also suggested what those reasons might 
be – some of which have been supported by other scholars.  
 
Nevertheless, there appear to be several omissions from the GaWC’s law-specific 
research output. Notably, the GaWC does not appear to have explored whether law 
firms have overarching geographical strategies, or the mechanisms by which such 
strategies might come into existence. And, at a more granular level, some of the 
GaWC’s explanations of the drivers of legal practice branch office geographical 
change are not always consistent with those offered by other scholars – or indeed 
proposed on anything more than a speculative basis. More pervasively, and in 
common with much of the social-legal research cited above, the GaWC has taken a 
highly AS-centric view of law firm geography. Whether this AS focus has impacted 
on the replicability of the GaWC’s observations, such as firms’ collective tendencies 
to congregate in certain global legal service centres or world cities, remains to be 
seen. Only once my evaluation has been undertaken by reference to my distinctive 
cohort of large EU law firms – the focal point of my two results chapters – will I be 
able to offer my conclusions on this point. At this stage, I will be able to evaluate the 
GaWC’s overall contribution to our understanding of large EU law firm geography. 
Moreover, once this exercise is complete, I will also be able to decide whether my 
overarching hypothesis – that large EU law firms, operating in various different EU 
states, collectively appear to adhere to a limited number of identifiable patterns of 
geographical behaviours – is supported.  
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3.1. Introduction 
My overarching hypothesis proposes that large EU law firms, operating in various 
different EU states, collectively appear to adhere to a limited number of identifiable 
patterns of geographical behaviours. I will test this overarching hypothesis by 
evaluating whether possible patterns of geographical behaviour, suggested by the 
GaWC by reference to one group of large law firms, appears to be replicated by a 
novel cohort of EU large law firms of my own selection. This chapter explains how I 
will test each “sub-hypotheses”, discussed previously in my literature review, by 
reference to my cohort. The more my various sub-hypotheses are supported by 
reference to my cohort, the more my overarching hypothesis will be supported – and 
vice versa (for convenience, I shall now refer to each of my “sub-hypotheses” as 
“hypotheses”). And, referring back to the title of this thesis, the more the GaWC’s 
previously-indicated patterns of behaviour are replicated within my cohort, the more I 
will conclude the GaWC’s research has aided our understanding of large EU law firm 
geography – or vice versa.  
 
My results in the following chapters reflect the nature of the GaWC’s legal practice 
research to date – a reflection also evident in this chapter. For my first nine 
hypotheses, which relate to possible patterns of law firm branch office and alliance 
capitalism behaviours, the GaWC’s research has guided me in relation to what law 
firm geographical data I should collect, and how it should be analysed. My results 
regarding my own sample firms’ behaviours regarding these issues can be found in 
chapter four. These findings are quantitative in nature. By contrast, my evaluation of 
the GaWC’s suggestion that law firms may alter their geographies in specific 
locations for a variety of reasons (hypothesis 11) takes a qualitative approach. This 
is because I am simply seeking to demonstrate “proof of concept” that large EU law 
firms do, indeed, change their geographies for a multiplicity of consistently-
identifiable reasons. Unfortunately, because the GaWC did not substantially 
investigate its own proposition in any detail, the group’s collective writings cannot 
guide my research method. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I will explain how I 
undertook this appraisal in relation to my cohort’s EU geographical changes, which 
took place between 1998 and 2009. These findings can be found in the latter part of 
chapter five. 
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In my literature review, I further suggested the GaWC’s research appeared to 
contain an important omission regarding possible patterns of legal practice 
geographical behaviour, because it did not substantively consider that law firms 
might commonly possess overarching geographical strategies. By contrast, my 
literature review uncovered limited evidence – typically derived from non-legal 
professional services globalisation research – to suggest that law firms might, 
indeed, have such strategies. Further, my analysis of this literature also indicated 
that it may be possible to decompile the essence of a legal practice geographical 
strategy into something that I could test for among my cohort. In my testing of 
hypothesis 10, I will first seek to establish that a reasonable number of EU sample 
firms across my various national cohorts can commonly be observed asserting that 
they do indeed have geographical strategies related to – but also distinctive from – 
the specific reasons why they change their branch office geographies in particular 
locations. I will then seek to establish that, in order to implement such strategies, my 
sample firms typically require a consensus to be reached between firm leaders and 
their wider partnerships. As with hypothesis 11, mentioned above, my testing of 
hypothesis 10 will be qualitative, because I am simply seeking proof of concept in 
relation to this issue. At present, this issue is largely unexplored within legal services 
research. If this hypothesis is supported, I will consequently conclude the GaWC’s 
legal sector research contains a notable omission. In this chapter, I will explain how I 
collected, and also analysed, the law firm data which forms the basis of this 
hypothesis evaluation. My findings can be found towards the start of chapter five. 
 
3.2. The scope of my investigation – firm sample selection, geographical scope 
selection and time period selection 
Before I discuss what data was collected, and how it was coded and analysed, I will 
first explain my cohort sampling and the territorial and temporal limits of my study.  
 
I shall explain the rationale for basing my cohort on the largest 15 law firms – by 
lawyer headcount – in nine EU states in 2009 shortly. However, the firms within my 
cohort are derived from various league tables published in the 2009 Legal 500 
EMEA legal directory (Pritchard, 2009). Using pre-existing legal publisher rankings 
as the basis for cohort selection appears to be the default sampling approach taken 
by several of the studies I discussed in my literature review, including research 
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undertaken by Silver (2000, p1105 - 1107), Galanter and Henderson (2007 - 2008, 
p1889 - 1890), Warf (2001, p401 - 405) and Morgan and Quack (2005, p1774 - 
1777) – and also the GaWC (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1857 – 1876, 
Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p96). And, given that the GaWC’s studies explored 
the geographies of large – rather small or medium sized– law firms, I did likewise, 
allowing like to be compared with like. Moreover, existing research tells us that a 
country’s largest legal practices are often geographically active (Beaverstock, Smith, 
1999, p1863; Silver, 2000, p1108 - 1129) over a period of time (Baker and Parkin, 
2005 – 2006, p1650) – even if not consistently so, particularly on an international 
basis (Beaverstock, Smith et al, 2000, p106 – 107; Warf, 2001, p401 - 403). As such, 
it is reasonably safe to assume that the large law firms in my cohort are likely to have 
an interesting story to tell regarding their evolving geographies during my evaluation 
time period – 1998 to 2009.  
 
Where my study differs from many of those discussed elsewhere in this thesis – 
including the GaWC’s research (Beaverstock, Smith et al, 1999, p1857 – 1876; 
Beaverstock, Smith et al, 2000, p96; Beaverstock, Taylor et al, 1999, p453 – 454) – 
is that my investigation does not soley focus on the geographies of large US and UK 
law firms – although such firms form part of my overall cohort. Past academic 
research has shown that large law firms in markets as diverse as Australia 
(Pinnington and Gray, 2007, 147 – 172), Canada (Daniels, 1993, p147 – 206) and 
Germany (Morgan and Quack, 2005, p1765 – 1785) can be geographically active. 
This has lent weight to my decision to cast my jurisdictional sampling net for 
evaluating the GaWC’s research widely. However, in truth, it was my previous career 
as a legal journalist on The European Lawyer magazine that alerted me to the 
possibility of doing so. From the outset of my PhD journey, I did not believe that, in 
order to study geographically active law firms, it was essential to evaluate the world’s 
largest legal practices, which tend be of US or UK heritage (Beaverstock, Taylor et 
al, 1999, p453 – 454). By way of illustration, in 2009, the three largest Austrian law 
firms (Pritchard, 2009, p994) collectively employed just 637 lawyers globally 
(Pritchard, 2009, p39, p50, p53) – less than one tenth of the lawyer headcounts of 
three of the UK’s largest legal practices that year (Legal Week, 2009, p22 – 23). Yet, 
notwithstanding their diminutive global scale, Austria’s three largest law firms (all 
non-AS) collectively operated 22 offices across 14 countries in 2009 (Pritchard, 
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2009,p39, p50, p53). By looking beyond the world’s largest law firms as the basis of 
my evaluation cohort, I was able to test the replicability of the GaWC’s findings 
among law firms that were geographically active and also “large” within their own 
markets – but not always “large” by global standards. By adopting this approach, it is 
hoped my findings will encourage future researchers to also cast their sampling net 
more widely than the AS “mega firms” favoured by the GaWC and others.  
 
My research seeks to uncover possible patterns of geographical behaviours between 
different cohorts of large law firms. Almost inevitably, my evaluation required me to 
compare and contrast the geographies large law firms in multiple jurisdictions – in 
this case the largest law firms in nine different EU states in 2009. My multi-cohort 
sampling is reminiscent of the GaWC’s approach in Connecting Rhine-Main (Hoyler, 
Freytag et al., 2008), where the geographies of eight distinctive sub-cohorts (in this 
case, eight different APS sectors within a single country) were explored and 
contrasted (p1100). Consequently, I regard the nine national sub-groups within my 
overall cohort as being neither unduly small nor large. However, unlike the GaWC in 
The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al, 1999, p1857 - 1876), which 
compared and contrasted the geographies of the top 30 London with their top 30 
New York equivalents, my investigation will mirror the approach taken by Morgan 
and Quack (2005), and only compare the geographies of the top 15 law firms per 
sample jurisdiction. My sampling decision is partly pragmatic but also principled. By 
selecting the largest 15 firms in nine EU evaluation jurisdictions, my potential sample 
size was 135 practices. In reality, my cohort was smaller – 107 firms – because 
several of my sample practices belonged to multiple national evaluation cohorts. 
Nevertheless, my sample size is larger than many studies which form the core of my 
literature review. My cohort is therefore sufficiently large to be considered statistically 
reliable for the purposes of the analysis for which my data would be subjected. The 
pragmatic element of my cohort selection is that my preferred sampling source, the 
Legal 500 EMEA legal directory (Pritchard, 2009), did not consistently produce top 
30 rankings for each EU country in 2009 – possibly because law firms in some EU 
states were so small that such rankings would be difficult to achieve. For example, in 
Malta, during my evaluation year, a top 15 law firm by size employed seven lawyers 
(Pritchard, 2009, p922), while in Slovenia a top 11 law firm employed just two 
(Pritchard, 2009, p1318). Within my overall cohort, what constituted a “large” law firm 
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was consistently larger than either of these examples. Nevertheless, in several 
jurisdictions I explored, the small size of specific sample firms represented the lower 
limits of those practices I felt it was worth evaluating. To illustrate the heterogeneous 
nature of my cohort, the smallest firm in my sample – Lavelle Coleman of Ireland – 
employed 40 lawyers in 2009 (Pritchard, 2009, p662). By contrast, Spain’s Garrigues 
employed 1,954 (Pritchard, 2009, p1342) that same year. Helpfully, the varied lawyer 
headcounts within my overall sample appears to be in accordance with research 
best practice, which suggests that sampling should be diverse within the boundaries 
of a defined population (Ritchie, Lewis et al., 2014, p116 - 117).  
 
The large legal practices I will evaluate in my study comprise the largest firms in 
Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherland, Sweden, Spain and the 
UK, as set out in the 2009 EMEA Legal 500. My decision to evaluate possible 
patterns of geographical behaviour among law firms in these jurisdictions was taken 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, my prior experience of working for The European 
Lawyer had indicated, anecdotally, that the geographies of large law firms in various 
EU states were likely to differ substantially from each other – large law firms in some 
EU jurisdictions were known to be geographically expansive (Parnham, 2005a, p52), 
others less so (Parnham, 2005b, p52). Assuming that geographical patterns of 
behaviour, indicated by the GaWC and others, could be verified within such a 
diverse group of “large” legal practices would provide reasonably strong evidence for 
future researchers that patterns of behaviour might be replicable in other legal 
markets. My European Lawyer-derived market knowledge therefore led me to 
conclude that the EU legal market would be a strong contender for being the focal 
point of my GaWC reappraisal – especially, as previously noted on p1, this market 
also appeared to be a focal for legal practice inward investment. My preference for 
evaluating the geographies of large EU law firms specifically was further reinforced 
by my discovery that numerous EU legal markets had not been subject to systematic 
academic scrutiny since Abel’s study (1993 – 1995) in the 1990s. Given that I was 
already familiar with the EU legal market, and that the geographies of large EU law 
firms had not been extensively explored by academic research in recent years, these 
considerations led me to conclude it was appropriate to select large EU law firms as 
the basis for my GaWC evaluation. Moreover, exploring the geographies of the top 
15 law firms in the above-mentioned EU states would mean I would be studying law 
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firms operating in both common law and civil law legal markets; those with relatively 
large – and also relatively small – national populations of lawyers (European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2006, p127 – 128); and also legal markets 
in both Northern and Southern Europe. In addition, existing research indicated that 
certain EU legal markets were likely to include a mixture of US / UK, indigenous and 
conglomerate law firms (Morgan and Quack, 2005, p1776; Luschin, 2010, p40 - 87), 
further adding to my cohort diversity. I decided to include the UK and German legal 
markets within my overall sample for a variety of reasons – not least because the 
relatively large populations of these countries meant they were significant employers 
of lawyers. In addition, including these two jurisdiction within my study would allow 
me to both compare, and possibly update, the findings of Morgan and Quack (2005, 
p1776), which was based on large UK and German law firm location data in 2003. 
 
In order to evaluate the GaWC findings, I did not believe it necessary to explore the 
2009 geographies of large law firms in every single EU country, on the basis that 
predicted patterns of behaviour were likely to be observable within a narrower 
sample group. This consideration also partially drove my decision to only explore my 
sample group’s geographical activities and strategies within the EU, rather than 
globally. As discussed previously, several of the GaWC’s key observations – notably 
the globalisation arenas in which firms traded (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, 
p1868 - 1873), and also the world cities they located themselves in (Beaverstock, 
Taylor et al., 1999, p456) – contained findings that were EU legal market-specific. 
Thus, I decided that it should be possible to evaluate the GaWC’s findings by 
reference to my sample firms’ EU locations alone. However, it is also accepted that 
resource and time constraints also influenced my decision to largely confine my 
investigation to the EU legal market. Given that one of my sample firms (Fidal) 
operated 95 offices in 2009 (Pritchard, 2009, p376), it would be logistically 
impossible for my whole investigation to be conducted on a global scale.  
 
In the absence of consistently-available English language law firm size league tables 
from official sources in each of my evaluation jurisdictions, the Legal 500 EMEA 
(Pritchard, 2009) size rankings appeared to be the most appropriate available for 
selecting my law firm cohort. Nevertheless, it should be appreciated that this 
publication’s rankings are not perfect. Despite being based on apparently-objective 
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data – the number of lawyers within that country – firms occasionally appear or 
disappear from rankings between years. In all likelihood, this is because the rankings 
are based on voluntary headcounts submissions, provided by the law firms 
themselves. For example, in 2009, all of the accountancy-linked law firms in Spain 
disappeared from that country’s Legal 500 EMEA lawyer headcount rankings 
(Pritchard, 2009, p1342), despite them comprising four out of the 15 largest law firms 
in the 2008 edition of the same directory (Pritchard, 2008, p1360), and despite these 
firms achieving high rankings in a 2010 Spanish language legal publication 
(Agúndez, Serraller et al., 2010). This is likely to result in my findings for this 
jurisdiction being slightly different to that which otherwise might have been the case 
had such firms been included in the 2009 Legal 500 EMEA rankings. In addition, 
there is no UK-wide lawyer headcount ranking in the 2009 Legal 500 EMEA legal 
directory – only a ranking based on the largest London law firms (Pritchard, 2009, 
p1602). However, given that the previous year’s EMEA Legal 500 suggested that 
even the 25th largest London law firms was larger than Scotland’s largest legal 
practice (356 lawyers compared with 337 (Pritchard, 2008, p1628; Pritchard, 2008, 
p1758)) and also substantially larger than Northern Ireland’s largest law firms (57 
lawyers employed in 2008), I decided that, in all likelihood, the largest 15 law firms in 
London were also the largest legal practices in the UK during 2009.  
 
My evaluation time period – 1998 – 2009 intentionally starts in the year the 
Establishment Directive was enacted. As previously mentioned on p59, this directive 
aimed to liberalise the branch office establishment regime for foreign law firms within 
the EU. As such, my investigation might be regarded as serving as an informal case 
history of the impact of Establishment Directive-driven EU legal practice 
geographical change. However, it should be stressed that this singular regulatory 
change will not be the focal point of my investigation, and will only be discussed to a 
limited extent in my results. Nevertheless, the starting point of my study slightly 
predates several significant European legal practice geographical events, which 
occurred around the year 2000 (Aronson, 2007, p798 – 801). This time period should 
therefore yield a rich source of materials when testing the GaWC’s various 
explanations for why large law firms change their geographies over time. The end 
point of my study, 2009, coincides with the Legal 500 EMEA legal directory ceasing 
to produce country-specific size rankings of large law firms. 
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3.3. Specific sources of data used – and why 
In relation to my analysis of my cohort law firms’ branch offices, and also their use of 
alliance capitalism, the specific sources of data used were determined by the 
requirements of each hypothesis, and also the time periods each hypothesis 
encompassed. As will be explained further below, it was possible to 
contemporaneously collect my cohort practices’ EU branch office location data 
directly from their own website at the very end of 2009. However, where historical 
branch office data was required – specifically in relation to hypothesis seven 
(possible points of commonality regarding branch office investments or divestments), 
the most viable source of materials to test this hypothesis were historical legal 
directories, which documented my cohorts’ EU branch offices on a year-by-year-
basis. Within socio-legal research, various scholars have used legal directories to 
assist with their evaluation of their cohort firms’ evolving geographies (Lynch and 
Meyer, 1992; Silver, 2000, p1105; Baker and Parkin, 2005 - 2006). Consequently, 
the source materials I used to test hypothesis seven appear to be acceptable. 
 
When collecting data regarding my cohort firms’ overarching geographical strategies 
(hypothesis ten), and also their decision to invest in specific locations (hypothesis 
11), various different approaches were possible. Surveys could be conducted, fresh 
interviews could be carried out, archival trade press sources could be used – or a 
mixture of approaches could be deployed. However, I quickly decided that the use of 
historical legal trade press sources alone was suited to my own study, for several 
reasons. Firstly, this approach was efficient, because it allowed me to reuse 
materials to assist with the evaluation of multiple hypotheses. For example, a legal 
trade press article might report that one of my cohort law firms had opened an office 
in a new location. This information would aid my hypothesis seven evaluation, which 
explored possible patterns of behaviour regarding focal points of legal practice 
inward investments and divestments over time. Additionally, this same legal trade 
press article might include a comment from a law firm leader, explaining how the 
expansion was intended to help deliver their firm’s wider geographical strategy – 
evidence potentially useful to my hypothesis 10 evaluation. Equally, that same law 
firm leader might then explain the firm’s decision to open in the location by reference 
a specific reason suggested by the GaWC – such as client demand – useful to my 
assessment of hypothesis 11. Secondly, the contemporaneous nature of the 
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explanations offered within trade press sources – typically delivered by those directly 
involved in this development – allows me to avoid having to rely on potentially 
imperfect recollections of historical firm strategies by senior personnel (Golden, 
1992, p848 - 860; Golden, 1997, p1243 - 1252). By contrast, in several studies of 
service firm globalisation I encountered during my literature review, survey 
respondents (Kreitl and Oberndorfer, 2004) or interviewees (Majkgård and Deo 
Sharma, 1998, p3- 4; Agndal and Chetty, 2007, p1455; Freeman and Sandwell, 
2008, p204; Segal-Horn and Dean, 2011, p201; Krull, Smith et al., 2012, p1104 - 
1105) were retrospectively asked to recall their reasons for their organisation’s 
geographical evolution, several years after the events discussed. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, these researchers typically made use of archival sources in any event to 
validate their findings (Arenius, 2005, p119; Freeman and Sandwell, 2008, p203; 
Segal-Horn and Dean, 2011, p201). Thirdly, as a follow-on point, I assumed that 
official explanations, as offered to the legal trade press, were just as likely to reflect 
firms’ real reasons for undertaking particular a geographical activity as any 
alternative source materials that was realistically likely to be available to me, such as 
conducting off-the-record interviews or anonymised surveys. Effectively, I have erred 
in favour of relying on legal trade press transparency to yield honesty, in preference 
to honesty delivered via the cloak of anonymity. Fourthly, I regarding using legal 
trade press sources alone as being adequate, considering what I intended to achieve 
in testing hypotheses 10 and 11. Were I, for example, seeking to establish the 
underlying motivations and influences of the leaders of my cohort law firms for 
adopting certain geographical strategies, it would arguably have been appropriate for 
me to conduct fresh interviews with those individuals, to seek to undercover those 
motivations and influences. However, this is was not my objective in relation this 
hypothesis. Instead, one of my key reasons for testing this hypothesis was merely to 
establish whether or not my sample EU law firms collectively appeared to have 
overarching geographical strategies – a fairly elemental proposition, which was 
nevertheless unexplored in the current body of legal sector-specific academic 
research. Similarly, in relation to hypothesis 11, it might have been possible for me to 
undertake a survey of my cohort law firms which sought, for example, to uncover a 
possible hierarchy of reasons why large law firms changed their geographies in 
specific locations. But, again, this was not my aim in testing this hypothesis. Instead, 
I was merely seeking to establish if my large law firm cohort did, indeed, change their 
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geographies for a multiplicity of different reasons – and, if so, whether the reasons 
identified by the GaWC and others were applicable across my sample. At present, 
both of these – again, fairly elemental – propositions are largely unexplored within 
existing legal sector research. Finally, it would appear that making substantial use of 
historical trade press sources was an acceptable research practice when conducting 
research into professional services geography of a qualitative nature. Indeed, during 
my literature review, I encountered several examples of studies where historical 
trade press sources appeared to be the dominant (Daniels, Leyshon et al., 1988; 
Daniels, Thrift et al), if always not the exclusive (Abel, 1993 - 1995, p737 - 870), 
evidential base for the study’s analysis. Therefore, I concluded that using legal trade 
press sources was an acceptable research practice.  
 
Nevertheless, it is accepted that my reliance on legal trade press sources alone is a 
limitation of my study, because it requires me to assume the comments made in 
those sources accurately represent law firms’ decisions at that time. With one 
noticeable exception (my discussion of herd behaviour), it has therefore not been 
possible for me to independently evaluate law firms’ explanations of their reasons for 
geographical change. Instead, corroboration of individual explanations, which form 
part of my testing of hypotheses, has been judged to have occurred cumulatively. 
Firstly, the core components of my hypotheses have been derived from existing 
research literature, ideally sourced from multiple studies. Secondly, I have then 
sought to uncover examples of multiple cohort firms offering the same explanation 
for a geographical change event, ideally involving a variety of domestic and cross-
border scenarios, and taking place over a number of years. Where a consensus 
between multiple sources emerges, which appears to either validate or disprove 
individual elements of my qualitative hypotheses, this weight of evidence has 
allowed me to determine whether I can safely regard each hypothesis as being 
supported by a reasonable weight of evidence.  
 
Of course, by using public domain historical sources while testing hypotheses 10 and 
11, I have enabled future researchers to reappraise my source materials, and reach 
their own conclusions regarding my findings. If future researchers find my 
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conclusions plausible – or not – they could further test my findings by reference to a 
new cohort of law firms, perhaps using an alternative research method. However, my 
experiences while researching this thesis suggests future researcher may encounter 
logistical and conceptual complexities in seeking to explore law firm geographical 
change via, for example, the medium of surveys or interviews. As I will illustrate in 
some detail on p162 – 164 and p182 - 186, several of my cohort practice either 
changed ownership or leadership during the relatively short time period of my 
investigation. This raises the intriguing question of who might legitimately speak for 
such firms when explaining the rationale for their previous geographical changes. 
 
3.4.1. How I collected my data 
The next four parts of my methods chapter explain how I collected my 2009 cohort 
branch office data, relevant to hypotheses one – six; how I collected my longitudinal 
branch office data, relevant to hypothesis seven; how I collected my alliance 
capitalism data, relevant to hypotheses eight and nine; and finally how I collected my 
geographical strategy data, relevant to hypotheses 10 and 11.  
 
3.4.2. How I collected data relating to my cohort’s EU 2009 offices 
The 2009 Legal 500 EMEA legal directory provided me with members of my law firm 
cohort. However, it did not – necessarily – provide me with all of the cohort branch 
office data I required to test hypotheses one – six. Participation in the directory is 
voluntary and, as a result, not all of my cohort firms supplied their 2009 branch office 
data to this publication. Therefore, during the final weeks of 2009, I visited all of my 
sample law firms’ websites, and captured information identifying each of their EU 
branch offices (although, due to an oversight, branch office data relating to elements 
of Landwell was not captured until the end of January 2010). This data formed the 
basis of my evaluation of hypotheses 1 – 6, and also the “end point” of my 
longitudinal evaluation regarding hypothesis seven, which explored whether certain 
EU cities have become focal points of my cohort firms’ EU branch office investment 
or divestment. However, appreciating that my cohort firms’ branch offices were likely 
to change over time, I also confirmed these firms’ 2009 branch office locations using 
a variety of hard copy legal directories published in the same year. This undertaking 
meant it was possible for me to provide evidential support, should the need arise, 
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that my cohort practices did trade in my stated EU locations during 2009. Thankfully, 
this subsequent data collection helped rectify my earlier Landwell data collection 
oversight in some, but not all, EU jurisdictions. My sources for this 2009 cohort 
branch office verification exercise included the 2009 editions of Chambers Europe, 
Chambers Global, Chambers UK, European Counsel 3000, Legal 500 (EMEA 
edition), Legal 500 (UK edition), Global Counsel 3000, Martindale-Hubbell (EMEA 
edition) and PLC Which Lawyer? Data was also collected from the 2010 Chambers 
Student legal directory, because it was published in 2009. On one occasion (EY Law 
in Italy), I also used one of this firm’s publications, in which some of the firm’s 
domestic offices were listed, to confirm its 2009 office locations. 
 
In order to capture and evaluate the data I required to test my various hypotheses, I 
constructed a MS Access database to assist with this process. Within Access, and 
for each sample firm, a data input form was produced. This form allowed each firm’s 
EU branch office local brand name, country and city locations to be collected. The 
form allowed law firm branch office data to be captured annually – an essential 
requirement when testing hypothesis seven (that certain locations change their 
popularity over time). And, although not required for hypotheses testing, I also 
captured EU-specific city and country lawyer headcount data for each cohort firm for 
each year of my evaluation. I also captured each firm’s annual Legal 500 EMEA 
relative national size ranking for each EU state each year, where available. I 
captured this data assuming it might help contextualise my various findings.  
 
Because the initial version of this thesis did not envisage exploring law firm 
geography on a global scale, I did not collect the worldwide branch office locations of 
my cohort firms in 2009. However, using the contemporaneous legal directory 
sources mentioned above, it has since been possible – retrospectively – to gather 
comprehensive 2009 global branch office data in relation to six of my nine national 
cohorts. Unfortunately, in 2009, the MDP / accountancy law firms within my overall 
sample did not provide global branch office location data to any of the legal 
directories I had access to. Consequently, in the three jurisdictions where my 
national cohorts included MDP / accountancy law firms, it has not been possible to 
compare and contrast the global branch offices totals of those three national cohorts. 
This branch office data shortcoming has also limited the scope of my evaluation of 
98 | P a g e   
hypothesis one to just six, rather than nine, sample jurisdictions. In order to 
determine if a subset of cohort firms comprises a majority of that cohort’s total 
foreign branch office network, one must first establish how many branch offices, in 
total, each cohort operates. This was not possible in three evaluation states where 
MDP / accountancy were present in 2009. 
 
3.4.3. How I collected data relating to my cohort’s evolving EU office presence 
In order to evaluate whether certain EU locations had become modest focal points of 
inward investment or divestment by my cohort firms – my seventh hypothesis – two 
approaches to collecting longitudinal data were possible. Either, one could collect 
data at one point in time and again at a future date. Alternatively, one could collect 
data at a certain point in time, and then collect legacy data going backwards in time. 
The former approach was taken by the GaWC in The changing geography of 
globalized service provision (Hassens, Derudder et al., 2011), which took two 
snapshots of their cohort firms’ evolving branch office network, firstly in 2000 and 
again in 2008 (p2293). However, time constraints meant it was not possible for me to 
explore how my cohort firms’ EU branch office geographies evolved, going forwards 
in time. Therefore, I chose the latter approach. This necessitated using historical 
legal directories to establish my cohort firms’ evolving EU branch office geographies.  
 
Although my approach was different to the GaWC in The changing geography, we 
both encountered a common problem, in determining our respective cohort firms’ 
presences in specific locations: the fact that: “firms get liquidated, merge with other 
firms, are replaced by new firms whose global presence/importance rises, etc” 
(p2296). Because the GaWC’s research agenda in The changing geography was the 
changing connectivities between cities (p2295), rather than geographies of the 
specific law firms, it was not problematic for this group to use different law firms in 
each year evaluated (p2296). However, my hypothesis focused on the investment 
and divestment decisions of specific law firms in specific EU locations. As a result, I 
did not regard it appropriate to substitute one law firm for another over time. My 
chosen approach obliged me – to the extent that historical secondary data sources 
allowed – to systematically trace my cohort firms’ presences in certain EU locations 
from 2009 backwards to 1998. 
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Having previously collected my 2009 EU branch office data as set out above, each 
firm’s 2009 locations were copied into a “dummy” 2008 record in my Access 
database. Each 2008 location was checked, using 2008 legal directory / legal trade 
press magazine sources. Where a firm had altered its geographical profiles between 
these two years, the 2008 record was amended. This backwards-heading data 
collection and updating process was repeated until the 1998 sampling cut-off point 
was reached. Then, for quality control purposes, the entire data set was re-checked 
against the original source materials. On many occasions, firms’ location histories 
“ran cold”, the further back in time my investigation progressed. Contemporaneous 
legal trade press sources were therefore scrutinised, to try to discover whether the 
firm previously traded in the location using a different name. If it did, its previous 
identity was added to the “master” record and the data capture process resumed.  
 
In some circumstances, my longitudinal journey uncovered both evidential and 
conceptual complexities, regarding whether a cohort firm had opened or closed a 
branch office in an evaluation location between 1998 and 2009. For example, in 
some situations, trade press sources suggested that a firm had opened an entirely 
new “greenfield” office in a location – in which case the event clearly represented a 
geographical expansion event. Similarly, an office closure clearly represented a 
retrenchment from a location. Matters become more complicated where cohort firms 
either merged or demerged between 1998 and 2009. In such circumstances, it was 
possible that one element of a firm had expanded into a new location – or retrenched 
from it – whereas another element of the same resulting firm (i.e. a practice’s merger 
partner) had not. Similarly, while reviewing my legal trade press sources, I also 
uncovered several examples of my cohort firms “swapping” ownership of EU offices 
during the time period of my investigation. Thus, the evolution of a single office 
might, simultaneously, represent an EU geographical expansion of one of my cohort 
firms, and a geographical contraction for another. Finally, on several occasions, I 
encountered situations where cohort firms simply vanished from the legal directories 
I was using to discover their evolving geographies between 2009 and 1998. By 
interrogating legal trade press sources, it was usually possible to identify what had 
happened: for example, a firm might have fractured during the preceding year – and 
had changed its name (s) as a result. Alternatively, the firm might have split off from 
a larger practice, and so only have recently established as a standalone entity. 
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Capturing such data proved problematic within my database, and required various 
“workarounds” to make the data collection process viable. Moreover, these 
behaviours have also made my analysis of whether specific EU locations have been 
a focal point on inward investment or divestment more difficult than originally 
anticipated – which is arguably an interesting finding in itself. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, my resulting hypothesis analysis requires a degree of contextualisation 
regarding how my results were arrived at. I discuss this issue further on p111 
onwards, where I explain how I analysed my data.  
 
More generally, this longitudinal complexity would appear somewhat problematic for 
any future researcher who wished to explore the drivers of legal practice 
geographical change via the medium of surveys or interviews. Given that entire law 
firms – and firms’ individual offices – sometimes change ownership, who might 
legitimately speak on behalf of a firm to explain its rationale for legacy geographical 
changes – its current leadership, or the leaders of the legacy entity when the event 
took place? My study has avoided this evidential and conceptual quandary by relying 
on explanations offered to the legal trade press, typically given contemporaneously 
to the geographical event in question, by the leader of whatever entity existed when 
the event occurred. However, this is a historical complexity is one which future 
researchers should consider carefully.  
 
3.4.4. How I collected data relating to my cohort’s use of alliance capitalism 
within the EU 
Hypothesis eight simply seeks to explore whether my various national EU cohorts 
commonly participated in alliance capitalism relationships in 2009. In particular, it 
seek to establish whether they commonly did so to a similar extent to that observed 
by the GaWC in relation to London firms in 1996 – 1997 (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
1999, p1863), and by Morgan and Quack (2005, p1776) in relation to German and 
UK firms in 2004. Hypothesis nine, by contrast, seeks to uncover whether my various 
national EU cohorts commonly relied on alliance capitalism to extend their EU 
branch office reach, using the distinctive approaches set out by the GaWC in The 
long arm of the law (p1862 - 1868).  
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Between the last week of 2009 and the first week of 2010, I visited the websites of 
my cohort firms, looking for any mention of their relationships with other legal 
practices. If any alliance relationships were mentioned, I captured that information in 
a standalone table within my Access database. For example, if a sample firm 
claimed to be a member of Lex Mundi, the firm was recorded as being a member of 
Lex Mundi in whatever EU states the firm traded in at the time. Equally, if the sample 
firm claimed to belong to an unbranded “best friends” alliance with one or more other 
EU law firms, the existence of that alliance was also captured. Working on the 
assumption that not all cohort firms declared their allegiances on their websites, I 
then reviewed numerous additional sources, in an attempt to discover these firms’ 
semi-private relationships. This data hunt involved me reviewing legal trade press 
articles which discussed law firm networks / alliances, and also law firm listings such 
as Martindale-Hubbell, Chambers & Partners and HG.org. I also undertook Google 
searches. Where any new networks / alliances involving my cohort were discovered, 
I added them to my Access database. Occasionally, I discovered that my sample 
firms belonged to a grouping several years after my initial data gathering. Where 
possible, I mitigated against this time-lag by requesting, and obtaining, the 
organisation’s 2009 membership directory. Additionally, relevant information was 
also obtained – both before and after 2009 – from the North American, Caribbean, 
Central and South American 2007 Martindale-Hubbell legal directory (LexisNexis, 
2007, pLA1B - LA108B) and McGarry’s (2011, p103 - 144) e-book, Professional 
Service Networks. Both of these publications contained list of law firm networks, in 
varying levels of granular detail. To further understand the extent to which these 
alliance capitalism relationships extended my cohort firms’ EU geographical 
presence, I also captured elemental data regarding the EU states in which their 
alliance partner firms traded – but only by reference to the countries in which their 
allied firms operated, and not individual cities. I also captured Legal 500 EMEA size 
ranking data for my cohort firms’ associated EU practices. Collectively, the alliance 
capitalism data I obtained forms the basis of my evaluation of both hypothesis eight 
and nine.  
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3.4.5. How I captured data relating to law firms’ overarching geographical 
strategies, and also their decisions to alter their geographies in specific 
locations 
For the reasons set out on p93 above, I used a common approach to capture data to 
help me test hypothesis 10 (law firms’ geographical strategies) and hypothesis 11 
(why law firms changed their geographical reach in specific locations). That is, I used 
historical English language legal trade press sources which reported on the 
geographies of my law firm cohort between 1998 and 2009. I shall explain how I 
coded and analysed this data from p120 onwards.  
 
The first stage of my legal trade press data collection involved the generation of a 
work-in-progress list of all known sample law firm identities, including their legacy 
identities, between 1998 and 2009, as initially sources from legal directories. By 
identities, I mean entities which – effectively – comprised my 2009 sample firms, 
even if they merged – or demerged – during my evaluation time period. This list of 
cohort firm identities (and legacy identities) provided me with an aide-mémoire for 
my magazine article data gathering. I then visited numerous specialist law libraries 
which stocked hard copy editions of my legal trade press sources. The sources I 
used included The European Lawyer, Iberian Lawyer, International Financial Law 
Review, The Lawyer, Legal Week, Legal Business and Top Legal International. 
While several magazines were accessible online, others operated behind a pay-wall. 
(I also found reviewing hard-copy publications to identify relevant articles to be a 
surprisingly efficient data collection process, compared with often unhelpful online 
search functions). The process of relevant article identification was iterative, and 
took place in conjunction with my data collection for hypothesis seven – the changing 
EU branch office geographies of my cohort firms. Thus, if I discovered that a cohort 
law firm had undergone a substantial geographical event (such as a merger) as I 
sought to uncover its evolving EU branch office geography for hypothesis seven, I 
also captured – where possible – any explanations offered for why that change event 
had occurred to aid my testing of hypotheses 10 and 11. Equally, if I discovered an 
explanation of how a cohort firm had changed its EU branch office network when 
collecting data for hypotheses 10 and 11, this aided my understanding of what had 
happened to that branch office for the purposes of my hypothesis seven evaluation. 
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During my legal trade press data collection process, I sought to capture every single 
geographical statement offered by my cohort law firms – and also any statement 
offered by any of their constituent legacy entities – relating to the EU between 1998 
and 2009. When relevant articles were located, its full citation details were manually 
entered into Endnote. My entire legal magazine trade press Endnote “library” was 
then imported into Access. And, for each Endnote citation produced, a separate data 
entry form was created. The article text was also added to each record, if available. 
Because one article might discuss the geographical activities of multiple sample law 
firms, it was possible, within the same Access form, to create a unique record for 
each law firm mentioned in that article. This form allowed each article to be coded in 
a manner set out on p120 below. One benefit of capturing legal trade press 
magazine articles within Access was that, when compiling my results, it was possible 
to quickly produce examples of firms’ geographical events, and the stated 
explanations of those events, by searching against specific criteria. For example, if I 
wished to claim that various firms across my entire cohort had opened in London for 
client demand-led reasons, it was easy to locate examples of firms making such 
claims – including the associated articles’ EndNote citations. 
 
Initially, my reason for undertaking this extensive data collection exercise was that I 
intended to subject my source materials to content analysis (Bryman, 2004), with a 
view to discovering whether certain reasons for geographical change offered by my 
cohort were more commonplace than others. In the event, it transpired that the legal 
trade press data I gathered – while extensive – did not explain every EU 
geographical change event undertaken by my sample firms between 1998 and 2009. 
Therefore, because my data collection was not comprehensive, I concluded that 
using content analysis to evaluate my findings would not be appropriate. However, 
the outcome of this extensive data collection was that it generated sufficient 
examples to assist with my evaluation of both hypothesis 10 (firms’ overarching 
geographical strategies and also their ability to implement those strategies) and 
hypothesis 11 (the reasons why firms changed their EU branch office geographies in 
specific locations). Helpfully, the data I uncovered also included explanations offered 
by a diverse range of large EU legal practices, include Anglo Saxon, MDP / 
conglomerate and indigenous practices, across the entire longitudinal time period of 
my study. The data also related to law firms operating in various EU jurisdictions – 
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not only the relatively well-explored UK and German markets but also in the lesser-
explored jurisdictions of Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden. Consequently, the breadth of this data meant I was could draw on 
examples from across my cohort when evaluating individual drivers of branch office 
geographical change – which my overarching hypothesis implicitly required. 
 
3.5.1. How I analysed and coded my data – introduction 
Each of my hypotheses requires a particular approach to coding and analysing my 
data. In most incidences, the GaWC’s research has guided my approach, because I 
was largely seeking to replicate their observations among my cohort firms. However, 
where the GaWC research did not offer useful guidance – specifically in relation to 
hypothesis 10 (firms’ overarching geographical strategies) and hypothesis 11 (the 
drivers of geographical change in specific locations) I instead drew on general 
research method literature to aid my coding and evaluation.  
 
3.5.2. How I analysed the scale of my cohort firms’ 2009 international branch 
offices 
Past research, discussed previously on p19 onwards, indicated that I might find that 
my various national cohorts exhibited different branch office norms relating to how 
many foreign offices they typically traded in. This research therefore indicated that 
would be inappropriate for me to attempt to generate a hypothesis which sought to 
encapsulate likely commonalities between my various national cohorts. However, 
because one of the stated intentions of my research is to identify branch office 
geographical differences, as well as commonalities, between my various national 
cohorts, I concluded it would be worthwhile to explore possible those likely 
differences in any event. To facilitate comparison between my various national 
cohorts regarding to their foreign branch office norms, I identified the mean, median 
and mode number in six jurisdictions where sufficient data was available. A foreign 
branch office was deemed to be any branch office that was foreign to each sample 
firm in each specific evaluation jurisdiction. 
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In light of my previous, and brief, analysis of the possible influence of time in relation 
to foreign branch office norms, I was keen to explore this issue further, where the EU 
cohorts of past research overlapped with my study. I therefore compared the national 
foreign branch office averages of my UK and German cohorts in 2009 with that of the 
averages revealed in research previously undertaken by the GaWC (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 1999, p1863) and Morgan and Quack (2005, p1776).  
 
3.5.3. How I tested hypothesis one: that a small subset of my cohort firms in 
each EU state will comprise a majority of that sample group’s international 
branch office networks 
Global branch office data was available for six of my national cohorts in 2009: 
Austria, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In order to establish whether 
a minority of firms within a national cohort represented a majority of that cohort’s 
total foreign branch office network, it was first necessary to establish the combined 
foreign branch office total of that cohort. For example, in Ireland, the total number of 
foreign office across the entire cohort was 24. Therefore, in order for my hypothesis 
to be supported in this country, substantially less than half of my total Irish cohort 
firms must, collectively, operate at least 13 (i.e. more than half) of the sample 
group’s total foreign office network. However, for my hypothesis as a whole to be 
supported, I decided that equivalent findings must also be observed across each of 
my national cohorts. 
 
Having reviewed my findings, I then discussed issues arising out of them, in light of 
my wider literature review. Here, an obvious point of discussion to arise out of the 
GaWC’s research in Geographies of globalization (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, 
p108 - 111) was whether Baker & McKenzie might consistently serve as a 
geographical outlier in each of my cohort countries, and therefore be responsible for 
a significant percentage of my national cohorts’ international office totals. 
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3.5.4. How I coded and analysed my cohort firms’ possible tendencies to 
cluster into distinctive globalisation arenas (H2) 
To test this hypothesis, I designated each 2009 EU location traded in by every cohort 
firm as being situated in either “Western” or “Eastern” Europe. I treated all former 
communist countries evaluated (including those around the Baltic Sea) as being 
“Eastern Europe”, and all other EU states as being Western Europe. By calculating 
how many offices each firm operated in either Eastern or Western Europe, it was 
possible to determine that firm’s overall EU orientation. Firms with more offices in 
Eastern than Western Europe were designated as having a predominantly Eastern 
European focus, and vice versa. Where a firm was found to operate an equal 
number of offices in both Eastern and Western Europe, it was deemed to have a 
pan-European orientation. Firms’ orientations were then consolidated on a country-
by-country basis, in order to explore two observations made by the GaWC: firstly, 
that groups of firms within a single sample jurisdiction might diverge from each other, 
in terms of the globalisation arena “schemes” (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p107 
- 108) in which they operated; and secondly that any given cohort might nevertheless 
– collectively – tend to favour operating in certain globalisation arenas in preference 
to others (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1873). In order to determine whether 
firms within a single cohort diverged from each other in terms of their globalisation 
arenas schemes, I calculated how many firms in each country had a predominately 
Eastern, Western or Pan-Europe orientation: the mere existence of a divergence 
within the cohort was sufficient to determine that distinctive schemes existed. This 
same finding also allowed me to establish whether, despite specific differences 
within that national cohort, my entire cohort had a clear collective preference for 
trading on an Eastern, Western or Pan-European basis. 
 
I then discussed other issues arising out of my exploration of my cohort firms’ 
transnational branch office trading behaviours. For example, in light of observations 
made by Morgan and Quack (2005, p1775) and Pinnington and Gray (2007, p158), I 
explored whether my non-AS firms tended to cluster into regions immediately 
adjacent to their own, rather than operating on a more geographical diverse basis 
within the EU.  
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3.5.5. How I evaluated whether my cohort firms had a tendency to trade in a 
small number of domestic locations (H3) 
In each of my nine sample countries, I calculated the total number of domestic 
offices operated by each of my cohort firms in 2009 on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
basis. Consolidating firms’ domestic branch office numbers on a cohort-by-cohort 
basis meant it was possible to determine the mean, median and mode number of 
domestic offices within each national sample group. Once these findings were 
established, it was possible to compare findings between sample jurisdictions. In 
light of Morgan and Quack’s (2005) comparative research, which had revealed that 
large UK firms traded in fewer locations than their German peers (p1776), I was 
keen to discover to what extent domestic branch number office number norms varied 
between my various national cohorts – especially in the seven additional EU 
jurisdictions which did not form part of Morgan and Quack’s study.  
 
3.5.6. How I evaluated whether my cohort firms tended to cluster their 
domestic branch offices into a limited number of common locations (H4) 
Here, I sought to identify whether my national cohorts tended to cluster into a limited 
number of domestic locations. To conduct this analysis, I first identified all of the 
domestic cities in which my cohort firms traded in 2009. I then calculated how many 
cohort firms traded in each of those cities. For example, my UK cohort firms 
operated a total of 50 offices in 18 different UK cities. Using this data, it was possible 
to determine how many cities comprised a majority of that total cohort’s total 
domestic branch office network. In the UK, this office majority number was 26. 
Starting with the most popular city, firm office numbers per city were added together 
until a cohort majority number was reach. In the case of the UK, the figure of 26 
offices was achieved by adding together the number of cohort firm offices in London 
(15), Leeds (5), Birmingham (5) – plus one other city playing host to at least one firm. 
Once it was known how many cities were required to constitute a majority of my 
cohort firms’ domestic branch offices, it was possible to determine whether extensive 
city clustering had occurred. For example, in the UK, four cities out of 18 collectively 
represented a majority of the UK cohort’s domestic office networks – which 
suggested that considerable domestic clustering had occurred. However, in order for 
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my hypothesis to be supported, I decided it would be necessary to observe similar 
domestic clustering behaviours across each of my sample EU jurisdictions.  
 
3.5.7. How I evaluated whether my cohort of firms collectively tended to trade 
in a small number of EU locations – including those deemed by the GaWC to 
be “global legal service centres”, “world cities”, or locations deemed “over 
provisioned by global law firm” (H5) 
My analysis of this hypothesis involved four distinctive stages. 
 
To test whether my cohort firms tended to cluster in certain EU cities, I calculated the 
total number of my sample firms trading in each EU city in 2009. To establish 
whether clustering has occurred, my findings are presented hierarchically, with 
locations ranked from the most to least popular. EU locations playing host to single 
cohort law firms are excluded because they do not represent locations in which 
multiple sample practices clustered. It is accepted that my results arguably over-
represent the importance of London because, as was previously explained, my UK 
cohort was derived by reference to the largest law firms in this city. However, in the 
remaining eight EU states I evaluated, such sampling biases did not occur. 
 
My analysis of my cohort firms’ potential tendencies to congregate in global legal 
service centres (GLSC) sought to follow the GaWC’s method, as briefly set out in A 
roster of world cites (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p453 - 455). Firstly, following 
the GaWC’s guidance (p454), I discounted those cohort practices which operated no 
foreign branch offices in 2009. The EU offices of all remaining sample firms were 
then summed. This calculation yielded the first round of “prime”, “major” and “minor” 
GLSC-designated cities. For example, because the number of cohort firms trading in 
Brussels had achieved the required “prime” GLSC designation, the city was 
classified as such. Equally, because two cross-border sample firms were observed 
operating in Athens in 2009, this location was deemed to be a minor GLSC. Where 
the GaWC’s methodology contained an omission – how to classify cities home to six 
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cross-border border law firms – I decided these locations should be regarded as a 
major legal service centre. This GaWC’s classification of major legal service centre 
was therefore extended from comprising between four or five cross-border cohort 
firms, to between four and six such practices instead. 
 
The GaWC’s alternative method for determining an EU cities’ global legal service 
centre status was also applied to my evaluation locations. In this evaluation, the 
“foreign” offices of cross-border cohort firms are the key units of analysis. For each 
national sample, I first established which foreign EU cities each cohort firms traded 
from, and also how many of those firms traded in those cities. Foreign office totals 
for each city – across all nine evaluation jurisdictions – were then summed, and 
cities designated according to the GaWC’s instructions. A city that was home to the 
foreign offices of 26 or more cross-border cohort firms was given a prime city 
designation, while a city playing host to the foreign offices of between two and four 
cross-border cohort firms was designated a minor legal service centre. Here, the 
complicating factor was that some of my sample firms were cohort members in 
multiple evaluation jurisdictions. Therefore, in the absence of instructions to the 
contrary, these firms’ “foreign” offices were counted on multiple occasions. To 
explain: Freshfields was a member of my Austrian, French, German, Italian, Spanish 
and UK cohorts. Therefore, its “foreign” offices were repeatedly evaluated from the 
perspective of each national cohort of which it was a member. For example, the 
firm’s Austrian office was discounted from my Austrian cohort evaluation because its 
Austrian office was not foreign to that location. However, the same firm’s Austrian 
office was deemed “foreign” from the perspective of Freshfields in Germany. Finally, 
in light of the previously-discussed omission in the GaWC’s methodology, where no 
classification was given to cities playing host to the foreign offices of between 18 and 
25 cross-border cohort firms, I decided that such cites should be designated as 
major legal service centres. Thus, the definition of a major legal service centre was 
extended from playing host to the foreign offices of between five and 17 cross-border 
cohort firms to now ranging between five and 25 of such practices.  
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The GaWC’s methodology offered me no guidance on how I should analyse my 
cohort firms’ adherence to their world city ranking. I therefore simply ranked my 
cohort cities in accordance with the designation issued to each city, as set out in A 
roster of world cities (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p455 - 456). Next to the city’s 
name, and world city designation, the total number of my cross-border cohort firms 
was listed. Presenting my findings in this way meant that it was obvious where points 
of commonalities and difference occurred between the GaWC ranking and my 
cohort’s cross-border presences. I also added all additional cities to the end of this 
ranking where at least two of my cross-border cohort firms were present, but which 
had not received a world city designation by the GaWC. A decision was made to 
exclude cities that played host to only one cross-border law firm on the basis that 
these cities would, in any event, have been screened out of the GaWC’s 
methodology when establishing these cities’ global legal service centre status. My 
evaluation of the usefulness of the GaWC’s world city rankings was therefore two-
fold. Firstly, did overall ranking of my cohort firms’ collective EU trading preferences 
broadly match the GaWC world city ranking? Secondly, did the totality of my EU 
cohort cities, in which at least two cross-border cohort firms were present, overlap 
with the EU cities identified by the GaWC as having some form of world city status?  
 
Finally, in light of the GaWC’s observation in Global law firms (Faulconbridge, 
Beaverstock et al., 2008, p463) that Leipzig was “overprovisioned” by global law 
firms, I calculated how many of my transnational cohort practices were present in 
this city in 2009. This paper offered no guidance regarding how many of my cohort 
firms might amount to an “over-provision” in this location. Therefore I simply 
compared the number of sample firms in the city with the totality of my cohort, and 
“took a view” on whether an overprovision had occurred. 
 
3.5.8. How I evaluated whether my transnational firms tended to collectively 
ignore certain EU locations (H6) 
On p42, I identified five EU cities that were likely to be home to few, if any of my 
cross-border cohort law firms, based on the GaWC’s findings in Global Law firms 
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(Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p463). The EU cities deemed under-
provisioned by global law firms by the GaWC were Athens, Copenhagen, Dublin, 
Lisbon and Madrid. My approach to testing hypothesis six, which relates to this 
proposition, was straightforward. Among my transnational cohort firms, I counted 
how many of these firms traded in these locations in 2009, and presented them on a 
city-by-city basis. Where additional, context-setting observations could be made, 
which helped explain my findings, these were offered in the accompanying analysis. 
 
3.5.9. How I evaluated whether my cohort firms had commonly invested in and 
divested from certain EU locations during the time period of my study (H7) 
On p43 onward, I identified several specific EU locations which appeared to form the 
focal point of legal practice inward investment or divestment, as (indirectly) identified 
by research conducted by GaWC and other scholars. Collectively, these locations 
were: Antwerp, Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris, Rotterdam 
and Vienna. To test hypothesis seven, I examined whether my cohort firms had 
either expanded into, or departed from, these locations between 1998 and 2009. In 
order to conduct this evaluation, I sought to establish a) which sample firms had 
opened in these locations during that time b) which firms had departed and c) for the 
sake of completeness, which firms were continually present. For the sake of 
consistency with my other investigations, I only evaluated the changing geographies 
of those “global” firms within my cohort, as defined by the GaWC in A roster of world 
cities (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p453 - 454) – which merely requires cohort 
firm to have a single foreign branch office. It is accepted that this is a noticeably 
lower threshold for defining a global firms than that more recently set out in the 
GaWC in The changing geography of globalized service provision (Hassens, 
Derudder et al., 2011, p2293 - 2307). This later paper requires that an APS firm must 
have offices in 15 or more cities, including one office in North America, Western 
Europe and Pacific Asia (p2295). However, had I adopted this stricter definition of a 
global law firm, all but a small minority of my cohort firms would have been rendered 
ineligible for evaluation. 
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The complicating factor in my analysis was how I should treat firms which had 
merged or undertaken other forms of restructuring during my evaluation time period. 
I therefore took the pragmatic view that I should conduct my investigation from the 
“point of view” of specific elements of my cohort practices. This “point of view” would 
typically be that of a surviving cohort practice, where a firm had fractured into 
multiple component parts during my evaluation time period. For example, while my 
Spanish sample firm, Garrigues, had continually existed between 1998 and 2009, its 
parent practice – Andersen Legal – had not. I therefore evaluated the evolving EU 
geography of this firm from Garrigues’ perspective, but also incorporated its legacy 
Andersen Legal branch office geography where appropriate. Similarly, where a 
cohort firm had altered its geography by absorbing a small firm, my evaluation was 
undertaken from the perspective of my cohort practice, rather than the legacy entity it 
acquired. Finally, in situations where two large firms merged, a decision was made to 
evaluate the firm’s geographic evolution from the point of view of the practice which 
– at the time – employed more lawyers. Thus, my evaluation of Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer’s evolving geography occurs from the perspective of 
Freshfields, rather than either of its legacy German practices, Bruckhaus Westrick 
Stegermann or Deringer Tessin Herrmann & Sedemund. It is accepted that this 
approach has introduced an Anglo Saxon bias into my investigation, given that my 
UK cohort practices were typically larger than the European firms they merged with.  
 
Several of my cohort firms were formed during the time period of my investigation, 
and therefore did not exist in 1998. My findings identify these firms, but they do not 
form part of my substantive analysis. Also not forming part of my analysis were those 
firms which, in 2009, were entirely domestic, on the basis that this evaluation is 
intended to study “global” law firms. Additionally excluded were a small number of 
firms where comprehensive EU branch office data was not available between 1998 
and 2009, and also a small number of firms whose geographical evolution was too 
complex to document with absolute confidence. In light of these commonly-occurring 
geographical complexities I encountered, I decided it would be useful to present 
illustrative case histories of two of my sample firms which underwent particularly 
complex EU branch office geographical changes between 1998 – 2009. These case 
histories draw on historical legal trade press and directory sources.  
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3.5.10. How I evaluated whether my cohort of firms made extensive use of 
alliance capitalism to extend their geographical reach (H8) 
The GaWC’s findings, discussed on p45 onwards, simply established how many 
firms within their 30-strong London law firm cohort used any form of alliance 
capitalism. My analysis, which forms the basis of hypotheses eight, is more granular. 
Not only have I attempted to determine, to the extent that secondary sources allow, 
how many of my sample firms within each national cohort participated in any form of 
alliance capitalism with other EU law firms in 2009, I have also attempted to 
determine how many EU-specific alliance capitalism relationships each of my cohort 
firms maintained during that year. This exercise has allowed me to determine what, if 
any, commonalities of alliance capitalism behaviours appeared to exist between my 
national sample groups that year. In this section, I additionally discussed a number 
of findings to emerge from my longitudinal evaluation of my cohort firms’ evolving EU 
geographies which relates to their use of alliance capitalism.  
 
3.5.11. How I evaluated whether my cohort of firms used alliance capitalism to 
extend their geographical reach in distinctive ways (H9) 
The GaWC research, discussed on p49 onwards, provided me with four potentially 
distinctive categories of behaviour by which my cohort firms might extend their 
branch office reach via the use of alliance capitalism. And, as part of my evaluation 
of the GaWC’s contribution to our understanding of large EU law firm geography, my 
desired outcome was to identify at least one sample firm per jurisdiction which 
adhered to each of the GaWC’s distinctive categories. I also sought to uncover at 
least one example per jurisdiction of a cohort firm which operated no foreign offices 
in 2009 and also belonged to no alliances. Finally, I sought at least one sample firm 
per jurisdiction which had an extensive international branch office network but also 
belonged to no firm groupings. I did not test for what the GaWC describes as an “ad 
hoc presence” – where a firm works in conjunction with a local practice in locations 
where it does not, itself, operate (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1866) on the 
basis that such relationships are – as claimed – ad hoc. It is therefore accepted that 
my study does not encompass the totality of my sample firms’ possible EU inter-
practice relationships – merely those of a more enduring, high profile or formally 
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constituted nature. Assuming I can find examples of each of the above-mentioned 
categories of behaviour being adopted by my sample firms across each of my 
national cohorts, this would lend further support to my overarching hypothesis 
regarding limited commonalities of large EU law geographical behaviours.  
 
So far as the GaWC provided guidance in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 1999, p1862 - 1866), I sought to replicate the authors’ own approach. 
Thus, in order to fall within the “minimal direct” presence category of behaviour, my 
cohort firms were only permitted to operate in one foreign location in 2009. Following 
the GaWC’s example in relation to Taylor Joyson Garrett and Interlex, my next 
category sought to include cohort firms which operated two international branch 
offices, but also belonged to a large-scale law firm grouping, along the lines of 
Interlex. In relation to the third category, no direct guidance was offered by the 
GaWC on how to define a strategic affiliation, or indeed, the number of foreign 
branch offices my cohort firms should operate to fall within this category. I therefore 
decided that, in order to qualify for a strategic alliance, any grouping should be 
relatively small and also include no externally-observable identity – i.e. a common 
brand name. I also determined that a law firm must operate more foreign offices than 
required in other categories – i.e. at least three. This latter criterion has also been 
used to evaluate one element of my fourth GaWC-inspired category. The second 
element of this category draws on the example of Denton International, offered by 
the GaWC. I therefore decided that my cohort firms must adopt a common alliance 
identifier within their firm name – i.e. “Denton”. In relation to the additional two types 
of behaviours identified by the GaWC, but not discussed, I have simply sought to 
identify firms which appear, based on the evidence available, to fall within these 
categories. They are, firstly: “no foreign branch offices and no known alliances” and 
secondly “direct transnational international presence only – no known alliances”. 
Here, my legal trade press analysis has helped me identify firms which have 
explicitly stated they fulfilled either of these criteria.  
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3.5.12.1. How I evaluated hypotheses 10 and 11 
Below, I discuss why I selected my preferred method – template analysis – to test 
hypotheses ten and 11, in preference to several possible alternatives. I shall then 
explain how I used my chosen method to code and analyse the data which underlies 
my hypothesis testing. Unlike hypotheses one – nine, both hypotheses 10 and 11 
were tested using qualitative data – largely, legal trade press materials relating to my 
cohort firms’ EU geographical activities between 1998 and 2009. 
 
3.5.12.2. Why I selected template analysis to evaluate hypotheses ten and 11 
I have decided to retain template analysis (Crabtree and Miller, 1999; King, 2004) in 
this latest iteration of this thesis because it allows me to efficiently test hypotheses 
10 and 11 by reference to my legal trade press sources. I shall shortly explain how 
template analysis allows me to achieve this objective. However, it is perhaps helpful 
to first briefly discuss some of the alternative qualitative approaches (Rapley, 2010) I 
considered but then rejected. As noted on p103, I had previously discontinued my 
initial attempt to analyse my legal trade press sources using content analysis after 
discovering these materials did not explain every single (or even a majority) of the 
EU geographical events undertaken by my cohort firms during my evaluation time 
period.  
 
The first qualitative approach I rejected for testing my hypotheses was the grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1999) method. This approach was discounted because, 
in recent years, the theory’s authors have suggested that theory should emerge from 
data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p12) rather than via prior engagement with existing 
literature (Charmaz and Bryant, 2010, p295). Consequently, the use of grounded 
theory to test hypotheses has been discouraged (Suddaby, 2006, p636). My 
exploration of law firm strategy and the drivers of geographical change seeks to test 
two hypotheses which are rooted in existing research. Therefore, using grounded 
theory to analyse my legal trade press materials is arguably inappropriate.  
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The second qualitative approach I rejected was case studies – at least as my main 
evaluation technique. Case studies have been used to explore the changing 
geographies of large accountancy practices on several occasions in recent decades, 
typically offering rich accounts of the evolutions of individual firms (Post, 1996; 
Sluyterman, 1998; Koza, 1999). It would therefore have been possible for me to 
explore the essence of both hypothesis 10 and 11 via the use of multiple case 
studies within my law firm cohort – possibly on the basis that they either exhibited 
similar or contrasting geographical behaviours (Yin, 2014, p56 - 65). However, I 
decided against using case histories to analyse my finding in relation to hypotheses 
ten and 11, because such a method would be inefficient, in light of the very large 
number of potential drivers of legal practice geographical change my literature 
review suggested I would need to test for. Because some of my cohort firms 
underwent singular geographical change events during the time period of my study, 
one approach would have been to produce a large number of case histories 
documenting such events. However, individually, these case histories would not 
have been very insightful. Alternatively, I could focus on a small number of cohort 
firms that were highly geographical active because, by doing so, I could explore 
multiple drivers of geographical change within a single case study. Neither 
alternative appeared desirable, given that I wanted to efficiently explore a large 
number of geographical change drivers, across a diverse range of cohort firms, in 
multiple EU states, over several years. I therefore concluded that using case 
histories alone would not help me achieve this objective.  
 
After considerable reflection, I decided against using the “framework analysis” 
approach advocated by Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton Nicholls and Ormston (Ritchie, 
Lewis et al., 2014) to assist with my hypotheses testing. It is accepted that, visually, 
this method’s matrix-based approach (Spencer, Ritchie et al., 2014, p305 - 309) for 
presenting data would have allowed me to efficiently illustrate situations where 
several of my cohort law firms offered common explanations for their geographical 
changes – the essence of my evaluation of hypothesis 11. For example, in order to 
explore whether “practice areas advised on” was a commonly-cited driver of 
geographical change across my cohort, I could assign “practice area considerations” 
as a descriptive theme to test for. Firms offering this particular explanation, vocalised 
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through legal trade press sources, could then be included as distinctive cases within 
the analytical matrix. More problematic for my study was one of framework analysis’ 
intended research outputs: the exploration of linkages between described 
phenomena (p318 - 340) – an outcome also suggested by Grbich in relation to 
thematic analysis (Grbich, 1999, p233 - 234). This intended research output is not 
that of my own investigation, which primarily aims to test hypotheses rather than 
generate new theories. In relation to hypothesis 10 (the existence of law firms’ 
geographical strategies), my hypothesis essentially seeks to confirm that law firms 
do indeed have such strategies, given the lack of recognition within existing research 
literature that such strategies might exist. This hypothesis does not seek to 
extensively discuss linkage between such strategies and other aspects of law firm 
geography. And, in relation to the reasons why law firms alter their geographies in 
specific locations (hypothesis 11), one of my key research objectives is to explore 
whether the geographical change drivers, suggested by the GaWC and other 
scholars, are relevant to my large EU law firm cohort. I did not seek to extensively 
explore linkages between such change drivers. Therefore, because there is a 
mismatch between the research output envisaged by framework analysis and the 
aims of my investigation, I have decided not to use framework analysis to test 
hypotheses 10 and 11. 
 
Turning now to template analysis: this qualitative research method has been 
described as being “well-embedded” in healthcare qualitative research, but not so 
well established in business and management research (Waring and Wainwright, 
2008, p92). Therefore, to understand the usefulness of template analysis to my 
study, it is probably helpful to outline its methodology and key research outputs. 
Essentially, using template analysis, data from sources are used to generate an 
initial template, which is then used to assist the researcher in the organisation of 
source materials during those materials’ subsequent interpretation (Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999, p93). Template analysis permits researchers to generate initial template 
“codes” from their literature review (p99), their personal experiences, anecdotal 
evidence and exploratory research (King, 2004, p259). Within the initial template, 
codes are arranged hierarchically: “level one” codes set the parameters of the 
various “level two” which sit within them, and explain aspects of the same theme at a 
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more granular level (King, p260 - 261). Once a preliminary template is formed, a 
larger body of materials to that which formed the initial template is systematically 
evaluated, to test whether the initial template adequately describes what is being 
discussed. Within template analysis, it is possible that these additional materials may 
indicate that an issue is not currently addressed by a code within the preliminary 
template – in which case a new code should be added, to rectify this omission. 
Additionally, initial template codes can be deleted, if the researcher decides they are 
superfluous – perhaps because, on closer inspection, the code overlaps with 
another. Codes can also change in scope between the first and final version of the 
template, where initial codes are found to be either too broad or too narrow. Codes 
can also be reclassified as either higher or lesser order codes (p261 - 263).  
 
The point at which the final template is “good enough” can only, King says, be 
determined by each researcher in relation to each research project. However, King 
suggests a template should not be considered final if “there remains any section of 
text which are clearly relevant to the research question, but remain uncoded”. He 
suggests it is unlikely that a template could be considered final if all data has not 
been read through – and coding scrutinised – at least twice (p263). When 
interpreting and presenting one’s template, King suggests the production of a 
template should not be regarded as being the process of analysis in toto (p266). 
This, King argues, results in a flat, descriptive account of the data. King does not 
advocate setting out any rules for how far the researcher should go in interpreting 
their coded data, which will depend on the nature of each study and practical 
constraints such as word counts. However, he argues that the ultimate aim of 
template formation should be to “produce an account which does as much justice as 
possible” to the richness of the data from which the completed template is derived. 
Case studies, illustrative examples, and the thematic presentation of findings can all 
help bring such findings alive – all supported by the use of “short quotes”, which King 
regards as essential to aid the understanding of specific points of interpretation 
(p267 - 268).  
 
In light of my brief overview of template analysis, its value to my study is obvious. 
Firstly, it allows me to draw on my academic literature review to help formula my 
template initial codes, which can then guide my analysis of my legal trade press 
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sources. Secondly, template analysis’ use of higher and lower order codes means I 
can not only explore whether my cohort law firms have strategies and common 
drivers of geographical change, but also decompile these broad codes into their 
more specific components to further assist my analysis, where helpful. For example, 
my literature review suggests that I may wish to explore whether my cohort firms 
alter their geographical reach for a multiplicity of reasons within the broad theme of 
“regulation”. Does my trade press analysis suggest this level of granularity is 
appropriate, and also supported by those materials? Template analysis can assist 
me in making such judgements. Additionally, the ability to add or remove 
unsupported codes means I can evaluate whether some of the GaWC’s less 
substantiated explanations for legal practice geographical change are be supported 
by reference to my sources – and whether unsupported codes should be deleted in 
the final version of my template. Finally, while my analysis of the plausibility of my 
template codes will primarily be driven by the use of “short quotes” derived from my 
trade press sources, this analysis will – in turn – facilitate discussions within my 
findings of closely-related matters which cannot be encapsulated within the template. 
For example, my literature review suggests that “legal system capabilities” may drive 
geographical change. However, my broader reading of this research suggests that a 
short discussion may be helpful regarding whether this consideration also affects 
firms’ relationships with other legal practices. While template analysis provides me 
with a framework for analysing my legal trade press sources, it does not artificially 
limit my discussion of issues which arise out of my code testing. 
 
It should be stressed that coding of my legal trade press sources forms an integral 
part of both my analysis of the GaWC’s research and also my own hypothesis 
testing. To explain: my narrow aim in testing hypothesis 10 is to consider whether or 
GaWC’s research contains a notable omission in failing to evaluate whether large 
law firms have standalone geographical strategies. My broader aim in testing 
hypothesis 10 is to explore whether my cohort firms exhibit commonalties regarding 
the existence, and implementation, of such strategies (assuming they are shown to 
exist). Similarly, my narrow aim in testing hypothesis 11 is to evaluate whether the 
specific drivers of geographical change offered by the GaWC are plausible, in light of 
the explanations offered by my cohort of large EU law firms via the legal trade press. 
120 | P a g e   
My broader aim in hypothesis 11 is to explore whether my sample EU law firms 
commonly changed their geography for those same reasons.  
 
Notwithstanding the qualitative nature of both hypothesises 10 and 11, a key 
component of my hypothesis testing is replication (Miles, Huberman et al., 2014, 
p307 - 308). This replication evaluation process began during my literature review, 
which indicated that certain behaviours might be observable among my sample 
firms. Exploring whether my sample law firms exhibited those behaviours on a 
template-sub-code-by-template-sub-code basis will allow me to determine whether 
each sub-code is, in itself, plausible. My approach does not require that every 
behaviour I identify is replicated across every cohort country, and across all types of 
law firm, in order that its accompanying template sub-codes is deemed valid. 
However, I am more likely to regard a sub-code as valid if explanations can be 
replicated on several occasions. Developing this point, the more sub-codes I deem 
plausible based on replication, the more I will regard its top level code as plausible. 
Where I deem a top level code plausible, I will also deem its accompanying 
hypothesis supported. Finally, the more my hypotheses are supported by reference 
to my sample firms, the more my overarching hypothesis regarding possible 
commonalities of geographical behaviour among those firms will also be supported.  
 
3.5.12.3. How I coded and analysed my legal trade press data 
Individual trade press sources often reported on multiple geographical events, or 
comments of a geographical nature. When this occurred, I cut and pasted details 
relating to each article into discrete records relating to specific cohort firms, which 
could be coded uniquely. Within my Access database, different types of codes 
(Miles, Huberman et al., 2014, p71 - 82) were appended to each record: firstly, 
attribute codes, which linked each article to a specific firm name, year, date, country 
and city location. This data was essential to my hypotheses testing, given my 
exploration of potential commonalities between the diverse law firms within my wider 
cohort. The second type of coding related to the process of geographical change, 
such as legal practice mergers and demerges, branch office openings and closures 
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and the joining and departures of law firm alliances. This data was mainly collected 
and coded to assist with my evaluation of hypothesis seven, which sought to explore 
my cohort firms’ longitudinal branch office behaviours. Finally, I undertook 
hypothesis coding in relation to hypothesis 10 (law firm strategy) and 11 (reasons for 
geographical change in specific locations). 
 
In relation to my hypothesis coding, no pre-existing codes existed. Therefore, my 
literature review guided the creation of these codes. These codes also formed the 
basis of my initial template. Thus, just as my initial template code decompiles “client 
demand” into the constituent parts – as suggested by my literature review – so does 
the coding of my legal trade press materials within my Access database. The coding 
of my legal trade press materials was also iterative. Thus, if an explanation was 
offered within my legal trade press sources that did not fit within one my initial 
template codes, then a new code was created to encapsulate what was being 
described. Once my source materials were fully coded within Access, illustrative 
examples were copied from my Access database, and included within my results. 
The outcome of this coding process also fed directly into the construction of the final 
version of my template. The template’s final version therefore reflects the levels of 
granularity at which my legal trade press sources suggest specific geographical 
change factors are discussed by my cohort law firms. If necessary, new template 
sub-codes have been added to reflect this level of granularity. 
 
In relation to hypothesis 11, one coding consideration that was relevant to both my 
initial template formation and also my subsequent legal trade press coding was 
whether I should create separate sub-codes to represent three different scenarios: 
an “expansion” event, a “contraction” event and an “active decision not to change 
one’s geographical profile” event. For example, should I create separate sub-codes 
which encompassed either “specific permission to trade in location granted” or, 
alternatively, “specific permission to trade in location revoked”? Ultimately, I decided 
that my hypotheses sub-codes should merely reflect the underlying reasons for a 
specific geographical change, and not the event’s direction of geographical travel. 
Therefore, in both my initial template and also my subsequent analysis, incidences of 
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expansion and contraction are evaluated within the confines of a single sub-code. 
On that basis, statements of “active geographical inertia” do not feature within my 
template. However, where helpful, discussions relating to individual sub-codes also 
include illustrative examples of cohort firms discussing the same issue by reference 
to their geographical inertia decisions.   
 
In accordance with King’s (2004, p266 – 268) suggested approach for analysing and 
presenting my findings, both the final template and illustrative accounts – drawn from 
my trade press sources – are offered in my results. Indeed, my findings are 
presented in a format largely determined by my final template. For each code 
evaluated, a decision was made to offer illustrative examples (White, Woodfield et 
al., 2014, p375) of the code’s real-world usage, drawn on different national cohorts 
across the entire 11-year time period of my study. Illustrative examples, provided in 
my PhD body copy are – in turn – supplemented by additional supporting examples, 
which can be found in the Excel spreadsheet which accompanies this thesis. These 
additional examples are offered in a simple matrix structure (Miles, Huberman et al., 
2014, p109 - 111), presented on a code-by-code, firm-event-by-firm basis in 
separate Excel workbooks. By adopting this systemic approach to displaying my 
findings, commonalities of behaviour between cohorts – or not – can be 
demonstrated. In accordance with King’s (2004, p268) preferred approach, the use 
of direct quotes from my legal trade press sources is my preferred method of 
illustrating my findings. However, to avoid disrupting the narrative flow of this thesis – 
and also to stay within its word limit – on some occasions, comments are 
paraphrased or summarised. Finally, my analysis which accompanies each template 
sub-code typically seeks to contextualise what has been observed, not only by 
reference to the core element of the code itself, but also by reference to issues 
raised by my literature review which cannot be encapsulated within either the 
template, or my matrix-based Excel findings.  
 
Overleaf, I present the initial version of my template which will guide my analysis of 
hypothesis 10 and 11. The final version of this template, updated by reference to my 
cohort firms’ observations, can be found on p224.
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Table 6: my initial template 
This template has been formulated by reference to my literature review 
1. LAW FIRM GEOGRAPHY    1.1. FIRM-WIDE STRATEGY (Hypothesis ten)      1.1.1. Firm-wide orientation        1.1.1.1. Manifested by:          1.1.1.1.1. Orientation of firm's leadership     1.1.1.1.2. Orientation of firm's partnership          
   1.2. DRIVERS OF GEOGRAPHICAL CHANGE IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS (Hypothesis 11)          1.2.1. Drivers of geographical change which are external to the firm           1.2.1.1. Regulation     1.2.1.1.1. Firm receives specific permission to trade in location     1.2.1.1.2. Firm exercises right to trade in location     1.2.1.1.3. Firm decides to trade in location via "regulatory entrepreneurship"           1.2.1.2. Client considerations     1.2.1.2.1. Firm responds to actual client demand     1.2.1.2.2. Firm responds to anticipated client demand          1.2.1.3. Firm acts in response to geopolitical events     1.2.1.4 Firm acts to mitigate against organisational risks    1.2.1.5. Firm acts in response to technological advances    1.2.1.6. Firm needs to interact with local services in chosen location    1.2.1.7 Firm acts in response to local infrastructure considerations    1.2.1.8 Firm acts in response to competitive pressures / herd behaviour   
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 LAW FIRM GEOGRAPHY (continued)          1.2.2. Drivers of geographical change which are internal to the firm    1.2.2.1. Legal systems advised on     1.2.2.1.1. Home state law offered     1.2.2.1.2. Host state law offered           1.2.2.2. Practice areas / industry sectors advised on    1.2.2.3. Financial considerations    1.2.2.4. Quality control considerations    1.2.2.5. Personal partner preferences  
3.5.12.4. Conclusions 
I have concluded that, despite template analysis being a relatively unknown method 
for analysing qualitative data within law, business and management research, it 
offers an efficient and transparent mechanism for testing qualitative hypotheses 
devised by reference to existing research. For that reason, I have used template 
analysis guide my evaluation of the legal trade press sources which form the basis of 
my testing of hypotheses ten and 11.  
 
3.6 Ethical issues 
The nature of my research appears to raise no issues of ethical concerns. 
Nevertheless, my research was subject to the ethical considerations, in keeping with 
the University’s Code on Research Integrity and Ethical Practice.  
 
As a self-funded student, I did not receive any grant to fund my research. I therefore 
have no contractual obligations to any external funders. And, while I worked for 
various law firms, legal regulators and legal publishing houses on a freelance basis 
while researching and writing this thesis, none of these clients have influenced my 
work in any way. Nor have they requested to review this thesis in advance of its 
submission. 
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My research did not require any human participation. Therefore, no issue relating to 
informed consent arose. Nor did my research involve the collection of any personal 
or confidential data. All of the materials used to assist with my research are already 
in the public domain.  
 
My use of historical legal directories to assist with my understanding of law firm 
geographic history appears to fall within the “fair dealing” exceptions to normal 
copyright protection for the purposes of non-commercial research and private study 
(Intellectual Property Office, 2014). Where such sources are used, they are 
appropriately acknowledged. Nevertheless, I have also specifically sought, and 
obtained, express permission from the copyright owners to use the “size” ranking 
league tables contained in the 2009 Legal 500 EMEA legal directory which forms the 
basis of my cohort selection.  
 
My use of legal trade press materials also appears to fall within the “fair dealing” 
copyright exceptions for non-commercial research and private study. Nevertheless, I 
have used the shortest possible quotes from individual articles to illustrate my point. I 
have also deliberately chosen to avoid including more than one snippet of articles 
per magazine edition, if possible. On some occasions, lengthy quotes have been 
paraphrased or summarised.   
 
All of the core data relates to my cohort firms’ geographies has been retained within 
my MS Access database, and is available for inspection on request. Each record is 
cross-referenced to an external citation which permits independent verification, be 
that a legal directory or a legal trade press article. Additionally, the Excel 
spreadsheet which accompanies this thesis includes relevant legal trade press and 
directory citations, either within the spreadsheet’s body copy or “posted” within 
individual data cells. 
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3.7 Methods section conclusions 
My use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods was an inevitable 
necessity, given my desire to explore the “wheres”, “hows” and “whys” of law firm 
geography within a single study. Helpfully, the GaWC’s research has provided me 
with useful guidance on how to conduct the majority of my quantitative “where” and 
“how” evaluations in relation to my cohort firms’ EU branch office behaviours and 
alliance capitalism relationships. In relation to the “why” element of my research, 
template analysis has proved an efficient and useful method for guiding my 
qualitative evaluation. Indeed, both research methods have complemented each 
other: as a result of my qualitative legal trade press evaluation, I have gained a 
better understanding of my cohort firms’ quantitative branch office behaviours and 
alliance capitalism usage. Equally, by evaluating my cohort firms’ quantitative branch 
office behaviours and alliance capitalism relationships, I have gained a better 
understanding of their geographical strategies, explored qualitatively.  
















Results section one: evaluating the EU 
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4.1. Introduction 
The remainder of this chapter explores four issues. In the first section following this 
introduction, I begin my results analysis by introducing my cohort of large EU law 
firms, and discuss its composition by reference to previous research. I then present 
several findings which, although helpful in contextualising my cohort analysis, sit 
outside my hypothesis evaluation. Later, I present my results which relate to to 
hypotheses one – seven, which collectively focus on my sample firms’ EU branch 
office behaviours. Finally, I discuss my findings relating to hypotheses eight and 
nine, which explores the nature of my cohort firms’ EU alliance capitalism 
relationships.  
 
Most of the issues discussed in this chapter aim to evaluate my overarching 
hypothesis and also my thesis question. By way of reminder, my overarching 
hypothesis proposes that limited geographical commonalities of behaviour may be 
observable among my large EU law firm cohort. In testing this hypothesis, my 
research seeks to establish whether possible common behaviours, indicated by 
GaWC research, are broadly replicated among my novel cohort of large EU law 
firms. By undertaking this evaluation, I am also seeking to answer my research 
question, which asks to what extent the GaWC’s research has aided our 
understanding of large EU law firm geography. By contrast, in section 4.2.2.1., my 
analysis will discuss my sample firm findings where little or no commonalities of 
geographical behaviours – both within and between my various national cohorts – 
are expected. This expectation is partially derived from my analysis of existing 
GaWC and non-GaWC research, discussed previously in my literature review. 
 
4.2.1.1. Cohort introduction 
The 107 firms which comprise my cohort can be found on the supplementary data 
table one (SD1) of the Excel spreadsheet which accompanies this thesis. Three 
observations are noteworthy regarding my cohort, in light of observations made 
during my introduction and literature review. I shall now discuss each in turn. 
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The first observation is the modest degree to which US / UK / Anglo Saxon (AS) 
feature as top 15 practices across my nine sample EU jurisdictions. This is in spite of 
past research, conducted by GaWC and others, which has suggested that western 
Europe (Chapman and Tauber, 1994 - 1995, p944 - 945; Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
1999, p1872 - 1873; Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p103; Silver, Phelan et al., 
2009, p1448) has been the focal point of large AS firms’ inward investments. Large 
AS firms are certainly not absent from many of my cohorts: indeed, Baker and 
McKenzie (Pritchard, 2009, p332, 426, 750, 944, 1342) and Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer (Pritchard, 2009, p14, 332, 426, 750, 1342, 1602) feature in five and six of 
my national samples respectively. Nevertheless, even in Germany, a EU state which 
research suggests has been a particular AS law firm investment hotspot in recent 
years (Aronson, 2007, p798 - 804), one third of my cohort practices (CMS Hasche 
Sigle, Nörr Stiefenhofer Lutz, Beiten Burkhardt, Gleiss Lutz and Hengeler Mueller) 
have previously been described as being “German” in origin (Morgan and Quack, 
2005, p1776; Luschin, 2010, p66 - 81). Indeed, across most of my sample countries, 
a clear majority of my cohort firms appear to be indigenous that country – not least 
because, as I will shortly elaborate, many cohort firms operated few, if any, foreign 
offices. Collectively, the continued dominance of indigenous firms in various EU 
jurisdictions indicates that any suggestion that those jurisdictions have been 
“invaded” by AS firms (Bruinsma, 2003, p22) is arguably an exaggeration. At most, 
what had occurred by 2009 was little more than an “incursion” by AS practices.  
 
My second observation relates to some of my more geographically expansive cohort 
members, and their varied local market size in different EU states. For example, 
notwithstanding Baker & McKenzie’s cohort inclusion in France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Spain, its relatively small 2009 national headcounts in Austria, 
Sweden and UK rendered it ineligible for inclusion in these cohorts (Pritchard, 2009, 
p34, 1396, 1602). Similarly, while Linklaters was a cohort member in France, 
Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, its Italian (Collins, 2004c, p3) and Dutch 
(Legal Week, 2009, p3) operations were too small (Pritchard, 2009, p750, 944) to be 
included in those countries’ samples. These national lawyer headcount variances 
suggest that, even though some transnational law firms are relevantly large in some 
legal markets, their presence in others is often modest by local standards. 
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The third notable finding revealed by my cohort selection is the ongoing existence of 
large conglomerate legal practices, despite their previous-announced death by the 
GaWC (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p466) and others (Baxter and 
Tromans, 2003, p1; Power, 2003, p1; Hoare and Power, 2004, p7). According to the 
2009 EMEA Legal 500, three of the largest 15 French sample firms, two of the top 15 
Italian practices and one top 15 Dutch firms (Pritchard, 2009, p332, 750, 944) were 
linked to the Big Four accountancy practices – thereby supporting Martin’s (2007, 
p187 - 188) observations regarding these practices’ ongoing survival in the post-
Enron era. I tentatively offer two explanations for why such firms’ ongoing existence 
were previously disregarded by the GaWC and others. Firstly, some conglomerate 
practices, notably French sample firm Taj, have recently re-established (Collins, 
2006, p3) their links with the “Big Four” accountants, having previously separated 
from them (Power, 2004a, p8). Secondly, for much of the latter half of the 2000s, the 
Big Four appear to have “hid” their associated EU legal practices in plain sight, often 
by using country-specific brand names which did not draw attention to those firms’ 
conglomerate nature. Indeed, my cohort introduction on Excel table SD1 specifically 
clarifies which of my cohort firms I deemed as being linked to the Big Four, where 
their branding does not clearly signify such a link. Besides France’s Taj, these cohort 
firms are: PwC’s Landwell in France (Mizzi, 1999, p9) and TLS in Italy (Pritchard, 
2009, p774), and Ernst & Young’s Holland van Gijzen in The Netherlands (Tromans, 
2003, p1; Illman, 2006, p1). More generally, several of my more “conventional” 
cohort practices, including Dutch firms Loyens & Loeff and Van Doorne and 
Germany’s Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek and Nörr Stiefenhofer Lutz, also operated as 
MDPs in 2009, employing not only lawyers, but also civil notaries and tax advisers 
(Pritchard, 2009, p469, 541, 977, 983) in 2009. My cohort introduction therefore 
suggests that conglomerate law firms – in various guides – form an integral part of 
my sample group.  
 
4.2.1.2. Cohort conclusions 
My cohort introduction illustrates the diversity of large EU law firms in 2009. AS law 
firms are clearly an important feature of the EU legal market, as indicated by their 
inclusion in several of my national cohorts. Nevertheless, such firms do not – 
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consistently – dominate all EU markets in which they operate, as indicated by their 
lack of size-based eligibly for some of my national samples. Equally, the ongoing 
presence of MDP legal practices – accountancy linked or otherwise – suggests that 
such firms also form an important element of my cohort. Finally, the presence of 
many indigenous practices in my cohort, even in globalised legal markets such as 
Germany, is also noteworthy. The legal practice diversity revealed by my cohort 
selection illustrates the importance of studying legal practice geography within any 
given market beyond the singular perspective of AS law firms. AS law firms may 
dominate certain legal markets. However, they do not dominate all legal markets – at 
least in terms of employing the largest numbers of lawyers in those markets. 
 
4.2.2.1. Understanding the extent of cross-border legal practice among large 
EU law firms – my findings compared with those of the GaWC and others 
This section does not focus on hypothesis testing in relation to my cohort firms. This 
is because past research suggests the geographical behaviours of my cohort firms 
are likely to be too heterogeneous to exhibit common geographical behaviours – 
which my hypothesis testing seeks to establish. The findings present below do, 
however, help contextualise the hypothesis testing which follows.  
 
I shall now discuss my findings in relation to my cohort firms’ 2009 global branch 
office networks. Sample firms in six of my nine sample countries are evaluated, for 
the reasons set out on p97. The number of foreign offices operated by each sample 
firm in each evaluation jurisdiction can be found on Excel SD tables 11 - 16. 
However, a summary is shown overleaf, on table 7. In a similar manner to the 
GaWC’s US legal market finding in Geographies of globalization (Beaverstock, Smith 
et al., 2000, p106 - 107), I discovered that, in two of my sample countries (Ireland 
and Sweden), a majority of those countries’ largest law firms traded in no foreign 
jurisdictions. Further, in a similar manner to the GaWC findings in The long arm of 
the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1863), I discovered that, while sample 
firms in some of my cohort countries often operated in multiple countries, many only 
did to a limited extent. Indeed, the median and mode number of foreign offices 
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operated by some of my national cohorts, presented below, are striking. Among my 
Austrian, Irish, Spanish and Swedish cohorts, the mode foreign office number was 
zero. Further, in Ireland and Sweden, a top 15 practice might be regarded as having 
a reasonably extensive foreign branch office network if it traded in just three foreign 
locations. These latter results are surprising considering that, as previously 
mentioned on p59, most of my sample law firms were free to operate branch offices 
across the EU by the time my evaluation took place. My findings suggest that, 
notwithstanding this freedom, many of my sample firms did not take advantage of it.  
 
Table 7: the average number of foreign offices operated by my sample firms 
across six cohort jurisdictions 
Sample jurisdiction Mean Median Mode 
Austria 9 4 0 
Germany 16.4 8 8 Ireland 1.6 1 0 Spain 13.27 10 0 Sweden 3.06 0 0 UK 16.46 13 4  
In light of my earlier comments regarding the possible temporal specificity of my 
findings, table 7 above provide evidence to both support and challenge this assertion 
– although sometimes by only the most slimmest of margins. On the one hand, the 
above-mentioned UK foreign office mean of 16.46 is considerably higher than the 
mean of 9.58 I observed by revaluating the GaWC’s top 15 firm findings in The long 
arm of the law. Conversely, this figure is also slightly lower than my re-evaluation of 
Morgan and Quack’s (2005) 2004 data, which revealed a UK foreign office mean of 
17.13. This reinforces my previously observation that, while the foreign office totals 
of UK law firms tend to increase over a long period of time, short term downward 
fluctuations can also sometimes be observed. However, when I compared my 2009 
German findings with my re-evaluation of Morgan and Quack’s 2004 equivalent data, 
no change was observed – in both 2004 and 2009, our respective findings were 16.4 
foreign office (p1776). In light of these contrasting findings, it has proved difficult to 
generalise what effect time has on law firms’ foreign office totals, beyond suggesting 
that they tend to increase over long periods of time, but can also show signs of 
modest decline – or remain static – in the short term.  
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My table 7 findings above also reinforce both Morgan and Quack (2005, 1776) and 
Pinnington and Gray’s (2007, p162) comparative results between large law firms in 
different countries, notwithstanding these studies’ contrasting findings. Like Morgan 
and Quack, my findings in relation to my UK and German cohorts indicate a degree 
of commonality regarding the extensiveness of their foreign branch office networks. 
For both cohorts, the mean number of foreign offices was around 16, 
notwithstanding that only a fifth of each respective national cohort involved common 
sample practices. However, like Pinnington and Gray’s study, my findings also 
suggest that large law firms in different countries have disparate norms regarding 
how many foreign offices they operate – as illustrated by the sharp differences 
between the mean, median and mode findings of my UK and German cohorts on the 
one hand, and Irish and Swedish cohorts on the other. This suggests that, contrary 
to my own overarching hypothesis, there is heterogeneity between large law firms in 
different EU states regarding foreign branch office norms.  
 
4.2.2.2. Cohort foreign branch office conclusions 
My findings suggest that large EU law firms exhibit heterogeneous behaviours 
regarding the scale of their foreign branch office networks. This heterogeneity 
appears to exist between firms within a single cohort at a single point in time – as 
demonstrated by my mean, median and mode findings in table 7. This heterogeneity 
also exists longitudinally within national cohorts, as indicated by my own 2009 UK 
and German findings compared those undertaken previously by others. Finally, this 
heterogeneity is also evident between EU states regarding what constitutes a large 
international office network – also as suggested by table 7. In relation to my 
overarching hypothesis – that patterns of behaviour might be observable in relation 
to my cohort – it is worth reiterating that, on p23, I suggested heterogeneity 
regarding these specific aspects of law firm geography was likely to exist, in light of 
my synthesis of past research. My overarching hypothesis will only be undermined if 
several of the various “sub-hypotheses” which follow are also disproved. These sub-
hypotheses, derived from evidence found in existing research, indicate that limited 
patterns of geographical behaviour should be evident within my cohort of large EU 
law firms.  
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In relation to whether the GaWC’s research has aided our understanding of large EU 
law firm geography, the following observation can be made. Firstly, in relation to 
Sweden, my findings replicate the GaWC’s observations in Geographies of 
globalization (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000), which found that a majority of their 
cohort firms traded in no foreign locations (p96). My findings in relation to my 
Austrian, Irish, Swedish and UK cohorts also broadly replicate the GaWC’s 
discoveries in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al. (1999), in which it 
could be determined that the mean and mode number of foreign offices operated by 
their cohort was five or fewer (pp1863). The most significant difference between my 
own findings and those of the GaWC relates to the mean number of foreign branch 
offices operated by my UK cohort. In 2009, this mean was considerably higher than 
the group’s earlier observations. However, as explained previously, this difference 
can probably be accounted for by the general tendency of large law firms to increase 
the number of foreign branch offices they operate over a long time period. In light of 
my findings, I have concluded that the GaWC’s research has aided our 
understanding of large EU law firm geography. 
 
4.3.3.1. Testing hypothesis one: that a small percentage of my cohort firm in 
each EU state will comprise a majority of that sample group’s foreign branch 
office networks 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis one, which explores whether a 
small percentage of the cohort firms I evaluate in each EU state will comprise a 
majority of that sample group’s foreign branch office networks. My jurisdiction-
specific findings can be found on Excel tables SD11 - 16. However, my synthesis of 
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Across all six of my evaluation jurisdictions, less than one third of each country’s 
sample practices consistently accounted for more than half the group’s total 
international branch office network. Indeed, as table 8 above illustrates, in Austria, 
just two firms – DLA Piper and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer – comprised almost 
66 per cent of that cohort’s entire foreign branch office total. In Sweden, the situation 
was even more extreme: one firm – Linklaters – was responsible for 54.35 per cent 
of the entire cohort’s foreign offices. My findings suggest that – even among a 
country’s largest law firms – a small sub-set of these practices are geographical 
outliers, in terms of the scale of their cross-border office capabilties. 
 
Surprisingly, despite the global pre-eminence of Baker & McKenzie, as described by 
the GaWC in Geographies of globalization (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p108 - 
111), this firm’s importance within my six-jurisdiction evaluation varied between the 
EU states I evaluated. Table 8 (p135 above) identifies the most geographically 
expansive firms in each cohort country I tested. Notably, Baker & McKenzie features 
in just two evaluation jurisdictions – Germany and Spain. More generally, my findings 
also reveal that the same large firms do not consistently dominate the totality of 
different jurisdictions’ foreign branch office capabilities to the same degree, even 
when those firms are consistently found to be among the most geographically 
expansive practices in multiple jurisdictions. To explain: as table 8 illustrates, DLA 
Piper represented 45.93 per cent of the Austrian cohort’s entire foreign branch office 
network. However, this same firm only represented 22.67 per cent of the UK cohort’s 
foreign branch offices. This lower UK percentage reflects the more internationalised 
nature of large UK law firms, compared with their Austrian peers.  
 
4.3.3.2. Conclusions 
My findings mirror the GaWC’s findings in Geographies of globalization (p106 - 107), 
where it was discovered that a small percentage of their 250-strong cohort 
accounted for a significant percentage of the sample’s foreign branch offices. Thus, 
for the second time, I have concluded that the GaWC’s research has assisted our 
understanding of large EU law firm geography. Additionally, because I have 
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demonstrated consistent international branch office behaviours across all six EU 
evaluation jurisdictions, my findings also lend support to my overarching hypothesis 
regarding limited common geographical behaviours among different groups of large 
EU law firms in 2009. However, in light of my other findings, it appears these 
commonalities have their limits. The number of sample firms required to form a 
cohort majority varies between EU states, as do the identities of the firms which form 
those majorities.  
 
4.3.4.1. Testing hypothesis two: that large EU law firms which trade 
internationally tend to cluster their foreign branch offices into distinctive 
transnational patterns 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis two, which explores whether large 
EU law firms which trade internationally tend to cluster their foreign branch offices 
into distinctive transnational patterns. My country-specific findings can be found on 
Excel tables SD17 – SD25. However, table nine below summarises my findings. My 
findings suggest that both propositions put forward by the GaWC Geographies of 
globalization (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000) and The long arm of the law 
(Beaverstock, Smith et al. (1999) are supported. My cohort firms did cluster their 
foreign branch offices into distinctive transnational patterns. 
 
In Geographies of globalization, the GaWC suggested that sub-sets of firms within a 
cohort might prefer to trade on a Western, Eastern or Pan-European basis (p107 - 
108). As my consolidated findings overleaf show, such behaviours were observed in 
several of my nine sample jurisdictions. In Austria, France, German and the UK, my 
cohort firms’ geographical orientations were split – albeit to varying degrees – 
between those which are orientated to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, or on a 
pan-European basis. Indeed, the Austrian result is distinctive, because it shows that 
Austrian firms were the most likely of all my cohorts to have an Eastern European 
orientation. However, my findings do not directly replicate those of the GaWC in 
Geographies of Globalization, which found that more of their cohort practices traded 
on a Pan-European basis, in preference to operating on an Eastern Europe basis 
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(p107 – 108). As table 9 below illustrates, among my sample, the opposite occurred. 
Overall, my cohort practices were more likely to operate on an Eastern European 
basis than a pan-European basis – largely on account of my Austrian sample firms’ 
preference for doing so. Nevertheless, in common with the GaWC, my sample firms 
also had a clear preference for trading in Western Europe, compared with other 
geographical configurations. Indeed, in Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands Spain and 
Sweden, every cohort practice had a predominately Western European orientation. 
My findings therefore also support two observations made by the GaWC in The long 
arm of the law: that Western European is a competitive globalisation arena in which 
law firms from different counties compete; and secondly, that Eastern Europe is a 
secondary globalisation arena – an area where firms from different countries also 
compete, but to a lesser extent (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1873). 
 
Table 9: overall orientations of national cohorts 
Cohort 
Number of firms per national cohort 
Predominantly Western Europe orientation 
Predominantly Eastern Europe orientation 
Pan-European orientation 
Austria 8 5 2 
France 14 1 0 Germany 14 1 0 Ireland 15 0 0 Italy 15 0 0 The Netherlands 15 0 0 Spain 15 0 0 Sweden 15 0 0 UK 14 1 0  
My findings suggest it is possible to apply the GaWC’s globalisation arenas and 
transnational schemes of behaviour to my cohort. However, my cohort analysis 
suggests other observable patterns of transnational branch office behaviour are 
observable by reference to my sample, which do not – invariably – fall within the 
GaWC Western Europe / Eastern Europe scheme. As table 10 overleaf indicates, in 
2009, several of my Austria sample firms clustered their foreign branches into 
various Eastern Europe states, in accordance with the GaWC’s approach. Similarly – 
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but also distinctively – several Dutch sample firms clustered into Belgium and, to a 
lesser extent, Luxembourg. A modest level of legal practice clustering is also evident 
among my Spanish practices into Portugal, and among my Irish firms into the UK. As 
the final column on table 10 below shows, it is accepted that most of these regional 
clusterings were minority activities within each national cohort. Nevertheless, I 
suggest future studies may wish to explore cross-border law firm geographical 
clusterings on a more fluid, cohort-sensitive basis, in preference to the continent-
wide level of granularity suggested by the GaWC.  
 
Table 10: regional EU branch office clustering among country cohorts 
Sample 
country 
No. of cohort firms in 
country with no 
foreign EU offices 
Countries 
clustered into 
Number of cohort 










Ireland 9 United Kingdom 6 
Netherlands 1 Belgium 10 Luxembourg 4 
Spain 6 Portugal 4 
 
Superficially, the above-mentioned clustering suggests I may have been too quick, 
on p15, to discount the idea that law firms may expand into countries which were not 
psychically distant from their own – given that “psychic distance is correlated with 
geographic distance” (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975, p307 - 308). 
However, my finding regarding the EU trading countries of my cohort firms arguably 
confirms my scepticism of this possible driver of legal practice geographical change. 
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For example, as Excel table SD4 illustrates, in 2009, none of my German cohort 
firms operated in neighbouring Denmark. Further, as Excel table SD2 shows, the 
only Austrian sample firms trading in neighbouring Italy were AS practices which has 
a pan-European presence in any event. Finally, notwithstanding the modest cross-
border presence of large Irish firms in the neighbouring UK (Excel table SD5), just 
one of my UK cohort practices reciprocated by operating in Ireland in 2009 (Excel 
table SD10). Thus, while my findings indicate modest EU transnational clustering 
among some national cohorts, the lack of equivalent EU clustering among others is 
also noteworthy.  
 
Arguably, several of the above-mentioned examples support the GaWC’s 
observation in Geographies of globalization – that some law firms appear to trade 
internationally according to an “idiosyncratic” scheme (p108). However, I suggest 
that what might be regarded as an idiosyncratic behaviour is sometimes cohort-
specific. For example, as table 8 above illustrates, Linklaters’ transnational EU 
geographical reach was idiosyncratic among its Swedish peer group, but noticeably 
less so among large law firms in Germany, Spain or the UK, where the firm was also 
a cohort practice. In these countries, as table 8 also shows, several other sample law 
firms operated as many, if not more, foreign branch offices than Linklaters. 
Nevertheless, in a limited number of situations, I also uncovered examples of cohort 
firms whose EU branch office networks were not only at variance with their 
jurisdictional peer group, but also – substantially – with my entire 107-strong cohort. 
For example, Swedish firm Glimstedt was one of just four cohort practices to trade in 
Estonia in 2009, and one of just three cohort firms to trade in Latvia and Lithuania. 
Similarly, fellow Swedish sample firm MAQS (Bedlow, 2003, p36 - 38), together with 
UK cohort practice Eversheds (Lind, 2008a, p6), were the only two cohort firms 
operating in Denmark that year. Moreover, MAQS’ Baltic Sea trading behaviour was 
unique, both within its Swedish peer group and also more widely across my entire 
cohort. Taken in the round, my findings suggest that some of my sample practices 
did, as the GaWC suggested in Geographies of globalization, operate an 
idiosyncratic international scheme. 
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One final observation is also noteworthy regarding transnational legal practice 
clusterings, in light of comments made by Morgan and Quack (2005, p1775) and 
Pinnington and Gray (2007, p162): that non AS law firms have a more regionally 
compact transnational profile compared with some of their more expansive AS 
equivalents. My longitudinal analysis of the evolution of my cohort practices between 
1998 and 2009 suggests the apparent distinction between indigenous and AS firm 
geography is not always as clear-cut as one might imagine. As table 11 below 
indicates, transnational indigenous practices often simply merge into transnational 
AS firms – adding to the AS firms’ global scale, but then ceasing to be indigenous as 
a result. For example, when DLA merged with Austria’s Weiss-Tessbach in 2003, the 
combined practices gave DLA Piper seven new offices, including five in the EU 
(Vere-Jones, 2003, p3). Similarly, prior to its 2000 merger with Germany’s 
Boesebeck Droste, UK AS law firm Lovells did not operate in Austria, Germany, 
Poland or Spain (Pritchard, 1999, p94). After the merger, it did (Pritchard, 2000, 
p85). I suggest it is important to reflect on the histories of how transnational firms 
arose before regarding them as being, for example, English or American. Often, their 
legacy components suggest they do not entirely warrant such a definition. 
 
Table 11: how large AS firms can further expand their EU reach by 
combining with already transnational indigenous law firms 
Cohort 
firm 
Legacy indigenous firm Event 
year 
Yielding new EU office offices in (not 
all offices remained in 2009) 
DLA Piper Weiss-Tessbach 2003 Budapest, Bratislava, Prague, Salzburg, 




Bruckhaus Westrick Heller 
Loeber (Legal Business, 
2000, p20) 
2000 Berlin, Bratislava, Brussels, Budapest, 
Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, 
Munich, Prague, Vienna (Pritchard, 2000, 
p76). 
Lovells Boesebeck Droste (Zaki, 
1999, p1) 
2000 Alicante, Berlin, Dresden, Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Vienna, 
Warsaw (Pritchard, 1999, p33). 
Linklaters Oppenhoff & Rädler 
(Tromans, 2001, p10 - 11) 
2001  Alicante, Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, 
Munich, Warsaw (Pritchard, 1999, p373). 
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4.3.4.2. Conclusions 
My findings suggest the GaWC’s observations are largely replicated among my 
cohort. In accordance with the GaWC’s observations in Geographies of globalization 
(2000, p107 - 108), specific firms within my various cohorts were observed favouring 
specific “schemes” of globalisation behaviour. More generally, my cohort firms 
tended to favour trading in Western Europe, in preference to other European 
configurations. Therefore, I have concluded that the GaWC’s research has aided our 
understanding of large EU law firm geography. Consequently, my own overarching 
hypothesis regarding commonalities of law EU firm geographical behaviour is also 
supported – with the proviso that a significant minority of my Austria sample had a 
cross-border EU trading preference that was at variance with the majority of my 
sample group. However, my findings also suggest that, supporting the observations 
of Morgan and Quack (2005, p1775) and Pinnington and Gray (2007, p162), cross-
border geography trading patterns are sometimes more regionally compact than the 
larger “globalisation arenas” scale of analysis used by the GaWC.  
 
4.3.5.1. Testing hypothesis three: that, within the EU, a country’s largest law 
firms will typically trade in a small number of domestic locations 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis three, which explores whether – 
within the EU – a country’s largest law firms will operate a small number of domestic 
branch offices. My country-by-country findings can be found on Excel tables SD26 – 
SD34. However, as summary table 13 overleaf reveals, my hypothesis is 
consistently supported across all nine evaluation EU states.  
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Table 13: domestic branch distribution per national cohort 
Sample jurisdiction Total no. of domestic branch offices Mean Median Mode Austria 22 1.47 1 1 France 140 9.33 1 1 Germany 83 5.53 5 4 and 5 Ireland 17 1.13 1 1 Italy 65 4.33 3 2 Netherlands 31 2.07 1 1 Spain 79 5.27 3 2 Sweden 57 3.8 3 1 UK 50 3.33 1 1  
My findings broadly replicate those of the GaWC in Connecting Rhine-Main (Hoyler, 
Freytag et al., 2008, p1107), and also my reinterpretation of Morgan and Quack’s 
comparative German branch office data (2005, p1776) – but on a wider geographical 
scale, and in additional EU legal markets. It appears the tendency for large law firms 
to trade in a limited number of domestic locations is not only confined to Germany, 
the focal point of the GaWC’s investigation in Connecting Rhine-Main. Indeed, in 
2009, my findings suggest it was unusual for a top 15 law firm in both Austria and 
Ireland, for example, to operate more than one domestic office. However, like 
Morgan and Quack’s comparative study, I also uncovered differences in local market 
norms between EU states. For example, even within the smaller EU states I 
evaluated, large Swedish law firms were more domestically expansive (mean 3.8) 
than their counterparts in Austria (1.47) or Ireland (1.13). The Netherlands was 
between these two market extremes, with law firms operating an average of 2.07 
domestic offices. Among my larger EU cohort states, while a small majority of firms 
in both my French and UK cohorts traded domestically from a single location, their 
Spanish equivalents were noticeably more likely to operate in two or more cities. 
Further, German firms were likely to trade in at least four locations. Thus, while my 
hypothesis may be correct in stating that my cohort firms “typically trade in a small 
number of domestic locations”, my findings also suggest that what constitutes a 
“small” number of locations appears to be EU country-specific. 
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Two additional points are noteworthy regarding the above findings. Firstly, the 
French mean of 9.33 domestic offices can largely be attributed to a single firm, Fidal, 
which operated 87 domestic offices in 2009. But for that one firm, the French cohort 
average would have been 3.79. Secondly, my German findings arguably have a 
wider significance in light of my observations made on p59, where I discussed how 
German firms – as recently as the 1980s – were banned from operating multiple 
domestic offices. That such firms had extensive domestic branch office networks in 
2009 illustrates how quickly they overcame the “institutional legacies” (Morgan and 
Quack, 2005, p1765 - 1785) of their recent regulatory past.  
 
4.3.5.2. Conclusions 
My findings suggests the GaWC’s observations in Connecting Rhine-Main, that 
groups of law firms within a country tend to congregate into a small number of cities, 
(Hoyler, Freytag et al., 2008, p1107), is supported – not only in Germany, but also in 
every EU state I evaluated. Thus, hypothesis three is supported. Further, my findings 
also support my overarching hypothesis regarding commonalities of large EU law 
firm geographical behaviours. Nevertheless, my finding also illustrates that such 
commonalities have their limits. In 2009, large law firms in different EU states 
consistently traded in a small number of locations. However, what constituted a 
“small” number of locations was country-specific. More granular generalisations are 
not possible. 
 
4.3.6.1. Testing hypothesis four: that, within the EU, a country’s largest law 
firms will typically cluster their branch offices into common locations 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis four, which explores whether 
within the EU, a country’s largest law firms will typically cluster their branch offices 
into common locations. My country-by-country findings can be found on Excel tables 
35 - 43. However, as summary table 13 overleaf shows, my hypothesis is 
consistently supported across all nine EU states evaluated. Overall, my cohort firms 
exhibited strong clustering tendencies into a limited number of domestic cities. 
Indeed, such was the concentration of law firms in Austria and Ireland that just one 
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city in each jurisdiction played host to more than half of that cohort’s entire domestic 
branch office network. In five of my evaluation jurisdictions, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherland, Sweden and UK, cohort firms were moderately more dispersed, with a 
majority of firms operating in between two – six cities. The notable cohort outlier was 
France. Here, 18 cities comprised a majority of that sample group’s domestic branch 
office network. However, this high number is explained by Taj’s vast domestic 
branch office network. But for that one firm, the majority of my French cohort firms 
clustered into just 10 French cities.  
 
Table 13: how a small number of locations consistently represented a majority 
of that cohort's domestic branch office network 
Sample country 
Total number of domestic offices representing cohort majority 
Minimum number of locations representing a majority of domestic cohort offices 
Percentage of domestic cohort offices presented by those locations  
Austria 12 1 68.18 
France 71 18 50.71 
Germany 43 3 52.39 
Ireland 9 1 82.35 
Italy 33 3 53.85 
Netherlands 16 2 64.51 
Spain 40 6 53.15 
Sweden 29 3 59.65 
UK 26 4 60.00  
My findings, shown on tables 14 and 15 below, broadly replicate my previously-
discussed interpretation of the GaWC’s findings in both Connecting Rhine-Main 
(Hoyler, Freytag et al., 2008, p1107) and Balancing London (Taylor, Hoyler et al., 
2010, p1298) – with the proviso that my sampling and methodology was very 
different to both of these studies. In common with Connecting Rhine-Main, my study 
identified Frankfurt (all cohort firms present), Berlin (12), Düsseldorf (14), Hamburg 
(8), and Munich (15) as being important domestic trading locations for Germany 
sample firms. Also like the GaWC’s study, my findings suggested Chemnitz (1 firm) 
and Mannheim (2 firms) were of marginal interest to my sample group. Once again, 
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my domestic German finding arguably have a wider significance, given the country’s 
relatively recent history – previously discussed on p59 – of limiting firms’ rights to 
operate multiple domestic offices. Given the right to trade throughout the country, 
many German firms have taken advantage of this freedom in recent years. However, 
this does not mean that such firms have chosen to trade equally in all German cities: 
some locations are clearly more important to them than others. 
 
Table 14: number of firms per domestic trading location (Germany) 
Location Number of cohort firms present in location  Percentage of cohort domestic office total 
Berlin 12 14.29 Chemnitz 1 1.19 Cologne 4 4.76 Dresden 4 4.76 Düsseldorf  14 16.67 Essen 1 1.19 Frankfurt 15 17.86 Hamburg 8 9.52 Hannover 1 1.19 Leipzig 2 2.38 Mannheim 2 2.38 Munich 15 17.86 Nuremberg 2 2.38 Stuttgart 3 3.57 
Cohort total 84 100.00  
In common with Balancing London, the centrality of London (15 firms present) to my 
UK cohort firms’ domestic geography was observed among my cohort firms – with 
the proviso that this finding was entirely expected, given that my UK sample 
comprised the 15 largest London law firms, as set out in the 2009 EMEA Legal 500. 
Nevertheless, my sampling also shows how Edinburgh (3 firms), Manchester (5), 
Birmingham (5), and Leeds (5) were noticeably less important legal centres for my 
UK cohort. As table 15 below also shows, the UK legal market was also home to 
several “outlier” cities, such as Aberdeen, Cambridge and Newcastle, in which a 
single – but not always the same – cohort firm traded.  
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Table 15: number of firms per domestic trading location (UK) 
Location Number of cohort firms present in location  Percentage of cohort domestic office total 
Aberdeen 1 2 Birmingham 5 10 Bristol 3 6 Cambridge 1 2 Cardiff 1 2 Edinburgh 3 6 Glasgow 2 4 Ipswich 1 2 Leeds 5 10 Liverpool 1 2 London 15 30 Manchester 5 10 Newcastle Upon Tyne 2 4 Newport 1 2 Norwich 1 2 Nottingham 1 2 Sheffield 1 2 Winchester 1 2 
Cohort total 50 100  
Moving beyond my hypothesis testing, my findings reveal a noteworthy observation 
regarding the importance of country’s capital city to two of my national cohorts. In the 
UK, table 15 above shows every cohort firm was present in London. However, this 
behaviour was not replicated in Berlin – shown on table 14 previously. Here, three 
German cohort firms were absent. Moreover, my longitudinal legal trade press 
analysis discovered that two German sample firms – Clifford Chance and Lovells 
(Gill, 2004, p4; Parnham, 2006, p6 - 7) – had withdrawn from Berlin during the period 
of my study, while the third, Allen & Overy (Pritchard, 2009, p908), does not appear 
to have ever opened there. By contrast, table 14 also shows, every German cohort 
firm was present in Frankfurt in 2009. Although not to the same extent, this finding 
replicates research undertaken by scholars exploring the US legal market, discussed 
previously on p33. This research found that more large US law firms operated in the 
country’s financial centre, New York, rather than its political capital, Washington.  
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4.3.6.2. Conclusions 
In light of evidence present above, I have concluded that hypothesis four is 
supported. Across the EU, my cohort practices consistently clustered into a limited 
number of common domestic locations. Thus, not only is another aspect of the 
GaWC’s research replicated among may sample group, another element of my own 
overarching hypothesis – of the commonalities of law firm geographical behaviour 
between large EU law firms in various countries – is also supported. However, 
although such commonalities of behaviour can be observed, my additional findings 
suggest those commonalities have limits. For example, different law large firms in 
different EU countries treat their capital cities differently in relation to whether a 
branch office presence is essential.  
 
4.3.7.1. Testing hypothesis five: despite their otherwise heterogeneous 
behaviours in relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort will 
nevertheless tend to congregate into a small number of EU locations. These 
locations will have previously been identified by the GaWC as “global legal 
service centres”, “world cities” or locations deemed “over-provisioned by 
global law firms” 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis five, which explores whether, 
despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in relation to their 2009 EU branch 
office locations, my cohort will nevertheless tend to congregate into a small number 
of EU locations. These locations have previously been identified by the GaWC as 
“global legal service centres”, “world cities” or locations deemed “over-provisioned by 
global law firms”. My findings are contained in three sections. Firstly, I explore 
whether my entire 107-cohort tended to trade in common EU locations; secondly, I 
explore whether the EU locations in which my transnational cohort firms traded had 
previously been identified by the GaWC as being global legal service centres 
(GLSC); thirdly, I explore whether my transnational cohort firms traded in EU 
locations identified by the GaWC as being world cities. 
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A summary of my sample firms’ 2009 collective EU branch office presences is set 
out in table 16 overleaf – I have excluded those locations where just one cohort firm 
traded because such locations do not represent points of cohort clustering. Overall, 
my findings do indicate a reasonable degree of collective EU branch office 
clustering, despite the inevitable role played by cohort selection in my results. For 
example, it is possible to discount 15 of 47 cohort firms operating in London because 
such practices were integral to my UK cohort selection. Nevertheless, a substantial 
minority of my wider cohort also operated in this city. The popularity of Brussels is 
also noteworthy, given that my sample did not include Belgian-based law firms. The 
collective presence of 47 of my 107-strong sample group in Brussels therefore 
supports Van Criekingen, Decroy et al’s (2005, p177) findings regarding the 
importance of this EU city.  
 
Finally, the popularity of the Central and Eastern European cities of Budapest (16 
cohort firms), Prague (17) and Warsaw (19) is also noteworthy. Each of these cities 
played host to at least 10 per cent of my cohort practice, despite their parent 
countries not forming part of any of my national cohorts. My findings broadly 
replicates that of the GaWC in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 
1999, p1869, 1873), which discovered the above-mentioned cities were favoured 
trading locations among both London and New York cross-border firms. It is 
appreciated that none of these cities played host to a majority of cohort member 
firms – even, typically, a substantial minority. Nevertheless, given that many of my 
cohort practices did not trade in any foreign locations in 2009, that any EU city can 
attract at least 10 per cent of my 107-member cohort provides some evidence of 
foreign branch office clustering among my sample.   
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Table 16: in 2009, did my entire sample group show signs of collective branch 
office EU clustering? 
EU cohort firm cities No. of cohort firms present Brussels, London 47 
Paris 27 Madrid 24 Frankfurt, Milan 22 Rome 21 Munich 20 Amsterdam, Warsaw 19 Stockholm 18 Prague 17 Barcelona, Budapest, Dublin, Vienna 16 Düsseldorf 15 Berlin 14 Bratislava, Bucharest 13 Gothenburg 10 Hamburg, Malmö 9 Sofia 8 Valencia 8 Bilbao, Lyon, Padua, Seville, Vigo 7 
Alicante, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Lille, Marseille, Rotterdam 6 Antwerp, Birmingham, Bologna, Cologne, Helsingborg, Leeds, Luxembourg, Malaga, Manchester, Palma de Mallorca, Turin, Verona 5 Bordeaux, La Coruña, Lisbon, Montpellier, Nantes, Oporto, Oviedo, Pamplona, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Strasbourg, Toulouse, Zaragoza 4 Bristol, Dresden, Edinburgh, Eindhoven, Florence, Girona, Grenoble, Ljubljana, Naples, Nice / Sophia Antipolis, Saint-Etienne, San Sebastian, Stuttgart, The Hague, Vitoria 3 
Arnhem, Athens, Belfast, Brescia, Brno, Cambridge, Copenhagen, Cork, Falun, Genoa, Glasgow, Graz, Helsinki, Jönköping, Leipzig, Lleida, Mannheim, Murcia, Newcastle Upon Tyne, Norrköping, Nuremberg, Orebo, Rennes, Tallinn, Tours, Utrecht, Valladolid 
2 
 
Turning now to whether my cross-border cohort firms clustered into the EU global 
legal service centre (GLSC) locations in a manner suggested by the GaWC in A 
roster of world cities (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p455). On Excel table SD44, I 
present my detailed findings in relation to the EU cities might be designated as 
“prime”, “major” and “minor” global legal services (GLSC), based on the 2009 branch 
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office locations of my cross-border cohort firms. A summary of these findings is 
presented on table 17 below, where I compare own cohort firms’ EU city 
designations with those of the GaWC. Here, my findings suggest almost no overlap 
between my cross-border cohort firms’ collective 2009 EU trading preferences and 
the GaWC’s rankings. This is particularly evident in relation to the minor GLSCs. In 
total, 52 cities achieved this designation by reference to my own cohort firms’ 
geographical behaviours, despite not being designated as such by the GaWC.  
 
Table 17: the minimal commonalities between the GaWC’s GLSC and my own 
cohort findings 
Designation Commonality between my findings and GaWC 
Difference of 
designation 
Number of cities 
not identified by 
GaWC as GLSC 
Prime Three cities 16 cities 5 cities 
Major Five cities Nine cities 34 cities 
Minor One city None 52 cities 
 
Source: author’s research, Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p455 
 
To illustrate the scale of the differences between my study and the GaWC’s findings, 
table 18 overleaf compares which EU locations should, according to the GaWC, be 
designated as prime GLSCs. According to the GaWC’s research, just three EU cities 
– London, Paris and Brussels – fulfilled their criteria. However, my study identified 24 
EU cities that did so, using the GaWC’s own methodology. Because my study took 
place many years after the GaWC’s research, I might have expected a degree of 
upwards city progression from “major” to “prime” to have occurred among during the 
intervening years. It is therefore understandable that several EU cities I classified as 
prime GLSCs, such as Berlin or Frankfurt, were previously classified by the GaWC 
as major. What is less clear was how my findings could classify Bilbao, Dublin, Sofia, 
Valencia and Vienna as being prime GLSCs, whereas the GaWC’s research did not 
even classify these locations as being minor GLSCs.  
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Table 18: cities deemed to be prime GLSC by my cross-border cohort firms, 
compared with the GaWC’s ranking for the same cities 
Prime legal service centres 
Location 
No. of international cohort firms (seven or more) 
No. of cohort firms' foreign offices (26 or more) 
GaWC definition Agree? 
Amsterdam 19   Minor No Barcelona 13   Minor No Berlin 14   Major No Bilbao 7   Not featured No Bratislava 13   Minor No Brussels 47 63 Prime Yes Bucharest 13   Minor No Budapest 16   Major No Dublin 11   Not featured No Düsseldorf 15   Minor No Frankfurt 22 25 Major No Hamburg 9   Minor No London 46 42 Prime Yes 
Madrid 20 32 Major and minor No Milan 20   Major No Munich 20 30 Minor No Paris 26 34 Prime Yes Prague 17   Major No Rome 19 29 Major No Sofia 8   Not featured No Stockholm 10   Minor No Valencia 8   Not featured No Vienna 11   Not featured No Warsaw 19 27 Major No Points of agreement Three  
Source: author’s research, Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p455 
 
The most likely explanation for these differences in results is straightforward: cohort 
selection. It is, for example, notable that my designation of Dublin as being a prime 
GLSC can be largely explained by the inclusion of nine cross-border Irish firms within 
my sample. Elsewhere in table 18, other prime GLSCs – including Vienna and 
Stockholm – appear to largely owe that designation to the inclusion of cross-border 
firms from that country in my cohort. Indeed, arguably a key challenge with the 
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GaWC’s methodology in A roster of world cities is that the authors set the bar for 
what should be regarded as “global” law firm too low (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 
1999, p453 - 454). Because the GaWC only required a cohort practice to operate in 
one foreign location, the domestic office network of any firm which crossed this low 
threshold becomes eligible for inclusion in the prime, major and minor GLSC city 
designation process. My findings therefore lend support to my previously-explained 
doubts regarding the extent to which GaWC’s GLSC findings could be decoupled 
from their underlying cohort. In light of the totality of my GLSC observations, and the 
lack of correlation between my own cohort firms’ trading preferences and those of 
the GaWC, I have concluded that the GaWC’s approach of classifying cities as being 
prime, major or minor global legal service centres has not aided our understanding of 
large EU law firm geography. 
 
Turning now to the GaWC’s world city rankings: my comprehensive findings can be 
found on Excel table SD45. It is appreciated that – to a large extent – my analysis 
compares “apples with pears”, given that the GaWC’s world city rankings were 
based on the aggregate findings of four different APS sectors. Yet, taken in the 
round, it is noticeable that several cities designated by the GaWC as being alpha, 
beta and gamma world cities also tended to host the largest groups of my cross-
border cohort firms – my findings in relation to these city destinations are presented 
on table 19 overleaf. Equally, those EU cities which did not fall within the GaWC’s 
world city classification scheme (not shown) also tended to host the lowest number 
of cross-border cohort practices. Certainly, my cross-border firms’ preferences for 
trading in London, Paris, Frankfurt and Milan broadly reflect these locations’ alpha 
world cities status, as designated by the GaWC. However, there are also obvious 
discrepancies in relation to cities such as Brussels on the one hand, which my 
research suggests should be regarded as a top-rated alpha world city, and 
Copenhagen on the other, which was ranked by the GaWC as a gamma world city, 
yet almost none of my firms traded in. By contrast, the omission of cities such as 
Bratislava, Bucharest, Dublin, Vienna – each of whom hosted at least 10 of my 
cross-border cohort firms – are also notable omissions from the GaWC-designated 
world cities shown above. Indeed, across all of my findings, I uncovered significantly 
more differences than similarities between my own findings and that of the GaWC. 
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These differences included 48 cities home to between two and eight of my cross-
border cohort firms, which the GaWC had not indicated as showing even minimal 
evidence of world city formation. On balance, therefore, I have concluded that world 
city designations presented by the GaWC has not aided our understanding of large 
EU law firm geography.  
 
Table 19: number of cross-border cohort firms present compared with GaWC 
ranking for the same city – only world cities shown  
City Number of cross-border cohort firms present 
World city designation GaWC world city ranking* 
London 46 
Alpha 12 Paris 26 Frankfurt 22 10 Milan 20 Brussels 47 Beta 8 Madrid 20 Amsterdam 19 
Gamma 
6 Düsseldorf  15 Prague 17 Rome 19 5 Stockholm 10 Warsaw 19 Barcelona 13 
4 
Berlin 14 Budapest 16 Copenhagen 2 Hamburg 9 Munich 20 * The higher the number, the more important the location’s world city status 
Source: author’s research, Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p456 
 
My final observation regarding the GaWC’s research refers to Leipzig, a location 
identified by the GaWC (based on 2000 data) as being over provisioned by global 
law firms relative to other sectors in Global law firms (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et 
al., 2008, p463). As table 16 above illustrates, among my entire cohort of large EU 
law firms, just two traded in this location in 2009 – CMS Hasche Sigle and Luther – 
(Pritchard, 2009, p468, 484). Indeed, it is notable that Clifford Chance (Tromans, 
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2001c, p1), Freshfields, Linklaters and Taylor Wessing (The Lawyer, 2001, p13) 
closed their offices in this city during my evaluation time period. My finding therefore 
suggests the apparent importance of certain cities to legal practice globalisation may 
not only be cohort, but also temporally, specific – an issue to be discussed further in 
the next section. Nevertheless, due to the paucity of my transnational cohort firms 
trading in Leipzig in 2009, I have concluded that the GaWC’s findings in Global law 




In light of the evidence presented above, I suggest there is reasonable evidence to 
suggest that large law firms from various different EU states commonly clustered in a 
small number of EU locations in 2009 – notably, London and Brussels. 
Consequently, I regard this finding as lending further weight to my overarching 
hypothesis, which proposes limited patterns of geographical behaviour among my 
large EU law firm cohort. However, in my analysis above, it has proved difficult to 
disentangle points of commonality between my cohorts from the cohorts from which 
they were derived. My findings therefore cast doubt on whether the GaWC’s 
assertion in A roster of world cities – that “gross similarities within and across service 
sectors does suggest that our inventory is reasonably robust: differences are likely to 
be minor and on the margins” (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p451) – is 
warranted. In light of the significant differences between this group’s GLSC and 
world city rankings and my findings, I believe the GaWC’s claim cannot be 
supported. In light of these considerations, I have concluded that the GaWC’s 
findings in A roster of world cities has not aided our understanding of large EU law 
firm geography. Nevertheless, it is also hoped that my findings are of interest, at 
least on a comparative basis, to scholars of economic geography. As briefly 
mentioned on p39, these researchers have previously discovered that different 
industries tend to have distinctive patterns of geographical coverage, in terms of their 
collective cross-border trading preferences. In light of my evaluation of the GaWC’s 
research, it would appear that different cohorts within the same sector also have 
different cross-border trading preferences.     
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4.3.8.1. Testing hypothesis six: that, despite their otherwise heterogeneous 
behaviours in relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort of firms 
will nevertheless collectively ignore certain EU locations. In particular, they 
will commonly ignore EU locations identified by the GaWC as being “under 
provisioned” by global law firms 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis six, which explores whether, 
despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in relation to their EU branch 
office locations, my cohort of firms will nevertheless collectively ignore certain EU 
locations. In particular, they will commonly ignore EU locations identified by the 
GaWC as being “under provisioned” by global law firms (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock 
et al., 2008, p463 - 464). The specific locations I expect my cross-border cohort firms 
to ignore are: Athens, Copenhagen, Dublin, Lisbon and Madrid. My findings are set 
out below.  
 
Table 20: number of transnational cohort firms present in 2009 in the EU cities 
described by the GaWC as being under provisioned by global law firms 
EU capital city Total number of transnational cohort firms present Athens 2 Copenhagen 2 Dublin 11 Lisbon 4 Madrid 20  
Perhaps inevitably, the above findings reflect the national cohorts from which they 
were derived. Nevertheless, if one strips away these cohort biases, it can be 
observed that, in 2009, most of these locations were home to very few of my cross-
border sample firms. For example, of the 11 cross-border cohort firms trading in 
Dublin, just two do not owe their existence in the ranking to their Irish sample status: 
PwC / Landwell (Pritchard, 2009, p685), which arrived in the country in 1999 
(Parnham, 2002, p14) and UK firm Beachcroft, which opened in the city in 2009 
(Dowell, 2009, p7). Regarding Copenhagen, my two cross-border cohort firms 
trading in this city in 2009 were Swedish sample firms MAQS (Pritchard, 2009, p275) 
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and UK practice Eversheds (Lind, 2008a, p6; Chambers, 2009, p576). In Athens, the 
two cohort firms present were EY Law’s PI Partners (Pritchard, 2009, p170) and UK 
sample firm Norton Rose (Pritchard, 2009, p1170). The identity of these firms is 
itself, interesting, because it suggests that no one “type” of law firm consistently 
operates as a geographical outliers regarding the international locations in which 
they trade. However, it is accepted that UK and accountancy-linked firms dominate 
the above-mentioned outlier practices. Conversely, the identity of the four firms 
trading in the under-provisioned EU capital city of Lisbon in 2009 is less surprising: 
apart from Linklaters (Chambers, 2009, p607), three of the four transnational sample 
firms present – Cuatrecasas Gonçalves Pereira, Garrigues and Uría Menéndez 
(Pritchard, 2009, p1372, 1375, 1389) – were Spanish in origin. Nevertheless, given 
that only four of my sample firms – including 15 of Spain’s largest practices – 
operated in Lisbon that year, my findings supports the GaWC’s observations in 
Global law firms that Lisbon is under-represented by global law firms. 
 
The status of Madid, the final EU location suggested by the GaWC as being under-
provisioned by global law firms, is more complicated. Of my 20 transnational cohort 
firms trading Madid in 2009, 15 were arguably not indigenous to that country, 
including Ashurst (Legal Week, 2000, p6; Pritchard, 2009, p918), DLA Piper (Mitchell 
and Collins, 2005, p2; Pritchard, 2009, p994), Deloitte (LexisNexis, 2009, pEU853B), 
Ernst & Young (Pritchard, 2009, p1374) and Salans (Week, 2007, p8). This raises 
questions about whether Madid could, in 2009, be said to be underprovided by 
global law firms. On balance, I suggest it was not – although I appreciate this has 
been a subjective judgement on my part.  
 
Overall, because a majority of the EU cities identified by the GaWC in Global law 
firms as being under provisioned by global firms were also under provisioned by my 
own cohort of cross-border practices, I have concluded that the GaWC’s research 
has aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography.  
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4.3.8.2. Conclusions 
For the reasons stated above, I have concluded that the GaWC’s research has aided 
our understanding of large EU law firm geography regarding the EU cities in which 
my cohort firms did not operate during 2009 – despite the temporal, cohort and 
methodological differences between my study and that of the GaWC. Collectively, 
my sample firms’ absence, or minimal presence, in those locations suggests that 
certain cities can – objectively – be said to be under represented by such firms. 
Consequently, my own overarching hypothesis regarding limited commonalities of 
large EU law firm behaviours is also supported.  
 
4.3.9.1 Testing hypothesis seven: - that, despite their otherwise heterogeneous 
behaviours in relation to their EU branch office locations, my cohort of firms 
will treat certain EU locations as being focal points of modest legal practice 
investment or divestment over time. Some of these more common investment 
and divestment locations will have previously been identified by either socio-
legal or GaWC scholars 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis seven, which explores whether, 
despite their otherwise heterogeneous behaviours in relation to their EU branch 
office locations, my cohort of firms will treat certain EU locations as being focal 
points of modest legal practice investment or divestment over time. Some of these 
more common investment and divestment locations will have previously been 
identified by either socio-legal or GaWC scholars.  
 
My longitudinal investigation into the evolving EU geographies of my cohort firms 
between 1998 and 2009 encountered similar challenges to those identified by the 
GaWC in The changing geography of globalized service provision (Hassens, 
Derudder et al., 2011): “firms get liquidated, merge with other firms, are replaced by 
new firms whose global presence/importance rises, etc” (p2296). Consequently, my 
evaluation is based on 70 out of my 107 cohort firms. Discounted from my evaluation 
were four sample firms which, while among the largest 15 practices in my various 
sample jurisdictions, were created between the start and end of my evaluation 
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period. Also discounted were 20 cohort firms that were found to be entirely domestic 
in 2009. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of my earlier findings, these excluded 
practices include five Irish and eight Swedish cohort firms. Finally, I discounted 13 
cohort firms, both domestic and cross-border, where it was impossible to determine 
these firms’ evolving presences in my EU evaluation locations throughout my 
analysis time period. In some cases, particularly in relation to five Spanish cohort 
practices, these firms’ histories were only sporadically documented in the source 
materials I had access to. However in others, notably in relation to those law firms 
linked to the “Big Four” accountants, their geographical evolutions were often simply 
too complex to evaluate with confidence. While it is disappointing that I could not 
evaluate the evolving EU branch office geographies of nearly one third of my total 
cohort, my inability to do so can only partly be attributed to my use of secondary 
source materials to assist with this process. Indeed, the complexities of such firms’ 
geographical evolutions is indicated in my Garrigues’ case history, discussed on 
p163. Garrigues is a former member of Andersen Legal. 
 
Turning now to my findings: my detailed, firm-by-firm, location-by-location, 
breakdown of my cohort firms’ EU geographical activities can be found on Excel 
table SD46. However, a summary is presented overleaf. While it is accepted that my 
findings are complicated by some firms both arriving and departing during the time 
period of my investigation (of which more shortly), my research suggests that several 
EU locations identified by past research were, indeed, focal points of investment and 
/ or divestment among my sample firms between 1998 and 2009. Reflecting Galanter 
and Henderson’s (2007) findings regarding the evolving geographies of the top 250 
US law firms between 1986 and 2006 (p1889 - 1890), my investigation revealed 
several of my cohort firms expanding into Brussels, London and Frankfurt. Equally, 
in a similar manner to Silver’s (2000, p1127 - 1128) findings regarding the trading 
trajectories of US law firms, my research shows that several of my cohort practices 
ceased operating in Brussels, Paris and London between 1998 and 2009. 
Collectively, my findings suggest a degree of “churn” among large EU law firms 
regarding the EU locations in which they trade. 
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Table 21: my cohort firms’ evolving EU branch office geography between 1998 
















Antwerp 1 4 0 2 1 5 +4 
Berlin 8 5 3 7 11 13 +2 
Brussels 35 7 10 1 45 43 -2 
Frankfurt 14 8 0 3 16 19 +3 
London 32 11 4 2 36 44 +8 
Madrid 9 7 4 1 13 16 +3 
Milan 12 6 1 3 13 18 +5 
Paris 16 4 7 2 23 20 -3 
Rotterdam 3 1 2 4 5 4 -1 
Vienna 8 3 0 0 6 9 +3 
 
In relation to the GaWC’s findings – which used a different method of evaluation and 
a different cohort to my own – perhaps the most notable aspect of my findings were 
that, in six out of the eight EU cities evaluated, our findings broadly coincided. Like 
the GaWC’s findings (which focused on connectives between cities, as encapsulated 
by geographically expansive global law firms), my findings found, on balance, more 
of my cohort firms operating in Madrid in 2009 than in 1998 – notwithstanding the 
exclusion of several of my Spanish firms from my study, for the reasons stated 
above. Similarly, broadly in accordance with the GaWC’s findings, my evaluation 
found more cohort firms trading in Antwerp, London, Milan and Vienna in 2009 than 
in 1998, and also less firms trading in Rotterdam. My findings in relation to Paris and 
Berlin indicates a different direction of geographical travel to that suggested by the 
GaWC – the group indicated that Paris has become more connected over time, and 
Berlin less. By contrast, I found that Paris was home to slightly fewer cohort firms in 
2009 than 1998, while Berlin was home to more. However, in both cases, the 
changes were marginal. Consequently, because my findings broadly concur with that 
of the GaWC in relation to five out of seven cities we mutually evaluated, I have 
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concluded that the GaWC’s research has aided our understanding of large law firm 
geography. Further, I have also concluded that, supporting my overarching 
hypothesis regarding limited communities of large EU law firm geographical 
behaviours, certain locations within the EU have been notable centres of inward 
investment or divestment during my evaluation time period.  
 
More generally, and by way of contrast, one of the more noticeable aspects of my 
findings is the static nature of many of my cohort firms’ presences in several 
evaluation locations. This is indicated in table 21 above, where many of my cohort 
firms are shown to be continually present in my evaluation cities between 1998 and 
2009. In all likelihood, my cohort firms’ continual presence in cities such as London, 
Madrid and Vienna during those years can probably be explained by the inclusion of 
firms based in London, Spain and Austria within my sample. However, it is also 
noticeable that 35 of my cohort firms continually traded in Brussels for the duration of 
my evaluation time period, despite not being Belgian in origin.  
 
Exploring this issue further, my additional findings on table 22 overleaf illustrate that, 
unambiguously, 11 of my cohort firms did not alter their EU branch office 
geographies in any way during my 11-year evaluation time period. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, a majority of the firms identified below are drawn from my Irish and 
Swedish cohorts – markets relatively unaffected by legal practice globalisation. 
Nevertheless, France’s Lefèvre Pelletier & Associés and Italy’s Chiomenti operated 
in a noticeably more internationalised environment between 1998 and 2009, yet did 
not change their EU branch office profile during that time. Collectively, my findings 
provide further evidence to suggest that branch office geographical change, either 
domestically or within a wider world region, is not an inevitable trajectory for large EU 
law firms – even when regulation / liberalisation gives such firms a broad freedom to 
trade wherever they like within a given market. 
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Table 22: sample firms with an unchanging EU office presence 1998 - 2009 
Firm name (2009) Consistent EU Location (s) – 1998 - 2009 
Cederquist Stockholm 
Chiomenti Brussels, London, Milan, Rome, Turin 
Dorda Brugger Jordis Vienna Eugene F. Collins Dublin Eversheds O'Donnell Sweeney (formerly O’Donnell Sweeney) Dublin Gernandt & Danielsson Stockholm Lefèvre Pelletier & Associés Paris LK Shields Dublin Matheson Ormsby Prentice Dublin, London 
Mannheimer Swartling Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, Gothenburg, Helsingborg, Malmo, Stockholm McCann FitzGerald Brussels, Dublin, London 
 
However, as I shall now discuss, other firms within my cohort took a contrasting 
approach, and changed their EU branch offices dramatically during my evaluation 
time period. Indeed, this behaviour helps explain why, on table 21 above, some firms 
were found to both arrive and depart from evaluation locations between 1998 and 
2009. I shall now present two case histories involving my cohort firms, which help 
explain this phenomenon. Both of these case histories illustrate the highly complex 
(and occasionally interlinking) nature of some of my cohort firms’ evolving EU 
geographies. 
 
In 1998, the firm which became my Austrian cohort practice, bpv Hügel, traded as 
Hügel Dallman & Partners. The firm operated in three EU cities: Vienna and Mödling 
in Austria, and also Brussels in Belgium (Pritchard, 1998, p28). In that year, name 
partner Armin Dallmann announced to The Lawyer magazine that his practice was 
"looking at possibilities and strategies" for gaining international presence (Lindsay, 
1998, p5). Subsequently, in 2000, the firm merged with German MDP Haarmann, 
Hemmelrath & Partner (McAteer, 2000, p66 - 69), a practice whose EU branch office 
network included my key evaluation cities of Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, 
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Milan and Paris (Pritchard, 2000, p208). Starting in 2003, the legal trade press 
began to report that the firm was undertaking various structural reforms (Evans, 
2003, p3; Gill, 2004a, p6; Parnham, 2004, p4 - 5; Power, 2004b, p8). Following 
disagreements over the firm’s lockstep pay structure, the firm’s co-founder, Wilhelm 
Haarmann, resigned (Cushnie, 2005, p7). Shortly afterwards, the firm’s branch 
offices began splitting off (Illman, 2006, p3). That same year, the practice was 
liquidated (Illman, 2006, p24 - 25). In the aftermath of the collapse of its parent 
operation, Haarmann’s Austrian arm, now trading as bpv Hügel, returned to 
operating as a standalone practice. And, in 2009, the firm traded in exactly the same 
three EU locations (Pritchard, 2009, p32) as it had in 1998. Further, rather than 
operating an extensive EU branch office network, bpv Hügel actively decided (Gibitz, 
2006) to extend its EU geographical reach via an alliance with three former 
Haarmann Hemmelrath offices (Legal Week, 2006, p5) in Bucharest, Budapest and 
Prague rather than operating its own branch offices. 
 
In 1998, Spanish cohort practice, Garrigues, had recently become part of Andersen 
Legal (AL) (Parnham, 2002, p12 - 18) a firm which, in 1999, press reports suggested 
was due to become the world’s largest employers of lawyers (Legal Week, 1999a, 
p5). During Garrigues’ membership of AL, AL acquired a 30-lawyer practice 
operating in Hamburg and Berlin (Legal Week, 1999a, p4) – which would ultimately 
become my German cohort firm, Luther (Tromans, 2007, p22 - 33). AL also then 
expanded in Belgium (Tromans, 2000a, p6). (Confusingly, Garrigues also operated 
its own Brussels office in 1998, known locally as Garrigues & Andersen (Pritchard, 
1998, p847)). In addition, during my evaluation time period, Andersen Legal 
operated long-standing offices in my cohort evaluation cities of London (Egan, 2000, 
p16 - 19), Paris (Galli, 1998, p37; Lindsay, 1998, p2), and Milan (LexisNexis, 1998, 
pEU1156B; Parnham, 2002, p12 - 18). In 2002, after the Enron scandal broke, 
Garrigues departed AL (Pearce, 2002, p50 - 52), shortly before AL itself collapsed 
(Parnham, 2002, p16 - 17). Consequently, in 2003, Garrigues’s EU geographical 
profile was reduced to its pre-existing network of domestic Spanish offices, together 
with a single foreign branch office in Brussels (Pritchard, 2003, p1068). Between 
2002 and 2009, Garrigues undertook a programme of EU branch office expansion, 
including merging with its former AL partner firm in Portugal (Melville, 2003, p6; 
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Collins, 2004b, p3), and also opening offices in Bucharest, Warsaw (Lind, 2008b, p6) 
and London (Chambers, 2008, p1619). This, therefore, explains Garrigues’ sudden 
absence from several evaluation cities in my accompanying Excel table SD46, and 
also its return to London in 2008.  
 
These case histories illustrate the geographical dynamism of these specific firms. 
However, I suggest these case histories also pose a challenge to any future 
researcher who wishes to conduct a survey or interviewed-based analysis of the 
geographical evolution of any firm with an equally eventful geographical history. In a 
bpv Hügel / Garrigues-type scenario who, legitimately, should speak for the firm, 
when explaining past events? The current leaders of the surviving firm entity? The 
(possibly departed) leaders of the firm’s (possibly defunct) parent practice? Or both? 
My reliance on historical legal trade press articles in my study means I have not had 
to address this logistical and conceptual dilemma. However, it is a dilemma that 
future researchers should consider carefully. 
 
4.3.9.2. Conclusions 
Overall, my findings suggest that the GaWC’s research in The changing geography 
(Hassens, Derudder et al., 2011, p2293 - 2307) has aided our understanding of large 
EU law firm geography, notwithstanding its different methodology and cohort group. 
My findings also indicate that certain EU locations – notably Brussels and London – 
have been focal points of legal practice inward investment (and divestment) among 
my cohort between 1998 and 2009. I therefore suggest that my findings reveal 
limited patterns of geographical behaviour within my cohort group – but only relation 
to the specific locations I evaluated. Yet often, and by contrast, my wider findings 
regarding my cohort’s evolving EU branch office geography also suggests sharp 
differences between my sample firms in relation to how their EU branch office 
profiles have evolved. Many of my cohort firms undertook little, or no, EU branch 
office change during my evaluation time period, while others did so dramatically – 
suggesting heterogeneity among my group. Indeed, on several occasions, this 
finding was only uncovered in light of my granular, year-by-year, approach to 
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evaluating my cohort’s branch office changes, notwithstanding the evidential 
challenges of doing so. Had I, for example, simply examined bpv Hügel’s EU branch 
office geography in 1998 and again in 2009, I might have concluded that this firm 
had undertaken no EU geographical changes during my evaluation time period. As 
my case history reveals, the truth was very different.  
 
4.3.10. Cohort EU branch office behaviour conclusions 
Having concluded my evaluation of my cohort firms’ EU branch office behaviours, it 
appears that – on balance – the GaWC’s research has assisted my investigation. 
Perhaps ironically, the GaWC’s research has proved easier to replicate among my 
cohort when describing specific cohort behaviours, rather than attempting to 
formulate generalised models. An example of the – largely replicable – former was 
the GaWC’s observation in Geographies of globalization that most of their cohort 
firms with international offices had “merely an international foothold in the globalizing 
law business” (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p106). By contrast, an example of 
the - largely un-replicable latter – would be the EU cities identified in A roster of 
world cities as being “global legal service centres” (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, 
p455). In terms of evaluating my overarching hypothesis, limited patterns of 
behaviour are evident among my cohort, including their tendency to cluster into a 
limited number of common domestic and international locations. However, my 
findings have also uncovered numerous examples of branch office heterogeneity 
within my various samples. Cohort differences included differences in the average 
number of foreign branch offices operated by my various national cohorts, and 
variances in average domestic office numbers in different evaluation countries. My 
cohort firms also varied in their tendency to alter their EU branch office reach over 
time. Thus, while my overarching hypothesis has not, so far, been disproven, my 
findings suggest my hypothesis is only applicable in relation to specific aspects of 
large EU law firm branch office geography, rather than more generally. 
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4.4.1.1. Testing hypothesis eight – do my cohort of large EU law firms make 
extensive use of alliance capitalism to extent their EU branch office reach? 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis eight, where I explore whether my 
cohort made extensive use of alliance capitalism to extend their EU branch office 
reach in 2009. By alliance capitalism, I mean a scenario where a firm cooperates 
with another legal practice it is also notionally in competition with (Dunning, 1995, 
p466). My detailed findings relating to my cohort firms’ alliance capitalism 
relationships are presented on Excel tables SD47 – SD55, but summarised below.  
 
Table 23: my cohort firms’ use of alliance capitalism within the EU 
Country 
Number of known EU alliances to which my 
cohort firms belonged to per jurisdictions in 
2009 
No. of cohort 
firms 
belonging to 
alliances 0  1  2  3  4  5  
Austria 3 5 6 1 0 0 12 
France 6 7 2 0 0 0 9 
Germany 4 5 5 0 0 1 11 
Ireland 1 7 4 0 2 1 14 
Italy 7 4 4 0 0 0 8 
Netherlands 7 4 2 2 0 0 8 
Spain 4 6 3 2 0 0 11 
Sweden 3 6 4 1 0 1 12 
UK 3 10 2 0 0 0 12 
 
Essentially, my findings broadly confirm both the GaWC’s UK-specific findings in The 
long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1863) and also Morgan and 
Quack’s (2005, p1776) comparative Anglo-German findings in Institutional legacies. 
As table 23 above illustrates, around the end of 2009, and across all nine EU states I 
evaluated, the majority of my sample firms in each jurisdiction used alliance 
capitalism to extend their EU branch office reach. Thus, I regard my overarching 
hypothesis regarding limited commonalities of large EU geographical behaviours as 
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being supported. Nevertheless, as table 23 also indicates, my national cohorts were 
found to use alliance capitalism to differing extents. For example, seven Italian and 
Dutch sample firms did not participate in any EU alliances in 2009. This is a far 
higher number than other national cohorts, notably Ireland. This finding therefore 
suggests that the commonalities between my national cohorts regarding their use of 
alliance capitalism are limited.  
 
As an additional observation, my detailed Excel findings – set out in SD47 – SD55 – 
indicate that cross-border law firms often use alliance capitalism in conjunction with 
their foreign branch office network, rather than as an alternative to them. I shall 
discuss the interaction between firms’ foreign branch offices and their use of alliance 
capitalism more extensively in my hypothesis nine results section below. However, 
perhaps the most striking behaviour revealed in these findings – also summarised 
above – is the large number of sample firms which participate in multiple alliance 
relationships simultaneously: in three extreme cases (Germany, Ireland and 
Sweden), taking part in five different alliance relationships at once. To the best of my 
knowledge, legal practice alliance polygamy has not been extensively explored 
within the research literature to date. Therefore, moving beyond my hypothesis 
evaluation, the obvious follow-on question arising out of my finding is – why? By 
analysing my legal trade press and legal directory-derived data, I have identified 
three possible explanations. In fact, my findings suggest the reasons why some firms 
engage in multiple alliance relationships is the same they participate in one: different 
types of alliances perform different roles. I shall now explain what those roles are, by 
reference to firms engaged in multiple alliances only. 
 
Firstly, different alliances have differing geographical reaches. For example, Irish 
sample firm McCann McCann Fitzgerald’s enduring North South Legal Alliance 
relationship (Hellings, 2000, p51 - 56) with L’Estrange & Brett only yielded it 
additional coverage in one UK region – Northern Ireland. By contrast, the firm’s 
Unilaw membership not only offered it additional coverage in various EU 
jurisdictions, but also Asia (LexisNexis, 2007, pLA101B). Similarly, Spanish sample 
firm Uría Menéndez belonged to different alliances with differing geographical 
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ranges. While Uría Menéndez’s “best friends” relationship provided it with additional 
coverage in France, Germany and Italy (Fleming, 2005, p43 - 46; Taylor and Ganz, 
2008, p1), its Lex Mundi membership extended its reach globally (LexisNexis, 2007, 
pLA68B - LA77B). Thus, one might regard belonging to multiple alliances 
simultaneously as a pragmatic way of delivering a firm’s desired geographical reach, 
in the absence of a singular alternative. Further examples of networks with differing 
geographical ranges are presented in Excel tables SD47 – SD55. 
 
Secondly, different alliances have differing legal specialisms. Some of the alliances 
my cohort practices belong to, such as Interlaw or Lex Mundi, require their member 
firms to be “full service” practices. By contrast others, notably Conference Bleue, 
Ecomlex, Ius Laboris and Taxand, focus on specialties such as pharmaceuticals and 
healthcare, IT and ecommerce, employment and pensions (LexisNexis, 2007, 
pLA14B, LA19B, LA42B, LA52B, LA69B), and tax (Legal Week, 2008, p5) 
respectively. Additional examples of the specialist networks my cohort firms 
belonged to in 2009 to can be found on Excel table SD56.  
 
Thirdly, different alliances have differing strategic objectives: some stress the 
importance of their member firms’ independence from each other, while others 
ultimately expect their members firms to merge: we might describe this latter type of 
alliance as being a “proto law firm”. Examples of my cohort firms belonging to either 
type of alliances in 2009 can be found on Excel tables SD57 – SD58. And, among 
my cohort practices, arguably the best examples of firms simultaneously belonging 
to two different alliances with two different strategic objectives are Austrian and 
German cohort practices CMS Reich-Rohrwig Hainz and CMS Hasche Sigle. Both 
firms are not only long-standing members of the World Law Group (Tromans, 2006, 
p28 - 30) but also proto law firm CMS (The Lawyer, 1999, p2). The World Law 
Group’s mission statement says its constituent practices are “independent law firms, 
who are not affiliated for the practice of law, and each firm is solely responsible for its 
own work” (LexisNexis, 2007, pLA105B - LA106B). By contrast, the long-standing – 
if repeatedly deferred (Edmund, 2008, p3) – objective of CMS is full economic 
integration (Cahill, 2001a, p1). Being members of these two different types of 
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alliances offers both CMS firms different levels of global coverage and also different 
strategic options. 
 
On a related point, my investigation also uncovered a possible relationship between 
my cohort’s 2009 branch office geography and their current or previous membership 
of specific proto law firm alliances. As Excel table SD58 reveals, several of my 
cohort firms belonged, between 1998 and 2009, to proto law firm alliances which had 
not, by the end of my study, progressed to full merger. Examples of firms engaging 
in yet-to-be-consummated relationships include the various members of CMS, the 
RoschierRaidla alliance (Hoare, 2004, p8) – of which Swedish same firm Roschier 
was a member – and Taylor Wessing’s alliance with BSJP Legal (Sadowski, 2009, 
p6). Indeed, one might even regard some proto law firm relationships as being a 
long-term hindrance to their member practices’ cross-border consolidation. This is 
because, while some of these groups existed for many years, they never achieved 
their stated objective of delivering inter-firm mergers before being discontinued. 
Failed proto law firms involving my cohort firms include BBLP, of which both German 
sample firm Beiten Burkhardt and Italian sample firm Pavia E Ansaldo were 
members (Mooney, 2001a, p1), and Pünder Group, in which Austrian sample firm 
Cerha Hempel Spiegelfeld Hlawati is a former participant (Tyler, 1998, p1). I shall 
discuss the reasons why some of these alliances failed to transform into integrated 
practices in the following chapter, where I evaluate the existence of law firm 
geographical strategies.  
 
Finally, my research suggests that some of my cohort firms’ absence from certain 
EU locations can be attributed to their previous decisions to downgrade former 
branch offices into a looser alliance relationship. Cohort firms adopting such an 
approach between 1998 and 2009 include Clifford Chance, whose Budapest-based 
alliance partner Lakatos Köves & Partners was spun off from the firm in 2008 
(Phillips, 2009, p27), the loose relationship between Austrian sample firm bpv 
Hügel’s (Legal Week, 2006, p5) and its former Haarmann Hemmelrath branch office 
counterparts in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania (McAteer, 2000, p66 - 
69) (Gibitz, 2006) and the spin-off of Linklaters’ former CEE offices into Kinstellar 
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(Laver, 2008, p34). Collectively, these finding suggest that, in order to properly 
understand legal practice branch office geography, one must appreciate that it often 
closely relates to the alliances to which law firms belong. Moreover, the relationship 
between law firms and their alliance partner practices can evolve bi-directionally: 
alliances can progress towards branch office unions, but also arise out of demergers 
of former branch offices.  
 
4.4.1.2. Conclusions 
Overall, my research suggests the GaWC has assisted our understanding of large 
EU law firm geography: in a similar manner to the GaWC’s UK-specific findings in 
The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1863), most of my cohort 
firms – in all of my evaluation jurisdictions – used alliance capitalism to extend their 
geographical reach. My findings therefore also support my own overarching 
hypothesis – that limited common behaviours can be observed between large law 
firms in multiple EU jurisdictions. However, beyond these broad observations, few 
commonalities of behaviour can be observed: as table 23 above illustrates, the 
number of alliances individual firms belong to varies, both between large EU law 
firms within a given cohort, and also between different cohorts in different EU states. 
More generally, my cohort firms also appear to belong to law firm alliances for a 
variety of reasons, such as the alliance’s practice area / industry focus or its 
geographical reach. For that reason, commonalties between my sample firms 
regarding their alliance capitalism behaviours appears only to exist in a narrow set of 
circumstances.  
 
4.4.2.1. Testing hypothesis nine – do my cohort of large EU law firms make 
extensive use of alliance capitalism in distinctive ways, which are commonly 
replicated across multiple EU states? 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis nine, in which I seek to replicate, 
among my nine national cohorts, the four distinctive approaches suggested by the 
GaWC in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1865 - 1866). In 
addition, I have also tested whether my cohort practices use two additional 
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approaches implicitly or explicitly suggested by the GaWC in the same paper: 
explicitly, not belonging to any alliances at all, yet still operating internationally; and 
implicitly not using alliance capitalism in any way, and also operating no foreign 
branch office. In order to regard such behaviours as commonly replicable, my criteria 
is specific – can I identify at least one firm within each national cohort which acts in 
accordance with the GaWC’s variously defined approaches? For example, can I 
identify a firm which has a minimal foreign office presence (i.e. one foreign office), 
which is supplemented by an alliance relationship?  
 
My detailed findings relating to my cohort firm’s alliance relationships can be found 
on Excel tables SD47 – SD55. But, on p172, I offer what I regard as illustrative 
examples from each of my national cohorts which appear to match the GaWC’s 
suggested approaches. As table 24 also shows, I have been unable to consistently 
replicate the above-mentioned patterns of behaviour across each of my cohort 
countries. My findings suggest various problems in trying to apply the GaWC’s 
typologies of behaviours. For example, in countries such as France, Germany and 
the UK, none of my cohort firms had adopted the approach suggested by the GaWC 
in relation to Travers Smith Braithwaite – that is, operating no foreign branch offices, 
and belonging to no inter-firm alliances. At the other end of the globalisation 
spectrum, the tendency of my 15 Irish sample firms to use alliance capitalism 
extensively meant none had adopted the approach documented by the GaWC in 
relation to Freshfields – that is, adopting a “no alliance” form of transnational 
operations. The only Irish firm which did not appear to engage in any form of alliance 
capitalism relationships, Ronan Daly Jermyn, did not trade transnationally (Pritchard, 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































173 | P a g e   
Between these two extremes, elements of the GaWC’s various approaches were 
broadly supported. That is, large EU law firms often supplemented their foreign 
branch office networks with alliances or affiliations. For example, in relation to the 
approach requiring firms to operate two of more foreign offices, supplemented by an 
alliance relationship, representative firms were identified in each of my nine EU 
evaluation jurisdictions. However, it proved difficult to identify an illustrative cohort 
member for two of the GaWC’s classifications. The first problematic model required a 
firm to operate a single foreign branch office, which was supplemented by an 
alliance relationship. Here, challenges in identifying such firms were two-fold. Within 
my German cohort, all sample firms operated more than one foreign office, thereby 
resulting in a lack of practices fulfilling the “one foreign location” criterion. Meanwhile, 
in France, Fidal (Pritchard, 2009, p376) fulfilled the first criterion, because it traded in 
just one foreign location. However, this firm could not be observed belonging to any 
law firm alliances, thereby rendering it ineligible under the model’s second criteria.  
 
The second problematic GaWC-defined approach required eligible firms to trade in 
three or more foreign locations, and also belong to a formal network – for which a 
common brand was deemed to be an indicator. In three evaluation countries, my 
national cohorts did include firms with a common branded identity: Ireland’s 
Eversheds O'Donnell Sweeney (Pritchard, 2009, p46, 662), Spain’s CMS Albiñana Y 
Suárez De Lezo (Pritchard, 2009, p1369) and Sweden’s Lindhs DLA Nordic 
(Pritchard, 2009, p1396, 1425). However, each of these firms operated on a single 
jurisdiction basis, and not in three or more foreign locations required by the GaWC. 
In The Netherlands, CMS Derks Star Busmann fulfilled the classification’s common 
branding requirement. However, it only operated in one foreign country, rather than 




In light of my cohort’s collective partial compliance with the GaWC’s classification 
scheme for alliance capitalism relationships, I have concluded that – on balance – 
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the group’s findings have not assisted our understanding of large EU law firm 
geography 2009. For that reason, this element of my overarching proposition, that 
common behaviours can be observed across large law firms in various EU states, is 
also not supported. Certainly, my findings indicate that my sample firms exhibit a 
range of alliance capitalism / branch office behaviours. However, my findings also 
suggest those behaviours cannot fit within the GaWC’s suggested classifications. My 
finding indicate it would be difficult, for example, for any follow-up research to seek to 
identify which “types” of alliance capitalism relationship were more or less popular 
within any given cohort, without first creating an alternative classification scheme to 
that suggested by the GaWC. 
 
4.5. Section conclusions 
As with my previous results, the findings outlined above revealed a mixed outcome, 
both in terms of the usefulness of the GaWC’s research in explaining my cohort 
firms’ EU geographical behaviours, and also in relation to my hypothesis testing. 
Clearly, many of my sample firms made extensive use of alliance capitalism in 2009. 
However, they also used alliance capitalism in different ways, both in relation to the 
number of alliances they belonged to, and also their reasons for belonging to their 
respective groupings. And, while various interplays between my cohort firms’ branch 
offices and their alliances were identified, the forms of those interplays were not in 
accordance with the GaWC’s suggested classifications. More generally, my broader 
findings suggest that EU law firm branch office geography and alliance capitalism 
appear to be highly interlinked. At any given time, in order to understand the branch 
office geographies of any cohort of large EU law firms, I therefore suggest that an 
understanding of those firms’ alliance relationships is also essential. Further, I 
suggest the dynamics between the two warrants further investigation in a future 
study.   
  













Results section two: evaluating my cohort 
firms’ EU geographical strategies  
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5.1. Introduction 
The remainder of this chapter contains two parts. In first, I reveal my findings in 
relation to hypothesis 10 – which explores the very existence, and also the possible 
constituent elements of, my cohort firms’ EU geographical strategies. In the second 
part, I reveal whether my cohort firms changed their EU branch office geographies 
between 1998 and 2009 by reference to the specific reasons suggested by either the 
GaWC or legal profession scholars – hypothesis 11. The sources used, and also my 
method of analysis, was discussed in my methods chapter. Briefly, I used template 
analysis to evaluate relevant English language legal trade press materials which 
related to my cohort firms’ EU geographies between 1998 and 2009. 
 
5.2.1. Testing hypothesis ten: - that large EU legal practices have overarching 
geographical strategies which are related to – but also distinctive from – the 
specific reasons why they change their branch office geographies in specific 
EU locations. Further, to implement these overarching strategies requires a 
consensus to be reached between a firm’s leadership and its wider partnership 
Testing this hypothesis will yield two related outcomes. My findings will firstly allow 
me to further assess the extent to which the GaWC’s research has aided our 
understanding of large EU geography. As previously mentioned on p51, the group’s 
existing legal sector research does not appear to recognise that large law firms of 
any description – EU or otherwise – might have such strategies. If my research 
indicates that my cohort firms do, indeed, have geographical strategies, this would 
suggest the GaWC’s legal sector research contains a notable omission. Moreover, 
such a finding would also provide further evidence to support my overarching 
hypothesis, which proposes that large EU law firms may exhibit limited geographical 
commonalities of behaviour.  
 
Having undertaken my legal trade press evaluation, I have concluded that the first 
crucial element of hypothesis 10 is supported. Across my various sample 
jurisdictions, my cohort firms were observed articulating what appeared to be 
distinctive geographical strategies. As mentioned on p51 above, my finding has 
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some novelty within existing legal sector research which, to date, has not 
substantially considered this possibility.  
 
In relation to the existence of geographical strategies, numerous examples were 
uncovered within my cohort, including pronouncements made by Anglo Saxon, 
conglomerate and indigenous European law firms – and across various sample EU 
jurisdictions. Collectively, this evidence suggests that the existence of a geographical 
strategy is not unique to any particular “type” of legal practice or legal market. In 
addition to the examples offered below, further illustrative cohort examples can be 
found on Excel spreadsheet SD59. 
 
“Dibb Lupton Alsop has developed a three-year strategic plan, which it believes will 
lead to the creation of an integrated European law firm…Dibbs aims ‘to be top 10 in 
the City and dominant in the regions with a credible European capability, all leading 
to the creation of an integrated European law firm.’” (Legal Week, 1999, p3) 
 
“Alberto Terol, managing partner for worldwide tax and legal at Andersen Legal [of 
which Spanish sample firm Garrigues was formerly a part of], says: ‘Germany is a 
strategically important market for Andersen Legal, and this merger is another step in 
our strategy to become a world class legal network and one of the leading providers 
of legal services worldwide.’” (The Lawyer, 1999a, p4) 
 
“Dillon Eustace has opened a new Cork office as part of a major growth strategy to 
expand across Ireland.” (Byrne, 2007, p8) 
 
The comments outlined above indicate the elemental existence of law firms’ 
geographical strategies within my cohort. Building on this observation, I then sought 
to uncover examples of cohort firms exhibiting distinctive geographical “orientations” 
(Bagchi-Sen and Kuechler, 2000, p131) regarding their future international 
intentions. In accordance with Bagchi-Sen and Kuechler’s observations, a variety of 
international orientations were observed.  
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Some cohort firms were hostile to the very idea of operating transnationally: 
 
Fernando Quicios Dorda from Perez-Llorca told The European Lawyer that the firm 
did not plan to open any foreign office, or join alliance with foreign firms. (Tromans, 
2007 - 2008, p45) 
 
Other sample firms were more sympathetic to cross-border expansion: 
 
“But Armin Dallmann, partner at another leading Austrian firm Hugel Dallmann & 
Partners, said his firm was ‘looking at possibilities and strategies’ for gaining [an] 
international presence and a number of his partners had talked to a number of 
partners at German and other firms. ‘We feel that the globalisation of the legal 
marketplace will continue,’ he said.” (Lindsay, 1998, p5) 
 
Finally some firms, which already operated transnationally, were observed planning 
additional cross-border capabilities: 
 
“Independent Spanish law firm Cuatrecasas is planning to open offices in Milan and 
Paris within 18 months. The firm, which increased its turnover by 33 per cent for the 
2000 financial year, says that having spent the last year focusing on the Americas it 
now wants to expand into key European markets.” (Legal Week, 2001a, p6) 
 
My legal trade press analysis suggested that some of my cohort firms also had 
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Some cohort firms had actively decided to operate from a single domestic location: 
 
“Stibbe has always solely been in Amsterdam, a deliberate choice.” – Stibbe, 
managing partner, Joost van Lanschot (Gill, 2004b, p6) 
 
Others were willing to engage in one – or more – mergers to extend their domestic 
branch office reach.  
 
“According to partner Per Berglof [from Swedish sample firm Delphi], the new firm 
will take on two more offices in different cities before the end of the year, and aims to 
create a national network”. (The Lawyer, 1998b, p5) 
 
As my earlier bpv Hügel and Garrigues case histories illustrated, some cohort firms 
retreated geographically during the time period of my study. Indeed, I uncovered 
several examples of some closing existing branch offices following a strategic 
review. For example, Linklaters’ decision to close four of its six Central and Eastern 
European offices was explained in strategic terms: the firm instead wanted to 
concentrate its limited resources on “larger, faster-growing markets” (Lind, 2008, p1). 
 
Collectively, the evidence presented above not only illustrates the existence of firms’ 
geographical strategies, but also the diverse nature of such firms’ geographical 
strategies and orientations: not only do such strategies / orientations encompass 
international or domestic preferences, they also encompass both branch office 
expansion and contraction decisions. Collectively, it is possible that these varied 
strategic / orientation preferences may help explain my cohort’s equally varied cross-
border and domestic EU branch office trading patterns, discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
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Curiously, my legal trade press analysis suggests some cohort firms not only have 
disparate strategies regarding whether or not they should trade internationally, but 
also in relation to the mechanisms by which they should do so. Building on my 
observations in the previous chapter regarding law firms’ usage of alliance 
capitalism, I uncovered several examples of sample firms who wished to adopt a 
certain international profile, but did not wish to undertake cross-border mergers in 
order to achieve that profile. Here, the explanation offered by single jurisdiction 
Spanish firm, CMS Albiñana Y Suárez De Lezo, for joining the CMS illustrates one 
way of addressing this paradox: because the firm “wanted to stay independent”, it 
joined CMS because CMS was an alliance of independent firms, and therefore a 
“perfect fit” (Collins, 2004a, p3). Other firms, by contrast, were more willing to revise 
their current referral-based strategy should circumstances require. For example, 
explaining his firm’s strategy to The European Lawyer, Boekel De Nerée’s Ferdinand 
Mason said his firm’s referral-based approach was conditional on there being a 
suitable pool of likeminded firms in other countries to refer work to. If such firms then 
started merging with Dutch practices, he added, Boekel De Nerée might need to 
revisit its strategy (Eyre, 2005, p46).  
 
Other firms were more emphatic in their refusal to consider combining with other 
practices – notwithstanding their own willingness to open foreign branches (Mooney, 
2001a, p6). Livio Esposizione, a spokesperson for Italian sample firm Tonucci, was 
insistent that:  
 
“We don’t want a merger with an international firm”. (Sutton, 2005 - 2006, p70) 
 
Nor was Tonucci alone in this regard. Several other firms in my cohort indicated an 
“independent but nevertheless cross-border” geographical preference, including 
Gomez Acebo & Pombo (Legal Week, 2000, p8), Houthoff Buruma (Howell, 2002, p4 
- 5) and Lefèvre Pelletier & Associés (Tromans, 2006, p36 - 40). Whether such firms’ 
geographical strategies are meaningfully different to “non-independent” (i.e. AS law / 
conglomerate firms), is debatable. Nevertheless, trade press sources suggest these 
firms believe their geographical approach to be distinctive. Further examples of my 
cohort firms making a variety of geographic strategy announcements can be found 
on Excel table SD59.  
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Having demonstrated that many of my cohort practices exhibited overarching 
geographical strategies and orientations during my investigation time period, I shall 
now explore what I regard as two key facets of my sample firms’ geographical 
orientations: firstly, the role of a firm’s leadership, and also its wider partnership, in 
the strategy formation process. I shall then demonstrate the apparent interaction 
between these two facets of law firm geographical strategy in a brief case study.  
 
Law firms leaders from various sample firms were discovered making geographical 
strategy announcements in the legal press:  
 
“Expansion has been our core strategy for the past five years with an aim to become 
the leading regional practice in southeastern Europe,” – Wolf Theiss managing 
partner, Markus Heidinger (Legal Week, 2005, p6)  
 
“[Allen & Overy managing partner, John] Rink says that he decided years ago that 
A&O should expand into five key European countries – Germany, Italy, France, The 
Netherlands and Spain. From these vantage points he hopes the firm will be able to 
dominate the European marketplace. He says: ‘This is part of our strategy to become 
a pan-European firm’.” (Dunleavy, 1999, p10 - 11) 
 
Arguably, the above-mentioned comments by law firm leaders support Bell’s (1995, 
p66) observations, that such individuals often have a clear vision regarding what 
international markets have the best potential for their practice. Indeed, some law firm 
leaders also have a clear vision regarding the precise order in which they should 
enter markets. For Spanish sample firm, Cuatrecasas, the preference of firm 
chairman Emilio Cuatrecasas was to first focus on Paris, then the world’s major 
financial centres of New York London and Shanghai, then Latin America and 
Brussels. (Moshinshy, 2008, p21). And, on a smaller scale, Eugene McCague, 
managing partner of Irish sample firm Arthur Cox, told The European Lawyer that his 
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firm’s recent arrival in London was the next logical step after consolidating 
domestically and in Northern Ireland (Tsang, 2001, p45).  
 
In light of my singular reliance on legal trade press sources to identify the existence 
of law firm leaders’ orientations, it is unclear what prompted these leaders to 
formulate their various orientations. For example, none of the above-mentioned 
examples indicate to what extent market the leaders’ orientations’ were based on 
their entrepreneurial spirit (Krull, Smith et al., 2012, p1112) or a systematic 
evaluation of alternative options (O'Farrell, Wood, et al., 1996, p111 - 112). In 
essence, my legal trade press analysis has simply allowed me to uncover the range 
of geographical orientations which my cohort firms’ leaders appear to have. I 
therefore suggest the underlying basis of law firm leaders’ geographical orientations 
warrants further exploration in future studies. Perhaps fresh in-depth interviews with 
those leaders, or surveys of them, might reveal how those orientations arose?  
 
Further exploring issues raised by my literature review, I uncovered limited evidence 
in support of Andersson’s ( 2000, p76 - 77) observation, previously discussed on p53 
– that a change of leadership can result in a change in a firm’s geographical 
strategy. Here, a short case history regarding the appointment of Jan ter Meer as 
managing partner of Dutch sample firm Boekel De Nerée illustrates this dynamic. 
Following his appointment, press reports suggest Mr ter Meer first reviewed (Legal 
Week, 2002, p3), and later discontinued, his firm’s relationship with UK sample firm 
Eversheds. This relationship had been in place since 1999, and was originally 
intended to progress to a merger (Joy, 2000, p50). Explaining his decision, Mr ter 
Meer subsequently told Legal Week “the co-operation has not brought either firm the 
advantages we envisaged two years ago,” (Tromans, 2002a, p8). He later confirmed 
to Legal Week that his firm was now “focusing on the international market as an 
independent firm”, and would be building up information alliances around the world 
with similar practices (Tromans, 2002a, p9). 
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By contrast, the appointed of Arent van Wassanaer as managing partner of Houthoff 
Buruma arguably illustrates the limits of law firm leaders’ abilities to deliver a strategy 
of geographical change within a partnership structure – the focus of the following 
section. Press reports suggest Mr van Wassanaer resigned after just nine months in 
the role, due to a dispute within the firm over its geographical strategic direction 
(Legal Week, 2001d, p6). According to press reports, Houthoff Buruma first voted in 
favour of (Tromans, 2000b, p6), and then against (Pawsey, 2002, p1), merging with 
an AS practice within a single year. Notably, having departed Houthoff Buruma, Mr 
van Wassanaer subsequently helped establish Norton Rose’s Amsterdam office 
(The Lawyer, 1999, p8). Not only does this example illustrate the limited powers of 
some law firm leaders to drive geographical change within their practice, it also 
suggests that those same lawyers can sometimes go on to help rival practices to 
deliver their own, more geographically expansive, visions.  
 
The final element of this hypothesis, and accompanying template, suggests that the 
orientation of a law firm’s wider partnership may form the second key element of a 
practice’s overall geographical orientation. Exploring this issue further, I specifically 
sought to uncover examples of my cohort firms’ wider partnerships being involved in 
their practices’ geographical strategy formation and resulting firm orientations. 
Numerous examples were uncovered, involving various different geographical 
strategy choices – and also yielding a variety of geographical outcomes.  
 
For example, my legal trade press sources report partners approving geography-
extending mergers: 
 
“Partners at Freshfields and German firm Deringer Tessin Herrmann & Sedemund 
have voted for a merger” (Townsend, 1999, p1) 
 
..geographical retrenchments, such as the ultimate 2002 departure (Collins, 2003a, 
p1) of Fidal from Deloittes… 
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Deloitte & Touche's Paris law arm next week faces a make or break vote that will see 
the 340-lawyer practice either commit to further integration with its big four parent or 
split from the network entirely (Collins, 2003, p3) 
 
..and even situations resulting in geographical stasis, where firm partnerships 
actively decided not to alter their existing branch office geographies. 
  
Linklaters' relationship with De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek has been damaged 
almost beyond repair after the Dutch giant voted against a merger with the magic 
circle firm (Byrne, 2006, p16).  
 
Collectively, this evidence suggests owner-manager democracy continued to be 
evident in many of my cohort practices EU during the 2000s – thus replicating 
Pinnington and Morris’ (2003, p90 - 92) observations, which had previously observed 
similar behaviours among large UK law firms. I therefore regard the final element of 
hypothesis 10 to be supported. Further illustrative examples of my cohort firms 
exhibiting such behaviour can be found on Excel table SD61. 
 
Having observed the involvement of both law firm leaders and wider firm 
partnerships in the formulation of their practice’s geographical strategies, my final 
observation relates to the dynamic between these two sources of strategic power. 
Here, my findings provide some evidence to suggest that, where there is a 
disagreement between the geographical strategy preferences of a legal practice’s 
management team and its wider partnership, the views of the law firm leaders do not 
always prevail. Here, a short case history – involving German sample firm Taylor 
Wessing – is helpful, because it incorporates several elements of law firms’ 
geographical strategies discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  
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In 1999, the then chairman of legacy German practice Wessing, Wolfgang von 
Meibom, told Legal Week that the four constituent firms of The Conference of 
European Lawyers – his own practice, French practice Siméon & Associés, Dutch 
practice Houthoff and Brussels-based firm Liedekerke Wolters Waelbroeck & 
Kirkpatrick – “were progressing towards a merger, but that no formal timetable had 
been drawn up” (Legal Week, 1999b, p5). However, two years after making this 
statement, the firm’s partnership voted to depose von Meibom as chairman. Also 
voted out of office at the same time was Gustav-Adolf Lange, the lead partner of the 
firm’s Frankfurt office. Press reports suggest the decision to depose both individuals 
arose out of disagreements over the firm’s international strategy: Lange wished the 
firm to remain independent, whereas von Meibom’s preference was for “linking with 
certain [unspecified] foreign firms”. von Meibom’s preference, the legal trade press 
reported at the time, meant he “could no longer represent the interests of the entire 
firm” (Tromans, 2001a, p1). Later, von Meibom became chief executive of the newly-
constituted Andersen Luther (Pawsey, 2001, p5) – thus following a similar career 
trajectory to Houthoff Buruma’s former managing partner, Arent Van Wassanaer. 
Shortly after Wessing removed von Meibom and Lange, the firm created a new four-
partner management committee to lead the practice (Mooney, 2001b, p1). And, 
within a year, Wessing partners voted to merge with UK practice Taylor Joynson 
Garrett by an overwhelming margin (The Lawyer, 2002b, p5), despite opposition 
from a team of “high profile” Frankfurt partners (Pawsey, 2002, p9). Later, the 
combined firm – now known as Taylor Wessing - embarked on what, at the time, was 
described as a “sustained European expansion programme” (Baxter, 2002, p1). In 
2003, a new Paris office was opened (Kat, 2003, p1). In 2005, a working party of 
partners within the firm were commissioned to investigate whether the practice 
should expand into additional EU states, notably Italy, Spain and the Netherlands 
(Bryne, 2005, p2). By 2009, the firm had not expanded into these jurisdictions 
(Pritchard, 2009, p418). However, it has formed an alliance with Polish firm BSJP 
(Sadowski, 2009, p6). In conclusion, in 2009, we can state that Taylor Wessing’s EU 
geographical profile did not match that originally envisaged by its former chairman 
(i.e. to merge with its allied firms in France, the Netherlands and Belgium), nor that of 
its deposed Frankfurt head (to remain independent) nor, indeed, its own declared 
strategy in 2005. Nevertheless, throughout this time owner-manager engagement 
was a constant element of this firm’s EU geographical strategy evolution. More 
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generally, the firm’s change in geographical direction following the Wolfgang von 
Meibom departure appears to be in accordance with Andersson’s (2000, p76 - 77) 
suggestion that senior management changes may result in a change in a firm’s 
corporate strategy. 
 
Building on my comments previously made on p96 and p162, the above examples 
further illustrates the challenges of seeking– retrospectively – to uncover an “official” 
reason why a law firm’s overall geographical strategy may change over time, given 
that leaders can be deposed, and that partnerships can change their minds 
regarding what the firm’s geographical strategies should be. In testing the above-
mentioned hypothesis, I am simply seeking to identify what the common elements of 
a large EU law firm strategy might be – for which using legal trade press materials 
alone is sufficient. However, my findings also suggest that any future researcher, 
who wishes to fully understand the underlying drivers of a specific law firm’s 
geographical strategy, will probably need to interview current and past firm leaders, 
and also members of the firm’s wider partnership, in order to obtain a rounded 
understanding of the issue. It would also probably be useful to make extensive use 
of archival sources to validate any claims made. 
 
5.2.2. Conclusions 
The evidence presented above suggests my cohort firms displayed a wide variety of 
geographical strategies, both domestically and internationally, between 1998 and 
2009. Moreover, my findings also suggest these firms’ geographical strategies may 
also be temporally specific, and liable to change. Finally, my findings suggest that 
my cohort firms’ EU branch office geographical strategies may interact, to some 
extent, with their alliance capitalism relationships. Yet, despite the heterogeneity of 
the considerations I have discussed, I suggest all three key elements of hypothesis 
ten are supported: the existence of law firm geographical strategy, and also the role 
played in the implementation of that strategy by both a firm’s leadership and its wider 
partnership. Consequently, my findings support my overarching hypothesis that 
commonalities of geographical behaviour can be observed between large EU law 
firms in various EU states. However, it is appreciated that the scope of these 
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commonalities appears limited to the very existence – and also the implementation 
mechanisms of – such strategies, rather than substantive strategic outcomes, which 
are heterogenic. In light of my conclusion, I have also determined that the GaWC’s 
lack of research into this issue represents a notable omission from its output. 
 
5.3.1. Testing hypothesis 11: - that my cohort of large EU law firms change 
their branch office geographies in specific EU locations for the reasons 
suggested by the GaWC or legal profession scholars 
Here, I reveal my findings in relation to hypothesis 11, where I seek to establish 
whether my cohort of large EU law firms changed their EU branch office geographies 
in specific EU locations for a multiplicity of reasons, which could nevertheless be 
defined and categorised. As previously indicated on p55, the very idea that law firms 
may change their geographies for a multiplicity of different reasons has a novelty 
within the limited pool of existing legal sector research, which has tended to explore 
geographical change from the perspective of a single causal explanation.  
 
In testing my final hypothesis, I sought to uncover incidences of my cohort firms 
explaining an EU branch office change event in a manner which broadly correlates 
with the explanations offered by the GaWC or legal profession scholars. It is by 
following this approach that I have been able to evaluate the extent to which the 
GaWC’s research has aided our understanding of large EU geography. A summary 
of explanations I expect my cohort firms to offer is encapsulated in the sub-sections 
of template code 1.2, shown on p123 - p124. I shall now evaluate my findings in 
relation to each sub-code. I appreciate that this will be a lengthy exercise, given that 
13 sub-codes were identified in my literature review – some of which also contained 
additional sub-codes. To assist with my hypothesis testing, illustrative examples 
have been selected to include law firms from multiple national cohorts, ideally 
including AS, MDP and indigenous firms. I have also included examples involving 
both cross-border and domestic branch office change events. The reason for this 
evidential sampling is deliberate: in order to support my overarching hypothesis 
regarding limited commonalities of large EU law firm geographical behaviours, I 
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regard it as essential that I can show a variety of sample firms offering what appear 
to be similar explanations for their EU geographical change events. However, it is 
accepted that law firms from some country cohorts are more highly represented in 
my findings than others. As my previous findings revealed, cohort firms operating in 
certain EU states were notably more geographically active between 1998 and 2009 
than cohort firms operating in other EU states. Consequently, the pool of legal trade 
press articles which explains different firms’ geographical change events also varies. 
 
5.3.2.1.1. External factor one: regulation  
The evidence presented blow supports each of the three sub-codes contained within 
template code 1.2.1.1.  
 
Firstly, the legal trade press sources I analysed suggested a small number of cohort 
practice firms sought, and obtained, permission to trade in new EU locations during 
my evaluation time period: 
 
“The merger of Clifford Chance and etude Faltz & Kremer was eventually finalised by 
the Luxembourg Bar Association in January 2000….” (The Lawyer, 2000, p27) 
 
“Ernst & Young has opened the way for multidisciplinary practices in The 
Netherlands after the Dutch Bar gave it the go-ahead for its accountancy and legal 
businesses to profit share.” (The Lawyer, 1999b, p4) 
 
Secondly, a small number of cohort firms entered new EU markets between 1998 
and 2009 in light of their Establishment Directive-enabled right to do so. Here, the 
opening up of the Portuguese legal market to foreign firms in July 2001 (CCBE, 
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2005) is reported to have generated a small cluster of foreign branch office openings 
by my cohort firms, including by Linklaters and Uria & Menendez: 
 
“The Portuguese market opened up to foreign law firms in July 2001, when an EU 
directive allowing EU firms to open in any EU country was transposed into 
Portuguese law. Spanish heavyweight Uría & Menéndez was the first firm to open in 
Portugal, following the transposition of the directive, with Linklaters hot on its heels in 
early 2002.” (Rovnick, 2003, p8) 
 
In some circumstances, domestic liberalisation was also responsible for cohort firms’ 
branch offices changes: 
 
“Audit giant PricewaterhouseCoopers has launched a new 130-strong tax and legal 
practice – named TLS – in Italy, following the relaxing of regulations governing what 
services multiple disciplinary partnerships can offer.” (Legal Week, 2006, p6) 
 
In relation to my third template code, regulatory entrepreneurship, the arrival of 
Norton Rose into Greece in 1999 (The Lawyer, 1999a, p3) appears to provide an 
illustrative example. Press reports describe how the firm initially operated via a 
“chambers style set-up”, with all lawyers working on a self-employed basis in order to 
“avoid criminal proceedings from the Greek authorities” (Khela, 2000, p1). Shortly 
after the Establishment Directive took effect in the country, in May 2000 (CCBE, 
2005), the firm became “one of the first international law firm to have registered its 
operations in Greece as a branch office” following approval by the Piraeus Bar 
(Malkin, 2002, p10). 
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Moving beyond my narrow template code testing, I also uncovered examples of firms 
engaging in what appeared to be regulatory entrepreneurial activity, but with 
contrasting outcomes. On the one hand, Norton Rose’s Greek experience is 
arguably an example of a firm engaging in successful regulatory entrepreneurial 
activity, because it was ultimately permitted to remain in its chosen location until it 
had the official right to do so. Conversely, KPMG’s attempt to operate in Antwerp via 
an association with Lonting & Partners ultimately failed. Having formed the 
association in 2001 (Cahill, 2001, p30 - 31), press reports suggest that Lontings then 
encountered difficulties with the Antwerp Bar, which refused to register the firm’s 
members. Partner Alexander van den Bergen told Legal Week at the time: "if we lose 
the appeal we will have to close the office," (Tromans, 2001b, p1) – which then 
happened (Pritchard, 2002, p98). On p61, I noted that scholars had previously 
observed MDP law firms in France locating themselves within the geographical 
boundaries of sub-national bars that were sympathetic to their existence (Daly, 2002, 
p609; Boigeol and Williemez, 2005, p54). Here, the closure of Lonting’s Antwerp 
office in the face of a hostile local bar, but the continued existence of its Brussels 
office (Pritchard, 2002, p98), suggests that operating within the geographical 
boundaries of a sympathetic local regulator can, indeed, be essential to a firm’s 
ongoing presence in that location – even within a single country.  
 
My final observation regarding the possible impact of regulation in relation to large 
EU law firm geography relates to apparent influence on some of my cohort practices’ 
alliance capitalism relationships, discussed previously on p63 in relation to Japan. 
For example, in Portugal, Cuatrecasas ultimately merged with Goncalves Pereira 
Castelo Branco & Asociados – its long-term associated practice (Rovnick, 2003, p8) 
– shortly after it was permitted to do so following Portuguese establishment 
liberalisation. By contrast, Uría Menéndez ended its association with Portugal’s 
Morais Leitão, J Galvão Teles & Associado around the time the Establish Directive 
became active in Portugal. Instead, Uría firm created its own Lisbon office (Mooney, 
2001, p8). The contrasting geographical outcomes of these two Spanish firms 
arguably illustrate the various possible options arising out of regulatory liberalisation, 
even in relation to a single sample group in relation to a single foreign country.  
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5.3.2.1.2. Conclusions  
Because the GaWC had identified the importance of regulation to law firm geography 
(Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p461), I have concluded that it has 
assisted our understanding of the drivers of legal practice geographical change. 
However, I have also found that regulation affects law firm geography in a noticeably 
more multifaceted way than the GaWC, citing Dunning, suggests – i.e. change can 
be attributable to “restrictions on the use of foreign barristers in court” (Beaverstock, 
2004, p165). Rather, I suggest the behaviours I have observed broadly fall within the 
categories set down within template code 1.2.1.1. For that reason, I believe this 
specific template code is supported. This code will therefore be retained in the final 
version of the template. Additional illustrative examples, involving cohort firms 
altering their EU geographies in light of contemporaneous regulatory requirements, 
can be found on Excel table SD62. 
 
5.3.2.2.1. External factor two: client considerations  
On p65, I identified two ways in which the EU geographies of my cohort firms might 
be influenced by client considerations. Firstly, I suggested that my sample firms may 
alter their EU branch office presence according to specific client demand (either by 
opening or closing it). Alternatively, I suggested they could open or close an EU 
office in in anticipation of future client demand. Both of these explanations form the 
basis of the sub-codes within template code 1.2.1.2. Outside my template code 
validation process, my literature review also indicated that some firms may decide 
not to alter their branch office geography because there was no compelling client-
related reason for them to do so. Further, my literature review indicated that some 
firms may decide to disregard client demand and not change their branch office 
geography – typically, for strategic reasons.  
 
My legal trade press analysis uncovered several examples of cohort firms explaining 
an EU branch office geographical event by reference to actual client demand. Such 
explanations related to both domestic cross-border branch office developments: 
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“Managing partner at Addleshaw Booth & Co, Mark Jones, whose London office 
opened in November, says its move was prompted by the needs of existing clients” 
(The Lawyer, 1999, p1)  
 
"Many Spanish companies are going to Poland and our clients are asking us to 
support them there” – Uría Menéndez managing partner Luis De Carlos, explaining 
the reason for his firm’s new Warsaw office.” (Moshinshy, 2005, p10) 
 
Other sample firms justified client-related geographical change in a more speculative 
manner, suggesting the move was motivated by potential client demand: 
 
“According to partner Per Berglof [managing partner at Swedish sample firm Delphi], 
the new firm will take on two more offices in different cities before the end of the 
year, and aims to create a national network. ‘You have to be large in order to attract 
new Swedish and foreign clients,’ he said.” (The Lawyer, 1998b, p5) 
 
“Gianni [Origoni, Grippo & Partners] managing partner Francesco Gianni said [in 
relation to the firm’s domestic expansion into Turin]: ‘We believe it’s very important to 
be where dynamic and fast-growing businesses are. Turin and Genoa in particular 
are playing increasingly crucial roles in the Italian economy’.” (O'Conner, 2005, p7) 
 
Tonucci’s explanation of its cross-border expansion into Prague suggested the firm 
was expanding both in relation to actual client demand – the firm had recently won 
work in the Czech Republic – but also more speculatively – i.e. the firm intended to 
expand its Central and Eastern client basis (Mooney, 2001a, p6). Another firm to 
explain their practice’s geographical expansion by reference to both current and 
future client demand was A&L Goodbody, whose new Belfast office was intended to 
“further develop our Northern Ireland expertise to existing and prospective clients” 
(Legal Week, 2007, p3). In light of these observations, it would appear that law firms 
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may change their branch office geography for both client-relation reasons at the 
same time – albeit possibly with one consideration dominant.  
 
In accordance with the findings of past research, I uncovered a small number of 
examples of cohort firms explaining their EU branch office closures for client-led 
reasons. Examples of this kind include Lovells’ retreat from Dresden, a development 
which occurred “after seeing investment in Eastern Germany tail off” (Legal Week, 
2000, p7) and also Simmons & Simmons’ departure from Portugal. This latter 
development was explained at the time by the firm’s managing partner, Mark 
Dawkins, who told The Lawyer “our clients don’t tend to need legal services in 
Portugal” (Chellel, 2009, p1). However, another client-related reason for law firm 
geographical change appeared to involve firms dispensing with offices which were 
felt to serve the “wrong” type (i.e. local) clients. Both examples offered below relate 
to cohort firms closing offices in the German city of Leipzig.  
 
“A [Clifford Chance] spokeswoman said the Leipzig split was necessary because the 
Leipzig partners had a predominantly local practice.” (Tromans, 2001c, p1) 
 
“[Taylor Wessing] We want to focus on the international brand," [says Munich partner 
in charge of the Leipzig closure, Wolfgang Rehmann]. "Since 1992, when the Leipzig 
office opened, it has been profitable. However, it has developed differently from the 
other offices. Our focus is on intellectual property, IT and corporate work, and we're 
consultants for big companies. The Leipzig office is not in line with this.” (The 
Lawyer, 2001, p13) 
 
Closing an office because it attracts the “wrong” type of client appears to resemble 
Pinnington and Gray’s (2007) observations that some large Australian law firms had 
opted not to expand outside of Asia Pacific (p158), thereby disregarding existing 
client demand. I had initially decided against including a template code which stated 
that “firm disregards client demand”, because I regarded this explanation as being an 
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example of “geographical stasis” – which my template was not intended to 
document. However, in light of the above examples, I have concluded that such a 
code should appear in the final version of my template.  
 
Following on from Silver’s (2000) observation that “not all clients need foreign or 
international legal services” (p1131), my legal trade press analysis uncovered two 
examples of cohort practices justifying their reasons for not undertaking EU 
geographical change on such a basis. In the first example, A&L Goodbody’s then 
managing partner, Paul Carroll told The European Lawyer that his firm had 
previously considered merging with a Northern Irish practice, but had decided 
against it due to lack of client demand (Parnham, 2005d, p40 - 45) – a decision later 
reversed (Legal Week, 2007, p3). In the second example, which relates to the CMS 
legal network, it was revealed, in 2004, that: “the chances of an early move to 
integrate CMS Cameron McKenna's international network have been dealt a blow 
following a survey that found little client support for cross-border mergers within the 
European grouping” (Collins, 2004, p8). Both these explanations are noteworthy 
because they suggest that a lack of client demand may influence some large EU law 
firms’ decisions not to change their EU branch office reach at a certain point in time. 
 
5.3.2.2.2. Conclusions 
Because the GaWC suggested that law firms might change their geographical reach 
for client-led reasons (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1859 - 1860), I have 
concluded that the group’s research has aided our understanding of large EU law 
firm geography. However, my findings more closely reflect Spar’s (1997, p13) actual 
client demand / speculative client demand explanation for the law firm geographical 
change, rather than the GaWC’s Dunning-inspired “competitive advantage in gaining 
access to transnational clients” explanation (Beaverstock, 2004, p165; 
Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p464 - 465). 
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The actual / potential client demand explanation appears to have been responsible 
for a large number of geographical change events involving members of several of 
my national cohorts, at various points in time, and involving both domestic and cross-
border geographical change outcomes – additional examples are provided on Excel 
table SD63. On that basis, I suggest this concept has broad applicability across my 
sample. Therefore, I regard template code 1.2.1.2. as being supported. However, for 
the reasons outlined above, I have added a further client-related explanation to the 
final version of my template: “firm disregards client demand”.  
 
5.3.2.3.1. External factor three: significant geopolitical events  
Broadly reflecting the GaWC’s suggestion in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 1999, p1857 - 1876), several of my sample practices altered their EU 
branch office reach between 1998 and 2009 in response to what might be described 
as “significant geopolitical events”. Not surprisingly, given the time differences 
between our respective studies, the geopolitical events which appeared to affect my 
sample firms’ EU branch office geographies were different to those identified by the 
GaWC in The long arm of the law. Whereas the GaWC observed that “Europe and 
European Monetary Union” (p1861 – 1862) had driven geographical change among 
their UK law firm cohort, my findings suggested that a recent round of EU accession 
and the fallout from the Enron scandal influenced my cohort firms’ evolving EU 
branch office networks between 1998 and 2009. However, my legal trade press 
evaluation also led me to conclude that both of these explanations were closely 
linked to other factors driving large EU law firm branch office change – notably, 
regulation and client considerations. 
 
“German independent Noerr Stiefenhofer Lutz is to open its sixth Central and 
Eastern European office in Bratislava, in a bid to take advantage of European Union 
enlargement…. Noerr senior partner Dieter Schenk told Legal Week: ‘We are 
rounding up our offices in both the EU member countries as well as neighbouring 
states. There are a large number of clients who invest in single countries but set up 
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an entire network of production sites in various areas. We want to cover the main 
regions that that our clients are based in.” (Gill, 2004b, p5) 
 
Similarly, the withdrawal of various constituent practices from the Ernst & Young and 
PwC/ Landwell networks were, in part, due to specific regulatory changes being 
introduced in the aftermath of Enron: 
 
“The Reviserslagen law on accountancy firms, which was introduced in autumn last 
year, states that an auditing firm cannot perform any legal work that is directly linked 
to an auditing firm. ‘So there's no point in Ernst & Young existing as a law firm,’ said 
Stockholm managing partner Anders Fernlund, whose office is now being dissolved.” 
(Hoare, 2002, p7) 
 
“Landwell's German firm Heussen is to split from the accountancy-tied network – 
depriving the alliance of one of its last remaining major members. The 100-lawyer firm, 
previously known as PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Veltins, will now follow a long 
line of former Landwell allies in splitting from the accountancy firm in response to 
tough international curbs on the services accountants can offer.” (Tromans, 2004, p1). 
 
In light of my findings, it is arguable that this explanation / template code should be 
subsumed into others, because it does not appear to exist independently of them. 
However, I have decided against doing so because, while the precise impact of 
geopolitical events may be jurisdiction-specific, the impact of such events often had 
wide-ranging geographical ramifications, across multiple jurisdictions, within a short 
period of time.   
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At a more granular level, my findings suggests that, while a significant geopolitical 
event can affect multiple firms in multiple countries, such events do not necessarily 
affect all firms in all countries within a given cohort. For example, as Excel table 
SD64 indicates, the fallout from Enron affected the EU branch office geographies of 
several additional Ernst & Young and PwC / Landwell member firms in a manner 
similar to that described above. Indeed, trade press sources suggest the regulatory 
fallout from Enron also prompted the departure of Taj from Deloitte (Collins, 2003a, 
p1), the apparent cessation of KPMG’s KLegal network (Baxter and Tromans, 2003, 
p1), and the restructuring within bpv Hügel’s legacy German MDP parent practice, 
Haarmann Hemmelrath (Power, 2004b, p8). However, my investigation did not lead 
me to conclude that this geopolitical event significantly impacted on the EU branch 
office geographies of non-conglomerate MDP firms. Similarly, while several cohort 
firms, including Cerha Hempel Spiegelfeld Hlawati (Kis, 2008, p6 - 7), DLA Piper 
(Fleming, 2008, p25 - 28), Garrigues (Lind, 2008b, p6), White & Case (Moshinshy, 
2008b, p10) and Wolf Theiss (Moshinshy, 2008c, p10) opened new offices in 
Bulgaria and Romania around the time of these countries’ EU accession, none of my 
Irish (Excel table SD5) or Swedish (Excel table SD9) cohort firms followed suit. It 
would therefore appear that significant geopolitical events do not equally impact on 
all legal markets, or all types of large firm – even within a single continent.  
 
5.3.2.3.2. Conclusions 
The potential importance of significant geopolitical events was indicated by the 
GaWC in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1861 - 1862). It 
was also found to be relevant to a wide range of my sample firms’ evolving EU 
branch office geographies. Therefore, I have concluded the GaWC’s research has 
aided our understanding of this issue. However, it is also accepted that geopolitical 
events sometimes work in conjunction with other factors, and may only affect a sub-
set of any given cohort. Nevertheless, despite this qualification, I regard template 
code 1.2.1.3. as being supported without modification. 
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5.3.2.4.1. External factor four: organisational risks 
The totality of my findings, which often involves my sample firms opening in new 
locations – and sometimes seeking out new local clients in the process – arguably 
represents a form of organisational risk reduction. However, I only uncovered a small 
number of legal trade press articles where this explanation could be directly 
attributed to my cohort firms’ geographical change events.  
 
This evidence firstly comprises of an indirect assertion in relation to UK cohort 
member, Ashurst, regarding its acquisition of additional office space in Frankfurt. 
Legal Week described this development as being part of a “wider drive by the firm, 
which has been pushing through a programme of Continental expansion in the last 
18 months, to diversify away from its domestic practice into European law” (Legal 
Week, 2001, p8). More directly, in 2009, Legal Week quoted Garrigues’ managing 
partner, Jose Maria Alonso, as stating that his firm’s business model was based on 
“geographical diversification” (McLeod-Robert, 2009a, p8). Arguably a third cohort 
firm pursing a geographical diversification strategy was Swedish sample firm, 
Roschier. Explaining the rational for the practice’s new Baltic alliance, senior partner 
Tomas Lindholm said: “the vision is that there’ll be considerable growth. The major 
part of that growth will be from the Baltics, because Finland is a relatively mature 
market and cannot expect much growth” (Hoare, 2004, p8). To contextualise this 
observation, at the time this statement was made, Roschier was Finland’s second 
largest law firm, and twice the size of the country’s fourth largest legal practice 
(Pritchard, 2004, p238). This suggests the firm regarded its home market as having 
limited development potential – an implication reinforced by its branch office opening 
in Sweden one year later (Hoare, 2005, p7). However, the Roschier example of 
geographical diversification is also interesting for a different reason: although its new 
Baltic offering was intended to transition into a merger, it was initially structured as 
an alliance. This suggests that legal practice diversification does not immediately 
require law firms to undergo branch office change.  
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5.3.2.4.2 Conclusions 
It is accepted that the legal trade press evidence which supports the GaWC’s 
diversification-related explanation for branch office geographical change is modest. 
My decision to retain this classification within the final version of my template is 
therefore largely based on the totality of the cohort diversifications I uncovered, 
especially in relation to client demand (and also legal systems advise on, of which 
more on p208). In light of my findings, I have concluded that the GaWC has assisted 
our understanding of large EU law firm geography. Consequently, template code 
1.2.1.4 will be retained in its final iteration.  
 
5.3.2.5. External factor five: technological advances 
My legal trade press evaluation yielded no examples of law firms explaining their EU 
branch office change between 1998 and 2009 by reference to the enabling role 
played by technological advances – a suggestion made by the GaWC in The long 
arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1861). Arguably the closest 
example I uncovered involved a comment made by Dr Richard Sterzinger, then a 
partner at Lovells’ German legacy firm, Boesebeck Droste, in The European Lawyer 
magazine. Here, Dr Sterzinger said that, following a vote in favour of the merger, a 
great deal of effort had been made to bring the two practices together, including the 
integration of each firms’ billing, intranet, email and accounting systems (Hellings, 
2000, p54 - 60). This comment is in line with Segal-Horn and Dean’s (2007, p214 – 
215) suggestion regarding the need for law firms, post-acquisition, to deliver 
common technology platforms.  
 
Moreover, on several occasions, I uncovered examples of my cohort firms 
discussing their attempts to integrate their IT systems with legal practices they were 
associated to, but not merged, with. These included the 1999 formation of the CMS 
alliance, which had resulted in the establishment of an inter-firm support group, 
intended to focus on IT issues (Tyler, 1999, p10 - 11). Similarly, press reports 
discussed the plans of Spanish sample firm, Uría Menéndez, to introduce “the same 
IT systems” as Davis Polk & Wardwell, a New York firm it was associated with 
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(Mooney, 2001b, p6). Finally, when French sample firm Salans formed an alliance 
with Krupa Srokosz Patryas in southern Poland, Salans’ chairman, Stephen Finch, 
told The Lawyer that “we wanted to formalise our relationship to cooperate on 
specific items, such as system support, tax issues and marketing matters…There’s a 
bit of investment of time and money on this and for things such as time recording 
systems” (Moshinshy, 2007, p9). Collectively, this evidence supports Deprey, Lloyd-
Reason et al’s (2012, p1617) suggestion that technology can supplant a firm’s need 
to extend its own branch office network in order to operate internationally. 
 
Because none of my cohort firms explained their EU branch office change between 
1998 and 2009 by reference to technological advances, I have concluded that this 
GaWC explanation is not relevant to our understanding of large EU law firm 
geographic change. Consequently, code 1.2.1.5. – which represents this explanation 
– will be deleted from the final version of my template. Nevertheless, it is accepted 
that my findings may be temporally and market specific. In Western Europe, between 
the late 1990s and 2000s, it is possible that communications technology has become 
so ubiquitous and reliable that it was regarded as a “non-issue” by my cohort firms 
with regards to their EU branch office developments.  
 
5.3.2.6.1. External factor six: firm needs to interact with local services 
My legal trade press analysis yielded limited evidence to support the GaWC’s 
Dunning (1989, p30)-inspired suggestion that law firms may change their geography 
to interact with local services (Beaverstock, 2004, p165). For example, at the time 
the firm’s London office was first announced, Gómez-Acebo & Pombo’s planned UK 
presence was described by Legal Week as operating “primarily as a liaison office 
staffed by a single Spanish partner with a number of associates spending six-month 
terms there on a regular basis”. And, at the time, the firm’s name partner, Fernando 
Pombo, explained the move because “we have to develop our own profile and 
identity” (Legal Week, 2000, p8). Similarly, explaining Houthoff Buruma’s new 
London office to Legal Week, “[the firm’s] management said that the London office 
will focus on establishing new relationships with City firms” (The Lawyer, 2002a, p5).  
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However, it should also be appreciated that, even if a firm initially opens an office to 
perform a representative function, that office may later evolve into a local law entity, 
thereby competing with that location’s law firms, rather than simply liaising with them. 
For example, Cuatrecasas Gonçalves Pereira’s new Paris branch, although initially 
described in the legal press as a “representative office”, was intended to develop into 
a more significant local practice. “We want to build up a local practice in Paris,” 
Emilio Cuatrecasas told The Lawyer in 2008. “We want to grow there” (Moshinshy, 
2008, p21). A similar strategic trajectory appears to have occurred in relation to 
Gómez-Acebo & Pombo’s previously-discussed London office. Speaking in 2008, the 
firm’s London managing partner, Fermin Garbayo, described his office as having 
evolved into “a hybrid between a rep office and a transaction firm…My idea is to do 
as much transaction work as possible” (Moshinshy, 2008a, p10). Finally, Gide 
Loyrette Nouel’s new London office, having initially been planned as a representative 
office (Legal Week, 1999b, p4), later launched in 2003 with a local law capacity 
(Collins, 2003b, p1), which quickly expanded still further (Tromans, 2006, p36 - 40).. 
 
Conversely, my legal trade press literature review also uncovered a small number of 
examples of cohort forms downgrading former branch offices into little more than a 
base for visiting lawyers – i.e. a representative office.  
 
“Partners did, though, agree to reduce De Brauw's [Blackstone Westbroek] 
Rotterdam and Hague bases to representative offices in order to consolidate in 
Amsterdam.” (Cahill, 2001, p3) 
 
“Wragge & Co has laid off all off the full-time lawyers at its Brussels arm citing a lack 
of work, it has emerged. The Birmingham giant made its two Brussels-based lawyers 
redundant late last year. Wragges said that UK-based head of competition Guy 
Lougher and partner Bernardine Adkins will spend more time in the office to 
compensate for the cuts.” (Legal Week, 2004, p1) 
 
202 | P a g e   
Finally, I uncovered an example of a sample firm closing what appeared to be 
representative offices as part of its strategy of operating in alliance with local firms in 
specific countries instead: 
 
“Hengeler Mueller is to forge 'best friends' referral relationships in Prague and 
Budapest, Legal Week can reveal, in a move that will lead to the closure of the elite 
German firm's local branches… Neither practice is staffed by fee earners on a 
permanent basis.” (Gill, 2004a, p5) 
 
In light of the liberalising effect of the Establishment Directive during my evaluation 
time period, I did not discover any examples of my cohort firms explaining their 
decision to establish a representative EU office because no other options were 
permitted by local regulations. Consequently, these firms’ decisions appear to have 
been a strategic choice rather than decision based on regulatory necessity.  
 
5.3.2.5.2. Conclusions 
In light of the evidence presented above, I have concluded that this GaWC 
explanation of legal practice geographical change has aided our understanding of 
large EU law firm geography. Moreover, I have determined that the associated 
template code 1.2.1.6. should be retained. However, my findings also provide some 
evidence to suggest that firms’ decision to operate a representative office in a new 
location may be temporally specific. Over time, such presences can transform into 
fully-functioning branch offices, and also vice versa. Finally, the Hengeler Mueller 
example suggests a potential relationship between a firm’s representative office 
presence in a specific market and that firm’s use of alliance capitalism in the same 
market. One, it would appear, can sometimes supplant the other. 
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5.3.2.7.1. External factor seven: firm acts in response to local infrastructure 
considerations 
Following my legal trade press analysis, I have concluded local infrastructure 
considerations did play a role in my sample firms’ EU branch office evolution 
between 1998 and 2009. Thus, I regard the GaWC’s (Beaverstock, 2004, p165) 
Dunning-inspired (Dunning, 1989, p30) explanation as assisting our understanding of 
large EU law firm geography. Nevertheless, I have also concluded that this template 
code should be discarded in the final version of my template. I will now explain why. 
 
My findings suggest at least one of my cohort firms established a new office in order 
to attract specific individuals who possessed a particular industry sector expertise – 
a consideration further explored on p213. 
 
“Magic circle firm Allen & Overy has hired three top partners from White & Case 
Feddersen to set up an office in Hamburg…..Germany's managing partner Mark 
Welling says that it was the people rather than the location that prompted the move 
to Hamburg. ‘Telecoms and energy were areas of relative weakness, but now we 
have one of the strongest teams in Germany,’ he says.” (The Lawyer, 2001, p1) 
 
Other cohort firms, such as Freshfields, extended their branch office reach, partly to 
increase their capacity to serve clients – an issue previously explored on p191. 
 
“Freshfields initially tried to achieve a presence in Germany through organic growth. 
But, says [Alan] Peck [the firm’s chief executive]: ‘We just could not get enough 
people. We were having to turn the big deals down’.” (Townsend, 1999, p2)). 
 
Finally, firms such as Garrigues opened offices in new countries in order to gain 
access to lawyers qualified in those jurisdictions – an issue explored further on p208.  
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“Spain’s largest law firm, Garrigues, is continuing its international expansion by 
opening a near full-service local law practice in Warsaw. The venture involves the full 
integration into Garrigues of the 15-strong Fúster & Sartorius, which has been 
operating in Poland for the past 5 years.” (Iberian Lawyer, 2007a) 
 
Each of these explanations arguably relate to local infrastructure considerations. 
However, each explanation also appears to be addressed by other template codes. 
Consequently, because code 1.2.1.7. appears redundant, it will not feature in the 
final version of my template. 
 
5.3.2.7.2. Conclusions 
My findings do not, fundamentally, disagree with the GaWC’s suggestion that local 
infrastructure considerations – as I have interpreted it – are relevant to large law firm 
EU geography.Therefore, I regard the GaWC’s explanation as assisting our 
understanding of the issue. Nevertheless, because the concept largely overlaps with 
various other template codes, template code 1.2.1.7. will be deleted from the final 
version of my template.  
 
5.3.2.8.1. External factor eight: competitive pressure / herd behaviour 
My findings in relation to this issue comprise two elements. Firstly, I discuss my 
findings across my entire cohort. Secondly, I have conducted a short case study of 
my UK cohorts’ behaviours in relation to Germany between 1998 and 2009. Working 
on the assumption that my sample firms were unlikely to admit to changing their 
German branch office geographies for herd behaviour-related reasons, the evidence 
supporting my detailed findings – revealed on table 25 below –  is based on a 
combination of legal trade press and legal directory sources.  
 
My legal trade press analysis did uncover one example of a cohort firm hinting that 
one of their EU geographical change events was driven, in part, by the activities of 
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their competitors. Discussing his firms’ forthcoming Lisbon opening, Gómez-Acebo & 
Pombo managing partner Manuel Martin commented that, not only did the firm’s 
clients work on a pan-Iberian basis “our three main competitors [Cuatrecasas 
Goncalves Pereira, Garrigues and Uría Menéndez] are all there” (McLeod-Robert, 
2009b, p8). More indirectly, while Freshfields’ then chief executive Alan Peck 
explicitly explained his firm’s German merger by reference to the need to build up 
local capacity, the accompanying commentary suggested the speed with which the 
union had been undertaken was due to the “need of the big five to get into the 
German market before it is crowded out” (Townsend, 1999, p2). In both of these 
examples, it is arguable that competitive pressures appear to have influenced these 
firms’ decision to alter their branch office geography in specific locations.  
 
Although direct evidence of herd behaviour from legal trade press materials is slim, 
indirect evidence – as revealed from legal directory sources – is more compelling. I 
shall now explore this issue further in a short case study, in which I explore my UK 
cohort firm’s geographical activities in Germany between 1998 and 2009. Here, it is 
important to first qualify my substantive observations: as table 25 on p205 reveals, 
six of my UK cohort practices did not trade in Germany in 2009, while a seventh, 
Wragge & Co, only arrived in 2008 (Kis, 2008, p4 - 5). Thus, almost half of my cohort 
firms appear not to have succumbed to an “adolescence angst” (Abel, 1993 - 1995, 
p741) that they might be left behind, and also resisted the “itch to follow” (Spar, 
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Nevertheless, what is irrefutable is that five geography-changing Anglo-German 
mergers, or part-firm mergers, took place among my 15-member UK cohort within 
little more than a year. These mergers / part firm mergers were: Clifford Chance’s 
union with Pünder, Volhard, Weber & Axster on 1 January 2000 (Tromans, 2001a, 
p6), Freshfields’ 2000 union with both Deringer Tessin Herrmann & Sedemund 
(Townsend, 1999, p1) and Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Löber (Hellings and Joy, 2000, 
p6); the combination of Lovells and Boesebeck Droste in the same year (Zaki, 1999, 
p1); the 2001 union of Linklaters with Oppenhoff & Rädler (Tromans, 2000, p2); and 
Norton Rose’s acquisition of the Cologne and Munich offices of Gaedertz, also in 
2001 (Parnham, 2001, p5). Consequently, I have concluded that some of my UK 
cohort firms did change their German branch geography for competitive pressures or 
herd behaviour reasons. Therefore, template code 1.2.1.8 is supported.  
 
However, it should be appreciated that, while it is plausible that the specific events of 
2000 – 2001 occurred for herd behaviour related reasons, this did not mean that all 
of my UK cohort firms went from a “standing start” in relation to their German 
strategy during that time period. For example, legal trade press reports suggest 
Clifford Chance had operated in the country since 1989 (Dignan, 1999, p10 - 11) – 
11 years before its geography-changing union with Pünder. Similarly, Freshfields has 
worked in conjunction with its ultimate merger partner, Deringer Tessin, since 1996 
(The Lawyer, 1998, p12). Indeed, as table 25 above shows, of the nine UK cohort 
firms trading in Germany in 2009, five were already present – albeit to a more limited 
extent than in 2009 – in 1998. The years 2000 – 2001 should therefore be viewed as 
representing a herd behaviour-led “spike” in UK cohort firm German activity, rather 
than its starting point.  
 
Finally, my legal trade press analysis also indicates that at least five of my UK cohort 
practices may have exhibited herd-like alliance capitalist behaviours around the 
same time period. The sample firms forming Anglo-German alliances between 1998 
and 2001 were: CMS Cameron McKenna (The Lawyer, 1999, p2), DLA Piper (Legal 
Week, 2001c, p6), Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (The Lawyer, 1998a, p5), Herbert 
Smith (Sellers Klein, 2000, p20) and Linklaters. By contrast, notwithstanding their 
208 | P a g e   
lack of German branch offices, Addleshaw Goddard did not appear to maintain any 
German alliances, even by the end of my evaluation time period. Additionally, 
Beachcroft’s relationship with SNP Schlawien Naab was only formalised in 2009 
(Ruckin, 2009, p5). Eversheds’ situation is ambiguous but, I suggest, erring towards 
herd-like behaviour. Although the firm formalised its alliance with Germany’s Heisse 
Kursawe in 2005, press reports suggest the move followed a “six-year hunt” 
involving “unsuccessful talks with a number of large [German] firms” (Gill, 2005, p5). 
On balance, I have therefore concluded that herd behaviour did occur in relation to 
some, but not all, of my UK cohort firms’ Anglo-German alliance capitalism 
relationships between 1998 and 2009. 
 
5.3.2.8.2. Conclusions 
Overall, my findings suggest that the GaWC’s observations – that UK firms 
globalised in the face of increased competition – is valid. Thus, I have concluded that 
GaWC had aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography. However, it is 
also accepted that the evidential basis for this finding has been limited to UK firms 
and, by implication, several of my German cohort practices. Nevertheless, I do not 
regard as being problematic – because I have decided not to include “firm acts in 
response to competitive pressures / herd behaviour” in the final version of my 
template. Essentially, I have concluded that this template code overlaps with a 
related concept, which I shall explain on p221. I will therefore combine the above-
mentioned, UK-specific, evidence base for herd behaviour with that of the related 
concept, which is based on the EU geographical behaviours of a broader range of 
sample firms. Following my analysis of this related concept, I will then formulate a 
new template code based on the totality of the scenarios which the alternative code 
describes.  
 
5.3.2.9.1. Internal factor one: legal system advised on 
My legal trade press analysis suggests my sample firms did alter their EU branch 
office reach by reference to legal system capabilities. Indeed, supporting the two 
sub-codes within template code 1.2.2.1., I uncovered examples of firms explaining 
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their EU branch office change both by reference to their “home state” law capabilities 
and also the law of the state in which their new office operated. 
 
Echoing the GaWC’s Freshfields example in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, 
Smith et al., 1999, p1862 - 1865), my legal trade press analysis suggested that large 
EU law firms do not always behave consistently in relation to the legal system 
capabilities offered in their newly-established branches. For example, Gómez-Acebo 
& Pombo took two contrasting approaches in relation to its planned London and 
Lisbon offices: 
 
“Gómez-Acebo & Pombo has revealed plans to become the latest Spanish firm to 
open in London. Managing partner Manuel Martín said: ‘A London presence is now 
back on the 2007 agenda, but only as a base for Spanish lawyers’.” (Moshinshy, 
2005, p1) 
 
“[In Portugal] the plan is to have one resident Spanish lawyer working alongside 
three Portuguese partners and their respective teams, which will be hired from the 
local market. The office will cover public law, corporate and financial services.” 
(McLeod-Robert, 2009b, p8) 
 
By contrast, Garrigues’ arrival into both Lisbon (Parnham, 2005a, p52) and Warsaw 
(Tromans, 2007, p40 - 42) was via mergers with established local firms, which 
immediately gave it local law capacity in both markets. However, in a further 
illustration of my cohort firms’ heterogeneous approach to this issue, while 
Garrigues’ arrived in Warsaw in 2007 to offer local law, fellow Spanish firm Uría 
Menéndez – which opened in the same city in the same year – took a different 
approach. Press reports suggested the new office would initially house just one 
partner, would not practice local law (Ruckin, 2007, p3), and would work alongside 
local Polish firms (Legal Week, 2007, p6). Clearly, the home law / host law options 
open to law firms when considering how to change their branch office locations are 
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multifaceted. Indeed, different firms from the same country can reach different 
decisions, even in relation to a common foreign location in the same year. 
 
The narrow focus of my investigation did not allow me to exhaustively explore the 
role of expatriate lawyers in relation to the global law firms, which was briefly 
explored by the GaWC in Global law firms (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, 
p486). Nevertheless, my findings suggest that, even where my cohort firms’ new EU 
offices were initially established by ex-pats, the intention of some was to rapidly 
develop a local law capacity:  
 
“[Linklater’ office head Miles Curley].said the new Madrid office would focus initially 
on English law and international transactions, but was "absolutely committed" to 
building a Spanish law capability.” (Boxell, 1999, p3) 
 
[NautaDutihl’s Luxembourg launch] “The firm is to send Rotterdam-based tax partner 
Derk Prinsen to launch the Luxembourg office on 1 November and then hire local 
lawyers once the office has established itself.” (Tromans, 2002b, p9) 
 
[Wolf Theiss’ Bratislava and Belgrade office launches] “The bulk of the lawyers in 
both offices have been relocated from the firm's Prague office to launch the two new 
offices. Local associates have also been hired to provide local law advice.” 
(Tromans, 2002b, p8) 
 
In other scenarios, new offices were established by employing teams of local 
practitioners from the outset. Such scenarios included Linklaters' arrival into 
Amsterdam, based around hiring of a locally-qualified partner “with a mandate to 
build a substantial Dutch practice” (Gill, 2004, p3), and the arrival of Gide Loyrette 
Nouel into London, in which the majority of the firm’s new personnel were English 
law qualified (Pearce, 2003, p43 - 44).  
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More generally, many of the more substantive cross-border mergers reported in this 
thesis have simply resulted in firms where lawyers working for the practice in one 
jurisdiction are overwhelming qualified to practice in that legal market, while lawyers 
working for the firm’s recently-merged office in another jurisdiction are also locally 
qualified. To offer a singular illustrative example, arising out of the merger of Spanish 
sample firm Cuatrecasas and its Portuguese counterpart, Goncalves Pereira Castelo 
Branco & Asociados (Rovnick, 2003, p8): a year after the two firms combined, the 
practice’s 2004 Martindale-Hubbell legal directory entry showed that almost all of the 
firm’s Madrid lawyers were admitted to practise in Spain, while the firm’s Lisbon 
lawyers were overwhelmingly admitted to practise in Portugal (LexisNexis, 2004, 
pEU1476B - EU1577B, EU1331B - EU1333B). This finding replicates Silver’s (2004 - 
2005, p926 – 927) findings regarding the typically local qualifications held by lawyers 
working in the foreign offices of US law firms.  
 
Regarding Daniels’ (1993, p184) suggested link between the types of clients a firm 
wishes to attract and the type of law it offers, several previously-discussed examples 
arguably support such linkages – although it is accepted that, due to the nature of 
the source materials used, some supposition is required to make such a connection. 
For example, explaining the rationale for Garrigues’ establishment in Warsaw via a 
merger with local practice Fúster & Sartorius (Iberian Lawyer, 2007a), local partner 
Polish Jaime Fúster said the office had, for many years, assisted Spanish investors 
(Tromans, 2007, p40 - 42) operating in the country – thereby complying with Daniels’ 
“home (Iberian) clients / foreign (Polish) law” model. Equally, Uría Menéndez’s ex-
pat led Warsaw office (Ruckin, 2007, p3), launched to assist to Spanish and 
Portuguese companies operating in the region (Iberian Lawyer, 2007b), is arguably 
an example of Daniels’ “home (Iberian) client / home (Iberian) law” explanation. 
Additionally, by relocating its lawyers from Italy to its new office in Prague to work for 
Czech clients (Mooney, 2001a, p6), Tonucci appeared to offer a service describe by 
Daniels as “foreign (Czech) client / home (Italian) law”. Finally, A&L Goodbody’s 
arrival in Northern Ireland via a merger with local practice STJ Legal, a decision 
made In light of the firm’s already “significant practice in the north” (O'Neill, 2007, 
p120 - 133), appears to represent Daniels’ final “foreign client (Northern Irish) / 
foreign law (Northern Irish)” approach.  
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Regarding Mayson’s (1997, p202) suggested link between a firm’s legal system 
offering and its relationships with other firms, my findings in relation to my cohorts’ 
branch offices / alliance relationships suggest such a link may exist. If a firm is not 
present in a jurisdiction (and therefore has no local law capacity in that market) but 
nevertheless associates with a local firm which does, such practices would appear to 
operate on a cooperative basis, as Mayson suggests. However, in light of my 
findings in relation to both representative offices and legal systems advised on, I 
suggest that – unlike Mayson – establishing a branch office in another country is not, 
necessarily, a sign that a practice is operating a competitive, integrated strategy in 
that market. Rather, as previously indicated, an office may simply liaise with local 
firms, or offer home country legal advice – in other words, a cooperative strategy. 
Nevertheless, my findings also suggest that, if a firm both establishes in a new 
country and also offers local law advice in that country, this would represent a more 
overtly competitive behaviour by that firm within that market. Indeed, in relation to my 
cohort firms’ alliance capitalism relationships, I uncovered several examples of 
cohort practices ending alliances with firms in other countries prior to launching their 
own local law capacity in those countries. Examples included Linklaters’ arrival in 
The Netherlands and Italy following the collapse of its relationship with De Brauw 
Blackstone Westbroek (Gill, 2004, p3) and Gianni Origoni Grippo & Partners (Collins, 
2004c, p3; Moshinshy, 2005, p9) respectively, and the planned arrival of both 
Gómez-Acebo & Pombo (Moshinshy, 2008a, p10; McLeod-Robert, 2009b, p8) and 
Uría Menéndez (Mooney, 2001, p8) in Portugal. This suggests that local law capacity 
considerations are integral to our understanding of not just law firms’ branch office 
dynamics, but also their alliance capitalism dynamics.  
 
5.2.2.9.2. Conclusions 
Overall, my findings suggests that, in relation to legal systems advised on, the 
GaWC has both helped and also not helped our understanding of large EU law firm 
geography. Reflecting the GaWC’s findings regarding Freshfields’ various 
international offices (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1862 - 1865), my findings 
showed that some of my cohort firms adopted an inconsistent approach regarding 
the legal systems which newly-established offices advised on. However, in relation to 
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the GaWC’s suggestion that expatriation is “a crucial organization strategy of the 
global legal firm” (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p484), my findings 
suggest that, while expatriate staff often assisted with the establishment of new 
offices, this was often a mere prelude to the office developing a local law capacity. 
Thus, my findings more closely reflect the findings of Silver (2004 - 2005, p926 - 
927), Silver, Phelan et al (2009, p1450) and Morgan and Quack (2005, p1770), who 
observed the tendency for large law firms to employ locally qualified lawyers in 
foreign locations.  
 
At a more granular level, I uncovered examples of cohort practices altering their EU 
branch office geography by reference to either home or host state law. Therefore, I 
have concluded that template code 1.2.2.1. is valid, and does not require alternation 
in its final iteration. However, as my above discussion also illustrates, my cohort 
firms were observed exhibiting heterogeneous behaviours regarding how they 
deployed local or home state law capacities in any given location, even among firms 
of the same national origins. Thus, while this consideration may be commonly 
relevant to my various cohort firms in relation to their evolving EU geographies, the 
manner in they make use of it when launching new offices is not. 
 
5.3.2.10.1. Internal factor two: practice areas / industry sectors advised on 
My legal trade press analysis suggests that practice area or industry sector 
considerations did cause my firms to alter their EU branch office geography during 
my evaluation time period.  
 
Mirroring the explanations offered in existing research, at least two of my cohort 
firms – NCTM (Stewart, 2007, p6 - 7) and Pavia & Ansaldo (Moshinshy, 2007, p12) - 
opened in Brussels during my evaluation time period in order to offer EU law-related 
services. Also reflecting past research, Wragge & Co’s new Munich office was 
launched with an intellectual property focus (Bousfield, 2008, p9). Additionally, 
various sample firms expanded – both domestically and internationally – into new EU 
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locations by combining with local corporate law-focused practices. These events 
included Ashurst’s arrival in Sweden via a merger with AJB Bergh, a “Stockholm 
M&A boutique” (Binham, 2005, p5), KLegal’s domestic expansion within Finland via 
its acquisition of Seppälä & Co, which was said to have “boosted its M&A capacity” 
in the country (Tsang, 2001a, p48), and Cuatrecasas Gonçalves Pereira’s arrival in 
Seville via an acquisition of Olivencia-Ballester, a “highly rated corporate boutique” 
(Moshinshy, 2005, p13). Indeed, on one occasion, the same firm – Beachcroft – was 
observed extending both its domestic and international branch office network for the 
same practice area-related reason. Domestically, the firm first expanded into 
Newport in 2009 by acquiring a personal injury firm in the city (Dowell, 2009, p7). It 
also expanded internationally by launching a Dublin-based practice which partly 
focused on personal injury work (The European Lawyer, 2009). Finally, in relation to 
industry sector-driven geographical change events, cohort firm examples include 
Tonucci’s expansion into Florence to service “Tuscany's large textile companies” 
(Gill, 2005, p6), Roschier’s expansion into Turku as part of its plans to develop its 
pharmaceuticals and biosciences capabilities (Parsons, 2003, p4) and DLA Piper’s 
Munich arrival to focus on corporate and TMC [technology, media and commercial] 
matters (Stewart, 2007, p6). Collectively, these examples illustrate the diversity of 
practice area / industry sector considerations relevant to my sample firms’ evolving 
EU branch office geographies.  
 
Besides playing a role in EU branch office openings, my legal trade press evaluation 
also indicated that some of my cohort firms may have retrenched geographically, or 
failed to alter their branch office reach, for practice area / industry sector-related 
reasons. For example, in 2005, UK sample firm DLA Piper closed one of its Dutch 
offices because “the niche focus of the firm's Rotterdam office did not fit with the full-
service capabilities of the Amsterdam practice” (Illman, 2007, p5). Also in The 
Netherlands, Dutch sample firm Van Doorne – then known as Trenité Van Doorne – 
demerged its Amsterdam and Rotterdam operations into two businesses, seemingly 
because the firm’s practice areas did not overlap in each location. At the time, the 
practice’s Amsterdam office specialised in banking and securities law, while 
Rotterdam focused on energy, transport, and logistics law (Cahill, 2000, p7). And, in 
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relation to EU branch office stasis, Dutch sample firm De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek (Cahill, 2001b, p1) refused to accede to the practice area rationalisation 
demands made by UK sample firm, and potential merger partner, Linklaters. 
Effectively, De Brauw placed the needs of its “market-leading domestic litigation 
practice” (Eyre, 2005, p45 - 47) ahead of its previously-intended desire to expand 
geographically. Finally, in 2002, Houthoff Buruma’s then managing partner, Michiel 
Wesseling, also cited the fear of being required to undertake a practice area 
rationalisation as a reason for not merging with Norton Rose (Parsons and Wilkins, 
2002, p12 - 22).  
 
5.3.2.10.2. Conclusions 
The evidence presented above suggests practice area / industry sector 
considerations were relevant to several of my sample firms’ EU branch office 
openings and closures during my evaluation time period. Therefore, I regard 
template code 1.2.2.2. to be supported. However, because the GaWC did not 
substantively explore this possible driver of large EU law firm geographical change, I 
have concluded that its research contains a notable omission.   
 
5.3.2.11.1. Internal factor three: financial considerations 
For the reasons stated on p80 – p82, the focal point of my investigation in this 
section is whether financial considerations might cause my cohort firms to alter their 
EU branch office capabilities in specific locations. And, in light of the evidence 
presented below, I have concluded that financial considerations did prompt several 
of my cohort firms to alter their EU branch office geographies. Thus, template code 
1.2.2.3. is confirmed.  
 
In light of Hennsler and Terry’s ( 2001, p287) findings that some legacy practices 
were less profitable prior to engaging in a geography-extending merger, I specifically 
sought examples of situations where the possibility of increasing partners’ incomes 
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may act as a “pull factor” for a geographical change event. Here, modest evidence 
indicating this eventuality was uncovered:  
 
“The merger between Clifford Chance and Punder Volhard Weber Axster will result 
in a 50 per cent pay rise for the German partners, The Lawyer can reveal. Punders' 
profits per partner are understood to be around £400,000 – two-thirds of Clifford 
Chance partners' earnings. But once the merger is complete all profits will be split 
equally across the three merged firms, including US firm Rogers & Wells.” (The 
Lawyer, 1999b, p3) 
 
Outside my evaluation time period, but discussed within it, it was also noted that 
“top” Dundas & Wilson partners were offered a far higher minimum salary when they 
joined legacy Garrigues parent firm, Andersen Legal, in 1997 (The Lawyer, 1998, p1) 
than they previously earned while working for their legacy practice.  
 
Conversely, in light of Aronson’s (2007, p802) observations that a period of 
restructuring followed the merger of UK and German law firms around 2000, I also 
uncovered examples of cohort practices closing their German offices for financial 
reasons, shortly after such mergers took place. Certainly, Lovells’ departure from 
Dresden was explained in terms of the two-partner office “no longer being financially 
viable” (Tromans, 2000, p7). However, simply being loss-making was not always the 
main reason why some sample firms shrank their German branch office coverage. 
For example, The European Lawyer reported that Clifford Chance did not close its 
Berlin office because it was unprofitable – just not profitable enough, in comparison 
with the firm’s other German offices. The European Lawyer noted that Clifford 
Chance’s Berlin office was 25 per cent less profitable than the firm’s other office in 
the country, due to its focus on low value real estate work (Eyre, 2005, p21). Again, 
this outcome would appear to lend weight to my previously-offered supposition, 
offered on p193 - 194, that – on some occasions – firms disregard client 
considerations when changing their branch office geographies.  
 
Additionally, an while, evidence supporting this point is modest, my findings 
suggested a possible link between financial considerations and market entry 
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strategies within my cohort – particular in relation to my UK sample firms’ Dutch 
expansion events: 
 
“After preliminary talks with local firms, in particular Nauta, came to nothing, 
Freshfields decided to set up an office from scratch. Chief executive Alan Peck says 
Dutch firms proved too big and insufficiently profitable for merger” (Laferla, 1999). 
 
The European Lawyer, meanwhile, reported that a merger between Lovells and a 
large Dutch firm would have caused structural difficulties, because Lovells was not 
interested in acquiring unprofitable practices. Lovells’ international managing partner 
John Pheasant told The European Lawyer that, by merging with a relatively small 
Dutch firm – Ekelmans Den Hollander – such problems could be avoided (Wilkins 
and Parsons, 2003, p16). Finally, and heading in the opposite geographic direction, 
press sources suggest the 2000 demerger of Trenité van Doorn into its constituent 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam-based entities may have been partly due to the focus of 
the former office on banking and securities law and the latter office’s "less profitable" 
specialisation in energy, transport and logistics law (Cahill, 2000, p7). 
 
Further illustrative examples of my cohort firms altering their branch office 
geographies for finance-related reasons are provided on Excel table SD65. 
 
5.3.2.11.2. Conclusions 
The evidence presented above – together with further examples offered on Excel 
table SD65 – suggest financial considerations drove EU law firm branch office 
change within my cohort in various different ways. However, in light of the limited 
evidence in support of each of the scenarios outlined above, I have decided not to 
decompile this overarching template code into multiple sub codes. Thus, template 
code 1.2.2.3. will not change in relation to the final version my template.  
 
The GaWC did not discuss the role played by financial considerations as a driver of 
law firm geographical change. Therefore, in relation to this issue specifically, its 
research contains a notable omission regarding the granular drivers of large EU law 
firm geographical change. 
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5.3.2.12.1. Quality control considerations 
The final Dunning-inspired (1989, p30) explanation for legal practice geographical 
change offered by the GaWC was quality control (Beaverstock, 2004, p165). In the 
absence of guidance from the GaWC regarding how this consideration might 
manifest itself, my legal trade press evaluation was aided by observations made by 
Muzio and Faulconbridge (2013, p900 – 901) and Segal-Horn and Dean (2009, p48 
– 49) who suggested, respectively, that internationalising firms may operate on a 
“one firm” basis, thereby allowing them to offer an “effortless experience” of “client 
facing consistency”. As I will now demonstrate, I uncovered several examples of my 
cohort firms explaining their geographical strategies in broadly similar terms: 
 
“Dr Thomas Gasteyer, managing partner of Punder Volhard [Clifford Chance’s 
legacy German entity], said: ‘We are convinced by the principle of the "one-stop 
shop' and are taking this course with determination’.” (Tyler, 1998, p1) 
 
“’The main reason we went into these [Central and Eastern European] countries is 
that we did not find the right correspondent firms there with the standards clients 
expected,’ explains Christian Herbst, a partner at Schoenherr in Vienna.” (Evans, 
2004, p31 - 32) 
 
Additionally, Wolf Theiss managing partner Markus Heidinger told The European 
Lawyer that his firm had decided not to service its clients via a referral network in 
Eastern Europe, because that was not what sophisticated clients wanted. By 
operating as an integrated practice, consistent quality could be offered, he said 
(Eyre, 2006, p42).  
 
 
However, I also uncovered examples of law firms instigating quality control 
procedure within law firms they were associated with, but not part of. In some cases, 
the instigation of common quality control standards were arguably part of a process 
intended to lead to a merger. For example, at the time the European Legal Alliance – 
which included Irish cohort firm Beauchamps as a member – was launched, “cross-
border matters will, at the option of the client, be managed by a single client partner 
and clients will receive a single bill”. At the time, legal press reports stated that this 
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alliance might potentially progress to a full merger (Cahill, 2002, p1). Conversely, 
while Salans’ previously-discussed alliance with Krupa Srokosz Patrya in southern 
Poland was intended to be “more seamless for the client”, Salan’s chairman Stephen 
Finch suggested that the development was not the prelude to the two firms 
combining: “At this time we didn't intend to open up a second office in Poland,” he 
said (Moshinshy, 2007, p9). Thus, it should be appreciated that quality control 
considerations may not merely prompt law firms to alter their branch office 
geographies – they can also be relevant to firms’ alliance capitalism relationships.  
 
5.3.2.12.2. Conclusions 
Having uncovered sufficient evidence to support the GaWC’s suggestion that quality 
control considerations may drive legal practice geographical change, I have 
concluded that the group has aided our understanding of large EU law firm 
geography. Consequently, code 1.2.2.4. will be retained unaltered in the final version 
of my template.  
 
5.3.2.13.1. Internal factor five: personal partner preferences 
During my legal trade press analysis I uncovered several examples of law firms 
changing their EU branch office geography in response to what – collectively – might 
be described as the personal preferences of firm partners. Only one of the examples 
I uncovered bears any resemblances to the suggestion offered by Løwendahl (2000, 
p156 - 157) – i.e. a firm might open a Madrid office because a UK partner has 
married a Spanish citizen, but then close it when the partner resigns. Here, the 
closest cohort example I uncovered related to Roschier’s closure of its London office, 
following the departure of its last remaining partner (Byrne, 2002, p94 - 99).  
 
More typically, offices closures appeared to have arisen as a result of team 
departures to rival practices: 
 
“White & Case has acquired the Prague office of Beiten Burkhardt Mittl & Wegener 
just weeks ahead of the German firm's agreed merger with the legal arm of big five 
accountant KPMG… The decision of the two-partner Prague office to join White & 
Case was due to a preference to join a US-led practice, [managing partner Jack] 
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Schiffer told Legal Week. ‘We are sorry to lose them and hate to see them go,’ 
Schiffer said.”(Tromans, 2001b, p6) 
 
“Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer is closing its two-partner Leipzig office….The firm 
was at pains to stress that the move was the idea of the German partners and not 
the English management in London. Frankfurt-based partner Burkhardt Bastuck 
said: ‘It was the Leipzig partners' idea.’” (Legal Week, 2001b, p6) 
 
“German firm Heuking Kuhn Luer Heussen Wojtek is taking on four partners to open 
an office in Munich. The move comes just two years after the firm closed its Munich 
office following the departures of 23 lawyers to PricewatehouseCoopers Veltins.” 
(Pawsey, 2002, p7) 
 
“Buruma Maris [a legacy compotent of Houthoff Buruma] closed its Rotterdam office 
in April following the departure of its tax group to De Brauw.” (Maiden, 1999, p43 - 
45).  
 
In relation to both the Beiten Burkhardt and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
examples offered above, it is notable that the affected firms explicitly explained to the 
legal trade press that the idea to close the office had come from the lawyers working 
in that office, rather than the firm as a whole. This explanation serves a point of 
comparison with my next, and final, driver of legal practice geographical change.  
 
5.3.2.13.2. Conclusions 
In light of the evidence presented above, I have concluded that Løwendahl’s (2000) 
suggestion that professional service firms may alter their branch office geography in 
light of the personal preference of partners has merit in the legal sector. Therefore, 
template code 1.2.2.5. will be retained in the final version of my template. However, it 
is accepted that the illustrative examples I offered each relate to office closures, not 
openings. Moreover, because “personal links” were suggested by the GaWC as one 
reason for some firms’ “idiosyncratic” branch office presences in Geographies of 
globalization (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p108), I have also concluded that the 
group’s observation has aided our understanding of large EU law firm geography 
regarding this point. 
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5.3.2.14.1. The role played by other law firms in legal practice geography 
In determining whether any element of my final template is complete, I am mindful of 
King’s suggestion that there should not be any sections of text remaining “which are 
clearly relevant to the research question, but remain uncoded” (King, 2004, p263). I 
shall therefore now discuss an additional explanation for law firm geographical 
change which appears to fall within that category, which previous legal profession 
research, including the GaWC, does not appear to have identified.  
 
One aspect of this explanation appears to be opportunism. For example:  
 
“Salans has closed its deal to take on the bulk of disintegrating Altheimer & Gray's 
remaining international network, handing the firm 57 lawyers, 13 partners and five 
offices in total…. It gives Salans five more international offices in Prague, Bratislava, 
Bucharest, Istanbul and Shanghai” (Legal Week, 2003, p1). 
 
Baker & McKenzie has acquired the three-partner Antwerp office of leading Belgian 
firm Liedekerke Wolters Waelbroeck Kirkpatrick & Cerfontaine….The move follows a 
decision by the majority of Liedekerke's partners in Brussels to spin off the Antwerp 
office into a separate entity.” (Legal Week, 2002, p8) 
 
Following the Enron debacle, lawyers at Caestecker [Andersen Legal’s Belgian 
practice] have voted to dissolve the partnership and join DLA, creating a 95-lawyer 
Belgian practice. This includes an office in Antwerp which focuses on the marine 
sector.” (Pawsey, 2002, p3) 
 
However, having reviewed all of my uncoded legal trade press data, I have 
concluded that my new template code should encompass events wider than simply 
“opportunism”. Instead, it should include a wide range of scenarios where law firms 
alter their branch office geographies in response to the behaviours of other legal 
practices. Within my cohort, this has often happened when one firm has terminated 
its alliance with another, prompting a change of branch office geography by the 
latter. Such a scenario occurred when Italian sample firm NCTM terminated its two-
year alliance with Ashurst (Freeman, 2000, p58 - 59) – causing Ashurst to establish 
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its own Milan office instead (Tromans, 2000, p3). Similarly, a year after Cerha 
Hempel Spiegelfeld Hlawati’s associated Hungarian partner firm, Szecsenyi Ugyvedi 
Iroda, became Schönherr’s new Budapest branch (Legal Week, 2008, p6), Cerha 
Hempel merged with different Hungarian practice, Dezsö & Partners (Phillips, 2009, 
p8), thereby re-establishing in the same country via a different delivery mechanism. 
To encapsulate these scenarios – and also the opportunistic scenarios discussed 
previously  – the final version of my template will therefore include a new sub-code: 
“firm responds to the actions of other legal practices” within higher level code 1.2.1.  
 
To a large extent, the above-mentioned template code overlaps with initial template 
code 1.2.1.8., which suggests competitive pressures or herd behaviour might drive 
EU legal practice geographical change. Therefore, as previously indicated on p208, I 
have decided to combine these two codes, while adopting the specific wording 
described above. Combining these codes also broadens and deepens its evidential 
base, which is now derived from all illustrative examples previously discussed. 
 
5.3.2.14.2. Section conclusions 
The above findings do not fundamentally disagree with the GaWC’s suggestion in 
The long arm of the law (1999) that competitive forces may drive geographical 
change. However, my findings indicate that some of my cohort did not simply alter 
their EU branch office geographies in response to competitive threats posed by new 
market entrants, such as accountancy practices or US law firms, as the GaWC 
suggests (p1860 - 1861). Rather, in some circumstances, my sample practices 
changed their EU branch office geographies in response to competitive pressures 
from firms they were previously allied with – which were often not US nor 
accountancy-linked legal practices. It is accepted that the scope of my revised code 
is broad. However, I also believe the code encapsulates geographical change events 
with clearly-identifiable common elements. For that reason, I believe the updated 
code is worthy of inclusion in the final version of my template.  
 
5.4. A revised template emerges 
One of the most striking aspects of my final template – shown on p224 – is how few 
template codes have changed, notwithstanding that much of the template was 
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originally formulated by reference to non-legal practice literature (in relation to 
geographical strategies) and AS law firm- focused research regarding to the drivers 
of geographical change in specific locations. Just one new sub-code – “firm 
disregards client demand” – was added, and two sub-codes – “firm responds to 
technological change and “firm responds in response to local infrastructure 
considerations” – were deleted. Finally, one existing code “firm acts in response to 
competitive pressures / herd behaviour” was amended, to broaden its scope. 
 
In light of the minimal changes required to the final iteration of my template, an 
obvious follow-on question arises: might my template also explain the geographies of 
other cohorts of legal practices, which were not included in my sample? Here, I 
suggest caution is required, for several reasons. Firstly, in relation to law firm 
strategy, at least one of my template codes is constructed on the premise that 
owner-manager democracy is the default form of law firm governance. Future 
research, conducted in other world regions or among different types of legal practice, 
should consider whether such assumptions are relevant to their own evaluation. 
Additionally, it is possible that specific factors deemed relevant (such as regulation) 
or not relevant (advances in technology) to my cohort firms’ decisions to alter their 
branch office geography may have been geographically or temporally specific to my 
particular sample group and evaluation location. It is therefore advisable that future 
research does not assume the explanations I offer will invariably apply to their own 
studies, or in the same manner. Finally, the nature of the source materials used to 
conduct my evaluation should also be considered: largely, the explanations offered 
are by the law firms themselves, as revealed in the legal trade press. It is therefore 
possible that additional explanations for geographical change exist, which were not 
offered in the source materials I evaluated. Future research should therefore not 
assume my explanations are exhaustive. In all likelihood, they are not.  
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Table 26: my final template 
This template has been formulated by reference to my literature review 
1. LAW FIRM GEOGRAPHY    1.1. FIRM-WIDE STRATEGY (Hypothesis ten)      1.1.2. Firm-wide orientation        1.1.2.1. Manifested by:          1.1.2.1.1. Orientation of firm's leadership     1.1.2.1.2. Orientation of firm's partnership        
  
   1.2. DRIVERS OF GEOGRAPHICAL CHANGE IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS (Hypothesis 11)          1.2.1. Drivers of geographical change which are external to the firm           1.2.1.1. Regulation     1.2.1.1.1. Firm receives specific permission to trade in location     1.2.1.1.2. Firm exercises right to trade in location     1.2.1.1.3. Firm decides to trade in location via "regulatory entrepreneurship"           1.2.1.2. Client considerations     1.2.1.2.1. Firm responds to actual client demand     1.2.1.2.2. Firm responds to anticipated client demand     1.2.1.2.3. Firm disregards client demand    1.2.1.3. Firm acts in response to geopolitical events     1.2.1.4 Firm acts to mitigate against organisational risks    1.2.1.5. Firm needs to interact with local services in chosen location    1.2.1.8 Firm responds to the actions of other legal practices          
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 LAW FIRM GEOGRAPHY (continued)          1.2.2. Drivers of geographical change which are internal to the firm    1.2.2.1. Legal systems advised on     1.2.2.1.1. Home state law offered     1.2.2.1.2. Host state law offered           1.2.2.2. Practice areas / industry sectors advised on    1.2.2.3. Financial considerations    1.2.2.4. Quality control considerations    1.2.2.5. Personal partner preferences  
5.5. Chapter conclusions 
Overall, my legal trade press evaluation has yielded a mixed outcome in relation to 
the GaWC’s research. In relation to my evaluation of hypothesis 10, my research 
suggests that large EU law firms do, indeed, have geographical strategies which are 
separate from, but related to, their decisions to change their branch office 
geographies in specific locations. Therefore, the lack of GaWC research into this 
issue represents a notable omission from its output. Conversely, my research also 
suggests that the majority of the GaWC’s more granular explanations for legal 
practice geographical change were supported, in light of the explanations offered by 
my sample firms to the legal trade press. Therefore, not only has the GaWC assisted 
our understanding of large EU law firm geography on this point, hypothesis 11 is also 
supported. More widely, my findings also endorse the GaWC’s novel proposition – at 
least by reference to existing legal sector research – that law firm geographical 
change can be driven by a multiplicity of different factors, which are nevertheless 
capable of being defined and categorised. It is hoped my findings prompt future 
researchers to look beyond the single causal explanation line of investigation when 
exploring the drivers of large law firm geographical change. Adopting a more 
multifaceted approach to this issue may open up new avenues of fruitful research, 
such as those previously indicated on p7. 
 
In terms of my own hypothesis testing, my findings have uncovered numerous 
commonalties between my various national cohort firms. This in, turn, supports my 
overarching hypothesis that limited commonalities can be observed. Those observed 
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commonalities include: the widespread existence of firms’ overarching geographical 
strategies and, within that broad concept, the repeatedly-observed manifestation of 
firms’ geographical orientations. Additionally, commonalities could also be observed 
between large EU law firms in relation to the specific factors that drove their specific 
EU branch office change events. Nevertheless, simply because I was able to 
observe several law firm leaders within my cohort indicating that they had 
geographical orientations, this did not mean that my cohort firm leaders could then 
be observed commonly articulating the same geographical orientations. Similarly, 
even those many of my cohort firms explained specific geographical change events 
by reference to commonly-indefinable explanations, the resulting manifestation of 
those explanations often then varied from firm to firm – for example in relation to 
“local” or “home” state law-driven geographical change events. Effectively, my final 
template has identified some of the key inputs driving legal practice geographical 
change. It is not, however, able to predict the outputs of such change.   





















 Chapter six 
 
Conclusions and possible future works 
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6.1 Conclusions 
Overall, I have concluded that the GaWC’s research has substantially aided our 
understanding of large EU law firm geography. Additionally, my own findings have 
added detail and precision to several of the GaWC’s observations, both in relation to 
the nature of law firm relationships with other legal practices, and also in relation to 
the reasons why law firms change their branch office geographies in specific 
locations. 
 
In terms of the GaWC’s observations regarding large law firm branch office 
geography, several of the group’s findings have been broadly replicated by my 
sample firms, notwithstanding our cohort differences. In common with the GaWC’s 
findings in The long arm of the law (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 1999, p1863) and 
explicit observations in Geographies of globalization (2000), many of my large EU 
law practices were found, in 2009, to have “merely have an international foothold in 
the globalizing law business” (p106). Also in common with the GaWC findings in 
Connecting Rhine-Main (Hoyler, Freytag et al., 2008, p1107) and Balancing London 
(Taylor, Hoyler et al., 2010, p1298) – notwithstanding our different methodologies – 
my cohort firms were observed clustering into a small number of domestic locations 
and, indeed, into specific common cities.  
 
I was less successful in replicating the GaWC’s EU-specific findings in A roster of 
world cities (Beaverstock, Taylor et al., 1999, p455 - 456), in which the group 
identified a number of EU agglomeration locations. In relation to EU global legal 
service centres, there was little correlation between those cities identified by the 
GaWC and my cohort’s 2009 EU branch office trading locations. And, in relation to 
world cities, my sample firms often coalesced into different cities to those suggested 
by the GaWC. More positively, my cohort firms were found to be largely absent from 
the EU locations identified by the GaWC in Global law firms as being under 
provisioned by global law firms (Faulconbridge, Beaverstock et al., 2008, p463 - 
464). Also positively, when evaluated longitudinally, the EU branch office investment 
and divestment locations favoured by my cohort firms between 1998 and 2009 were 
broadly in accordance with the GaWC’s legal sector-specific findings in The 
changing geography of globalized service provision, 2000 – 2008 (Hassens, 
Derudder et al., 2011, p2303). 
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On a broader geographical scale, individual firms within my various national cohorts 
could be observed operating distinctive “geographical schemes”, as suggested by 
the GaWC in Geographies of globalization (Beaverstock, Smith et al., 2000, p107 - 
108). This paper also suggested – in common with The long arm of the law (1999) – 
that entire cohorts of large law firms tended to favour trading in distinctive world 
regions. And, within the EU, the favoured “globalisation arena” was, according to the 
GaWC, Western Europe (p1873). My findings concur with both of these 
observations, with the proviso that I also uncovered modest evidence of nation-
specific cross-border EU branch office clusterings which were more regionally 
compact than the GaWC’s preferred transnational scale of enquiry.  
 
In terms of my cohort’s use of alliance capitalism to extend their EU reach beyond 
their own EU branch office network, my findings both support and challenge the 
GaWC’s observations. On the one hand, supporting the GaWC’s findings in The long 
arm of the law (1999, p1863), my findings suggest that, in each of my sample 
jurisdictions, a majority of my cohort practices used alliance capitalism relationships 
within the EU in 2009. However, the manner in which my cohorts did so could not be 
fully accommodated within the various classifications offered by the GaWC in the 
same paper (p1865 – 1868). 
 
In relation to law firms’ geographical strategies, my findings suggest the GaWC’s 
legal sector-specific research appears to contain a notable omission: that large law 
firms do indeed have geographical strategies that are related to, but also distinctive 
from, reasons why they alter their branch office geographies in specific locations. 
More positively, my legal trade press analysis indicated that the GaWC had correctly 
identified several considerations that appeared relevant to my firms’ evolving EU 
branch office geographies, notwithstanding that the majority of the GaWC’s 
explanations were offered speculatively. My findings therefore indicate that future 
researcher should adopt the GaWC’s approach, and assume that a wide range of – 
nevertheless definable – considerations are responsible for driving law firm 
geographical change in specific locations. However, my findings also suggest that 
such research should not disregard the relevance of law firms’ overarching strategies 
and orientations to their overall geographical configurations – a consideration the 
GaWC’s legal sector research has not appreciated to date. 
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Overall, these granular findings also support my overarching hypothesis – that 
limited patterns of identifiable patterns of geographical behaviour can be observed. 
Nevertheless, my findings also revealed numerous examples of national cohorts, 
and firms within those cohorts, exhibiting heterogeneous geographical behaviour. 
These heterogeneous behaviours included: the number of foreign offices operated 
by my cohort firms in 2009; differences in national norms regarding the number of 
domestic branch offices firms traded from; the extent of firms’ use of alliance 
capitalism; firms’ varied geographical orientations; and differing responses to 
common geographical considerations, even within common locations. We should 
therefore appreciate that, while specific overarching commonalities can be observed 
within and between large law firm cohorts in different EU states, we should not also 
expect all geographical behaviours to be replicated within and between those 
cohorts. 
 
Finally, my research has identified various EU legal markets in which large law firms 
were – and were not – geographically active. It is hoped this finding encourages 
future researchers interested in law firm geography to consider exploring a more 
diverse range of legal practices than large US and UK law firms alone. As my 
findings reveal, other legal markets, and the large firms within them, are often 
geographically expansive and also geographically dynamic.  
 
6.2 Future works 
A number of avenues for future work are suggested, which may build my specific 
findings. 
 
In light of my findings regarding the centrality of law firms’ geographical strategies 
and orientations, it might be useful for future research to explore the underlying 
motivations of law firm leaders for favouring certain geographical strategies, and for 
having certain geographical orientations. What causes some law firm leaders to 
develop their practices into substantial cross-border operations, while others chose 
to operate on a smaller geographical scale? Additionally, how do law firms prioritise 
which locations to expand into, when consideration such as client demand or market 
access liberalisation offer a range of alternative opportunities? Are decisions made 
on the basis of market research or rational analysis or – as some have suggested – 
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on the basis of a leader’s entrepreneurial spirit? Finally, what mechanisms do law 
firm leaders deploy win the support of their firm’s wider partnership, thus allowing 
them to deliver on their geographical vision? 
 
My research suggests law firms change their branch office geographies for a variety 
of reasons. However, what my research could not quantify – in light of the legal trade 
sources used – are possible hierarchies of importance regarding these various 
geographical change drivers in any given geographical event. It might therefore be 
helpful for future research to seek to quantify such hierarchies of importance, and 
establish whether any factors consistently dominate firms’ decisions to change their 
branch office geographies. It might also be helpful to explore linkages between the 
various factors I have identified. However, it should also be appreciated that, in light 
of the geographical dynamism exhibited by some of my cohort firms – both in terms 
of their evolving ownerships and leaderships – obtaining reliable data regarding law 
firms’ prior motivations for their historical geographical changes may prove 
evidentially challenging.  
 
Finally, my research method, which combines quantitative elements guided by past 
research, and qualitative components guided by template analysis, has indicated 
possible interactions between the various findings explored during the course of my 
research: for example, how firm’s branch office coverage may, in part, be influenced 
by its evolving relationships with its alliance capitalism partner firms. The nature of 
such possible interactions arguably warrant further exploration in their own right in 
future studies. It is hoped that my wide-ranging investigation into law firm geography 
may offer future researcher a useful evidential starting point for undertaking such an 
investigation.  
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